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I. INTRODUCTION 
The number of suits against federal agencies and departments has 
increased dramatically in recent decades. 1 Judicial initiatives and con-
gressional enactments in the late 1960s and early 1970s significantly 
weakened the traditional obstacles to suits against the government 
(such as standing barriers, sovereign immunity defenses, and 
nonreviewability doctrines) and have exposed an increasingly wide 
range of governmental decisions to legal challenge.2 Moreover, the 
proliferation of public interest law organizations since the early 1970s 
has meant that federal agencies are frequent defendants in suits involv-
ing "questions of important public policy."3 
Like other defendants, the federal government frequently agrees to 
settle suits against it with consent agreements or consent decrees. This 
• Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University. B.A., Cornell 
University, 1974; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1983. 
** Assistant Professor, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
A.B., Georgetown University, 1978;J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1982. The authors would 
like to express their appreciation to those attorneys who shared their court briefs and 
thoughts with them. Special thanks are owed to jim Bradke,Judith Ledbetter, Alfred Aman, 
and Robert Summers, for their thoughtful comments. 
l. In 1960, for example, federal appellate courts received 737 appeals from federal ad-
ministrative agency decisions. 1963 ADMIN. OFF. OF UNITED STATES CoURTS ANN. REP. 188. 
The corresponding figure in 1983 was 3,069. 1983 ADMIN. OFF. OF UNITED STATES COURTS 
ANN. REP. 101. In 1969, federal courts of appeals received 1,472 appeals from the district 
courts in suits of all kinds against the federal government. 1973 ADMIN. OFF. OF UNITED 
STATES CouRTS ANN. REP. 104. The corresponding figure in 1983 was 4,856. 1983 ADMIN. 
OFF. OF UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 103. 
2. For an overview of the trends, see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975). 
3. Two commentators have defined public interest practice as the activity of a "non-
profit, tax-exempt group that devotes a large share of its program to providing legal represen-
tation to otherwise unrepresented interests in ... proceedings involving questions of impor-
tant public policy." D. CLOVIS & N. ARoN, SuRVEY OF PuBLIC INTEREST LAw CENTERS: 
NARRATIVE REPORT 1 n.** (1980). 
203 
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practice saves time and effort for Justice Department lawyers, of course, 
and may forestall more damaging or burdensome judicial resolutions. 
But in suits involving "questions of important public policy," the prac-
tice has obvious dangers. It allows one administration to commit its 
successors to policies they might not otherwise have chosen. And it 
presents the risk that major policy decisions will be fixed in secret nego-
tiations with small groups of private plaintiffs rather than through the 
more open and accountable procedures of ordinary executive 
decisionmaking. 
Before the 1980 election, these dangers may have seemed hypothet-
ical. But that presidential election produced a sharp change in the 
political and policy perspective of the executive branch-undoubtedly 
the sharpest change since the early 1970s and, in the view of most pub-
lic interest law organizations, surely the most adverse.4 Consent de-
crees negotiated by the Carter Administration naturally posed 
difficulties in a number of areas for Reagan appointees. And public 
interest law organizations charged the new administration with failing 
to uphold the terms of some of these earlier agreements. Federal 
courts have thus faced a novel and vexing question in the last few years: 
Must consent decrees be enforced when they constrain the policy pre-
rogatives of a new administration? 
The range of policy contexts in which this question has come before 
appellate courts illustrates its scope and importance. In recent years, 
federal courts of appeal have considered the question in such diverse 
federal policy fields as environmental regulation, 5 civil rights enforce-
ment,6 federal mortgage subsidy programs,7 and the national security 
efforts of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI").8 Moreover, the 
agreements involved were not minor or peripheral, but controlled such 
fundamental executive concerns as the content of presidential recom-
4. The results of a 1983 survey of public interest lawyers illustrate the ideological dis-
tance between the public interest law movement and the Reagan Administration. See Lichter 
& Rothman, What Interests the Public and What Interests the Public Interests, PuB. OPINION, Apr.-May 
1983, at 44. The survey found that only 3% of public interest lav .. 'Yers had voted for Gerald 
Ford in 1976 and that only 2% voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980. !d. at 46. When asked 
whether they "approved" of the activities of particular public figures, the survey participants 
responded most favorably toward Ralph Nader and Senator Edward Kennedy (each obtained 
approval from 93% of the respondents). !d. at 47-48. Whereas 34% indicated approval of 
Fidel Castro, only 5% reported approval of President Reagan. !d. at 48. 
5. National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see notes 232-239 
infra and accompanying text. 
6. Women's Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This case was a 
consolidation of two cases, Women~ Equity Action League ("WEAL") and Adams v. Bell, both of 
which concerned the same amended consent agreement. Although WEAL is noted first in this 
discussion, Adams is the earlier case, and therefore we will use the case name Adams through-
out this article to refer to all phases of this complex litigation. See notes 213-231 infra and 
accompanying text. 
7. Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984); see notes 240-247 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
8. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984); see 
notes 206-211 infra and accompanying text. 
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mendations to Congress,9 the details of regulatory standards,10 and the 
timing and methods of ongoing executive enforcement operations.11 
In some of these cases, courts interpreted consent decrees of a pre-
vious administration to accommodate a new administration's concern 
for policy flexibility and to ease evident qualms about excessive judicial 
intrusion into internal executive affairs. But no appellate decision on 
the subject has yet offered a clear ruling on the underlying constitu-
tional issues raised by such broad ranging consent agreements. For the 
most part, the courts have relegated the entire responsibility for avoid-
ing burdensome consent agreements to the executive branch. The 
Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Local No. 93, International Association of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland 12 seems to endorse this complacent ap-
proach. The Court held that district courts may even enforce provi-
sions in consent decrees that they could not properly order on their 
own authority.13 
The problem with this approach is that executive officials often face 
powerful incentives to achieve quick settlement of disputes. Thus, they 
are not always reliable guardians of their own or their successors' long-
term policy discretion. Not until March 1986 did the Attorney General 
issue guidelines to Justice Department litigators prohibiting them from 
agreeing to constraints on executive or administrative discretion be-
yond what courts could order on their own authority.14 The guidelines 
single out a few aspects of executive discretion as properly exempt 
from judicial control and hence not properly constrained by consent 
agreements. 15 The brief memorandum presenting these guidelines 
9. United States v. Board ofEduc. of Chicago, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1116 (1985); see National Audubon Soc'y, 678 F.2d at 299; notes 192-205 infra and 
accompanying text. 
10. Ferrell, 743 F.2d at 454; Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984); see notes 342-347 infra and accompanying text. 
11. Adams, 743 F.2d at 42; Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1007. 
12. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986) [hereinafter Cleveland Firefighters] 
13. For fuller discussion and analysis of this decision, see notes 25-37 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
14. E. Meese, Memorandum on Department Policy Regarding Consent Decrees and Set-
tlement Agreements (March 13, 1986) (Internal Department of justice Memorandum on file 
with the Stanford Law Review). For an analysis of the guidelines' purpose and likely effective-
ness, see Jost, Commentary: The Attorney General's Policy on Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 101 (1987). 
15. The memorandum states that no federal department or agency should "limit its dis-
cretion by consent decree where it would assert that a similar limitation imposed by injunction 
unduly or improperly constrains executive discretion." E. Meese, supra note 14, at 3. The 
memorandum articulates Department of justice policy not to authorize any consent decree or 
settlement agreement that: (1) "converts into a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary 
authority ... to revise, amend, or promulgate regulations"; (2) "either commits the [federal] 
department or agency to expend funds ... that have not been budgeted for the action in 
question, or commits a department or agency to seek a particular appropriation or budget 
authorization"; (3) "divests the Secretary or agency administrator, or his successors, of discre-
tion committed to him by Congress or the Constitution where such discretionary power was 
granted to respond to changing circumstances, to make policy or managerial choices, or to 
protect the rights of third parties." /d. at 3-4. 
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does not, however, offer any theory to justify or clarify the enumerated 
limitations. The guidelines expressly empower the Attorney General to 
exercise discretion in permitting exceptions to these limitations in par-
ticular cases. 16 And, in fact, the Reagan Administration, like past 
administrations, has sometimes acted as if it recognized no constitu-
tional limits on the extent to which the executive could bind its policy 
discretion or cede its constitutional prerogatives through consent 
agreements. 17 
Despite the ruling in Cleveland Firefighters, there are strong argu-
ments against unlimited executive power to enter consent agreements. 
Some of the strongest arguments derive from the structure of the Con-
stitution, from the implications of leading Supreme Court decisions, 
and from long-established legal principles in federal administration. 
There are also strong practical arguments for giving explicit judicial 
recognition to such limitations. The troubling outcomes in the recent 
cases on consent decrees reinforce this conclusion. Neither the under-
lying constitutional principles nor the practical concerns behind them 
are adequately served by uncertain rules of self-restraint in the Justice 
Department. 
Because consent agreements are, in many ways, similar to contracts, 
we begin our argument in Section II by reviewing constitutional and 
statutory exceptions to the general principle that government must 
honor its contractual obligations to private parties. As our brief survey 
indicates, courts have always balanced the government's obligation to 
honor agreements against its need to retain discretion in broad matters 
of public policy. Section III relates these "public policy" exceptions to 
the policy prerogatives of the federal executive branch that are most 
clearly reserved by the Constitution. We argue that in relation to 
(a) executive recommendations to Congress, (b) broad spending poli-
16. A concluding paragraph, titled "Exceptions," states that: 
The Attorney General does not hereby yield his necessary discretion to deal with the 
realities of any given case. . . . [W]ritten approval of the Attorney General, the Dep-
uty Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General will be required to author-
ize departure from these guidelines. [Federal attorneys seeking such approval must 
provide] a concise statement of the case and of reasons why departure from these 
guidelines will not tend to undermine their force and is consistent with the constitu-
tional prerogatives of the executive or the legislative branches. 
Id. at 4. 
However, the memorandum offers no guidance as to what conditions would be necessary 
to satisfy these requirements and thus appears to contemplate broad discretion in the Attor-
ney General to approve such exceptions. Id. 
17. Thus, for example, in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F .2d 1117 
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984), the Reagan Administration asserted that 
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was bound by an earlier consent decree to 
adopt a particular scientific methodology in setting a water pollution standard. The Adminis-
tration maintained this position even though industry intervenors challenged the particular 
methodology involved as inappropriate, and the Administration conceded that relevant stat· 
utes did not actually require the EPA to adopt this approach. In this case, the Reagan Admin-
istration was quite content to "let its hands be tied." See notes 342-347 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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cies pursuant to general appropriations, and (c) ongoing enforcement 
policies, the Constitution implies definite limits on the remedial author-
ity of courts to control executive action-limits that the executive itself 
cannot waive in consent agreements. 
Section IV reviews five recent cases in which courts of appeals con-
sidered charges that the government had violated earlier consent 
agreements and in which the government, in turn, raised fundamental 
questions about the enforceability of overly broad decrees. In Section 
V we critique the ensuing decisions in light of the principles advanced 
in Section III. We argue that these decisions evade the underlying con-
stitutional issues and may create uncertainty and confusion regarding 
the status of government consent agreements. Finally, in Section VI we 
offer practical support for an explicit recognition of the limits on judi-
cial authority to bind the policy discretion of the executive. The very 
fact that executive agencies often welcome such impositions, we argue, 
underscores the danger to responsive and accountable policymaking 
from overly broad consent agreements. 
II. THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-AND CONSENT DECREES 
A. The Hybrid Nature of Consent Decrees 
The Supreme Court has noted that consent decrees "have attributes 
both of contracts and of judicial decrees." 18 A consent decree is like a 
contract in the elemental sense that it reflects the agreement of both 
parties: A court cannot enter a consent decree unless both parties con-
sent to every provision of the decree. 19 Like a contract, moreover, a 
consent decree binds the parties to what they have actually agreed and 
not to what they might have claimed or deserved under the law: "[T]he 
agreement reached normally embodies a compromise ... [where] the 
parties each give up something they might have won had they pro-
ceeded with the litigation."20 
Yet a consent decree differs from an ordinary contract because the 
court enters it like ajudgment on the merits: Entry of a consent decree 
usually renders the underlying dispute res judicata.21 Accordingly, the 
terms of the decree can be enforced, like any other court order, by con-
tempt citations for noncompliance.22 Moreover, because a consent de-
cree is a judicial decree, the issuing court retains the authority under 
ordinary equitable principles to modify its provisions, even over the ob-
18. United States v. fiT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975). 
19. See United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964). In Cleveland 
Firefighters, the Court held that court entry of a consent decree is not contingent on intervenor 
approval. 106 S. Ct. at 3079-80. 
20. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). 
21. lBJ. MOORE,j. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1j 0.409(5] (2d ed. 
1984) [hereinafter MoORE's]. 
22. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435,440 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) 
(Rubin, J ., concurring). 
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jections of one of the parties.23 At the same time, because consent de-
crees directly engage the authority of the entering court, they are 
subject to certain restrictions that do not apply to ordinary contracts. 
In System Federation No. 9~ Railway Employees Department v. Wright 24 
the Supreme Court ruled that a consent decree must be modified when 
there has been a change in the relevant statute because a court's "au-
thority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the 
decree is intended to enforce."25 This ruling seemed to establish the 
principle that a court cannot enter a consent decree that requires more 
than the court could have ordered on its own authority after a decision 
on the merits. 26 This principle seems sensible because the special force 
of a consent decree derives precisely from the court's involvement. 
The initial bargaining power of the parties in negotiating the decree is 
presumably limited by what the parties could expect the court to order 
on its own if they did not come to terms voluntarily. Thus, where one 
of the parties to a consent decree cedes more than the utmost a court 
could have exacted on its own authority, there are grounds to suspect 
that the decree reflects collusion between the parties or some element 
of distortion or misrepresentation by one of the parties.27 
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Cleveland Firefighters 28 adds a 
new element of complexity, however. That decision concerned a con-
sent decree settling claims that the Cleveland fire department had prac-
ticed race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. The decree pledged Cleveland to hire and promote minor-
ity firefighters, whether or not these firefighters had been personal vic-
tims of discrimination by the fire department.29 The firefighters' union 
urged the Court to invalidate this decree because it exceeded the ex-
press limitation onjudicial authority in Title VII that "[n]o order of the 
court shall require ... the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an 
individual . . . if such individual was refused . . . employment or ad-
vancement ... for any reason other than discrimination on account of 
race."30 The Court nevertheless upheld the consent decree on the 
ground that "a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a 
23. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). 
24. 364 u.s. 642 (1961). 
25. /d. at 651. 
26. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this proposition as recently as 1984 in Firefighters 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9 (1984). 
27. Collusion and misrepresentation are among the traditional grounds for refusing to 
enforce consent agreements. See Note, The Consent judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and 
Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (1959). 
28. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). 
29. See id. at 3069. 
30. /d. at 3071; Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). On 
the day that Cleveland Firefighters was decided, the Supreme Court ruled in Local 28 of Sheet 
Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC that this provision of the Civil Rights Act does 
not serve as an absolute bar to the ordering of preferential relief benefitting individuals who 
were not actual victims of discrimination. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). 
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consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than 
the court could have awarded after trial."3 1 
The majority opinion in Cleveland Firefighters conceded, however, 
that "a federal court is more than a 'recorder of contracts' from whom 
the parties can purchase injunctions"32 and accordingly reaffirmed that 
"a consent decree must 'come within the general scope of the case 
made by the pleadings,' and must further the objectives of the law upon 
which the complaint was based."33 More importantly, while holding 
that "the limits placed [by statute] on the remedial authority of a fed-
eral court . . . are not implicated by voluntary agreements," the Court 
still acknowledged that such an agreement could be entered and en-
forced by the courts only "to the extent that the consent decree is not 
othenvise shown to be unlawful."34 By its own terms, then, the deci-
sion in Cleveland Firefighters does not seem to overrule lower court deci-
sions invalidating consent decrees based on "the inability of a public 
officer to bind the public by agreeing to a consent judgment beyond his 
authority or for a collusive purpose"35 or based on "the inability of 
parties to effectuate an agreement void on grounds of public policy by 
making it the basis of a consent judgment. "36 
In sum, Cleveland Firefighters indicates that not every limitation on the 
independent remedial authority of federal courts necessarily implies 
exactly parallel limits on judicial authority to enter and enforce consent 
decrees. But the decision reaffirms that what parties cannot agree to in 
ordinary contracts, they cannot make binding through consent de-
crees. Althoughjudicial deference may be justified when reviewing the 
31. Cleveland Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3077. Three dissenting justices protested that this 
decision was an improper departure from the rule affirmed in System Federation and other deci-
sions. The majority opinion is also surprising in light of the Court's opinion in Sheet Metal 
Workers. Cleveland Firefighters could be interpreted as being restricted to the peculiar circum-
stances of civil rights disputes under Title VII because the majority opinion repeatedly 
stressed the importance of interpreting Title VII in light of the strong legislative preference 
for voluntary settlement of discrimination claims. The opinion in Cleveland Firefighters, written 
by Justice Brennan, refers frequently to the Court's decision in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), which held that statutory language in Title VII, seem-
ingly prohibiting preferential treatment or racial quotas, was directed at quotas imposed by 
government but not quotas established in voluntary agreements. According to Justice Bren-
nan's reconstruction of the legislative history, Congress, when enacting such limitations as 
Section 706(g), was "particularly concerned to avoid undue federal interference with manage-
rial discretion" rather than to establish a principle of nondiscrimination protecting white em-
ployees along with minorities. 106 S. Ct. at 3074 (citing Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-07) . 
Conversely, the dissenters in Cleveland Firefighters (Justices White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice 
Burger) read the legislative history of Title VII as intending protections for white employees 
as well as minority group employees. Recently, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. 
Ct. 1442 (1987), the Court relied on H'l?ber, holding that Title VII does not prohibit the adop-
tion of affirmath·e action plans by public employers. 
32. 106 S. Ct. 3077 (quoting 1B MooRE's, supra note 21, at ~ 0.409[5]). 
33. /d. (quoting Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880)). 
34. /d. at 3078. 
35. 1B MooRE's, supra note 21, at ~ 0.409[5]. 
36. /d. 
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employment contracts of municipal service departments, 37 contracts 
with federal executive agencies are, in fact, subject to some very impor-
tant limitations. These limitations are grounded in basic constitutional 
principles. Limitations on the enforceability and validity of consent de-
crees with federal agencies, then, are not simply a matter of particular 
limitations onjudicial authority of the sort urged in Cleveland Firefighters. 
Courts cannot enforce (and therefore should not enter) certain kinds of 
federal consent decrees, not simply because of statutory restrictions 
limiting the authority of courts to order the result involved, but also 
because articles I and II of the Constitution forbid executive officials 
from making such agreements. 
B. Limitations on the Obligation of Government Contracts 
The Framers were very respectful of the right to make and enforce 
contracts. Article I contains a specific prohibition on state laws "im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts."38 And while the Constitution as 
originally enacted imposed no explicit prohibition of this kind on fed-
eral actions, that omission was largely remedied by the addition of the 
Bill of Rights. Because contract rights are a form of property, they are 
protected against many forms of federal interference by the fifth 
amendment's prohibition on the deprivation of property without "due 
process of law" and on the taking of property without 'just compensa-
tion. "39 Given the evident concern of the Framers for protecting con-
37. There are a number of ways in which local officials can have a different status than 
federal executive officers under the Constitution. First, the Constitution imposes a number of 
structural limitations on federal operations, in the name of the separation of powers, that do 
not apply to state and local governments. The organization of county and municipal govern-
ments can, and frequently does, depart in numerous ways from the tripartite arrangement of 
powers operating at the federal level (and, with slight variations, in all state governments), 
without raising any constitutional difficulties. Second, federal constitutional law recognizes 
distinctions between the constitutional status of local government operations and state gov-
ernments. For example, the eleventh amendment guarantee of sovereign immunity-prohib-
iting suits against a state without its consent-protects only state governments and not 
county, city, or lesser governmental units. See, e.g., Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 118 (1868); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961). The 
courts have regarded these lesser governmental units as more akin to private corporations 
than to states for purposes of sovereign immunity. See Cowles, 74 U.S. at 122. Federal courts 
have accordingly disregarded state statutes that attempt to confine suits against these local 
operations to the state courts. See, e.g., Markham, 292 F.2d at 716. 
38. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Madison declared that "laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts are contrary to the first principles of the social compact." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, 
at 282 U- Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For fuller discussion of the importance attributed 
to this clause by the Framers, see B. WRIGHT, THE CoNTRAcr CLAUSE oF THE CoNSTITUTION 3-
26 (1938). 
39. In Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934), the Supreme Court held that 
legislation cancelling government war risk life insurance policies was unconstitutional because 
private claims "arising out of contract with [the federal government] are protected by the 
Fifth Amendment" and cannot be restricted unless "the action taken falls with the federal 
police power or some other paramount power." But since then the Court has upheld several 
retroactive restrictions on claims of federal contractors where some general public concern 
has been evident, even if not strictly within the traditional conception of "the police power." 
Thus, for example, in Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 
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tract rights along with other forms of property, it was not a very big 
step for the Supreme Court to hold, in its early celebrated decisions in 
Fletcher v. Peck 40 and Dartmouth College v. Woodward,41 that constitutional 
protections for contracts apply even to contracts with the government. 
Yet, the notion that government could be held to account in the 
courts for its contract obligations has always been somewhat qualified: 
During the debates over ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton, 
Madison, Marshall, and other leading figures agreed that the Constitu-
tion would not override the established principle of "sovereign immu-
nity" -the principle that governments cannot be sued without their 
consent.42 In 1793, when the Supreme Court allowed a holder of un-
paid state debts to sue the State of Georgia without its consent,43 the 
public reaction was so severe that the eleventh amendment was quickly 
added to the Constitution to reaffirm the claim of the states to sover-
eign immunity.44 The parallel claims of Congress to grant or withhold 
waivers of sovereign immunity for suits against the federal government 
seem never to have been seriously questioned.45 
(1958), the Court upheld the validity of a legislative restriction on the use of housing con-
structed under a Federal Housing administration-insured mortgage that had been issued 
without this restriction five years earlier. The Court upheld a similar ex post facto restriction 
on housing contractors in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). 
40. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
41. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517 (1819). 
42. The Court reviewed arguments from leading figures of the era regarding the contin-
uing force of sovereign immunity in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-
24 (1934). 
43. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Justice Iredell argued in a forceful 
dissent that the Framers had not intended to eliminate sovereign immunity. /d. at 429-49. 
44. The Chisholm decision aroused such ire in Georgia that one house of the state legisla-
ture voted to make a capital crime any attempt to pursue financial claims against the state by 
"compulsory [judicial] process." The eleventh amendment provided a more reasoned re-
sponse to the decision. See C. jACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
56-57, 47-74 (1972). 
The eleventh amendment, ratified in 1798, reads: "The Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State." U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. Read literally, the amendment might not seem to 
guarantee the defense of sovereign immunity for suits against a state brought by one of its 
own citizens. Yet the Supreme Court has offered a broad reading of the amendment. Thus, 
in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court ruled that the eleventh amendment over-
ruled Chisholm and restored the original conception of sovereign immunity. /d. at 12-14. This 
construction prevents states from being sued by their own citizens without state consent. In 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), the Court held that the eleventh 
amendment restored the defense of sovereign immunity to states in suits by foreign nations, 
even though the amendment only refers to suits by "citizens or subjects" of foreign states. /d. 
at 330-31. 
45. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia: "The universally received 
opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the 
judiciary act does not authorize such suits." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). The 
Court set out, with considerably more fullness, the scope of the defense of sovereign immu-
nity for suits against the federal government in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-84 (1855). The doctrine did not, of course, prevent 
suits against federal officials as individuals, but some suits of this kind have been treated as 
suits against the United States and therefore subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. 
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Even where the state governments or Congress waived sovereign 
immunity, which became rather common in the course of the nine-
teenth century,46 the concern behind this ancient doctrine did not be-
come altogether irrelevant. The business of government is not quite 
the same as private business, even where "the sovereign" is conceived 
as the agent of the people's will. Democratic principles exacerbate the 
tension between government's obligation to individual contract part-
ners and its obligation to govern in the general interest, for democracy 
presupposes that the voters can always hold government to account for 
its decisions and demand that they be changed. As justice Brennan has 
observed, "[t]he Framers fully recognized that nothing would so jeop-
ardize the legitimacy of a system of government that relies upon the 
ebbs and flows of politics to 'clean out the rascals' than the possibility 
that those same rascals might perpetuate their policies simply by lock-
ing them into binding contracts."47 
This problem was well recognized by federal courts, even in the lat-
ter part of the nineteenth century when judicial solicitude for contract 
rights and property rights was especially pronounced. One of the prin-
cipal doctrinal devices for limiting the problem dates from that era. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a sharp distinction between the police powers of government-
government in its capacity as sovereign regulator of otherwise private 
property and private conduct-and those governmental functions more 
directly analogous to private activity, where the state, as property 
owner, engages in buying, selling, or granting property to others.48 
See, e.g., Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917); 
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906). 
46. At the federal level, financial claims against the United States were considered and 
resolved by private bills in Congress until the middle of the nineteenth century. Congress 
established the Court of Claims in 1855, 10 Stat. 612, 13 Rev. Stat.§ 1049-58 (1878), to "hear 
and determine" most types of money claims against the United States (other than tort claims). 
But the court's determinations initially were not regarded as binding judgments and could 
only be enforced by the separate enactment of particular private bills in Congress. In 1866, 
Congress made judgments of the Court of Claims binding and subject to appellate review in 
the Supreme Court, 14 Stat. 9, 13 Rev. Stat. § 1059 (1878). Subsequently, in the Tucker Act 
of 1887, 24 Stat. 505 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (1982)), Congress enlarged the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims and bestowed concurrent jurisdiction on federal district and cir-
cuit courts for claims under $10,000. 
47. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
48. It was not, however, simply or even primarily in contract clause cases that the courts 
struggled to articulate and define the "police power." Before the Civil War, the police power 
was sometimes invoked in commerce clause cases, where the Court struggled to distinguish 
the regulatory powers necessarily reserved to the states from those matters of commercial 
regulation preempted by congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., 
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). The scope of the police powers 
subsequently became a sharply disputed issue in substantive due process cases as well, where 
the Court sought to distinguish permissible regulation from improper interference with per-
sonal liberty or private property. But even in these cases, the Court conceded that the precise 
scope of the police power could not be neatly or comprehensively defined. In Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), for example, where the Supreme Court struck down a ma'd-
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The Court then developed the doctrine that the protections of the con-
tract clause do not apply to exercises of the police power.49 As a logical 
corollary, the Supreme Court insisted that private parties could not 
evade regulatory restrictions by contracting with a state for guarantees 
against the exercise of its regulatory powers. Such contracts could not 
be valid, the Court maintained, because the police power cannot be 
constrained by contract. 50 
Thus, in Stone v. Mississippi the Supreme Court denied that a state 
legislature's grant of a charter to operate a lottery game (in considera-
tion of large payments to the state treasury) could prevent the legisla-
ture from subsequently prohibiting lotteries.51 The expectations 
founded on the charter could not be treated as a contract claim binding 
the state because "the legislature cannot bargain away the police power 
of a State."52 As Chiefjustice Waite explained: 
[T]he power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the 
government, no part of which can be granted away. The people, in 
their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preser-
vation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of 
public and private rights. These several agencies can govern according 
to their discretion ... while in power; but they cannot give away nor 
sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in respect to 
matters the government of which, from the very nature of things, must 
"vary with varying circumstances."53 
In the late nineteenth century and the early decades of this century, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine that states can-
not "bargain away" their police powers.54 As recently as 1977, in 
mum hours law for bakery workers for exceeding the legitimate police powers of the state, the 
Court nonetheless conceded that "the exact description and limitation of[such police powers] 
have not been attempted by the courts." /d. at 53. The Lochner decision declined "any at-
tempt at a more specific limitation" beyond the claim that such powers "relate to the safety, 
health, morals and general welfare of the public." /d. 
49. Contract clause doctrine was not developed simply for the sake of government con-
tracts. Some doctrine was necessary to reconcile the constitutional guarantee against "impair-
ing the obligation of contracts" with the power of the states to regulate purely private activity. 
Otherwise, a brewer might claim the constitutional right to an exemption from a statute 
prohibiting beer sales on the ground that the law "impaired the obligation" of contracts for 
the sale of beer. But the Supreme Court dismissed the claim. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887). Justice Holmes later articulated the principle more concisely: "One whose 
rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the powe~ of 
the state by making a contract about them." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 
349, 357 (1908). 
50. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664-65. 
51. 101 u.s. 814, 817 (1879). 
52. /d. at 817. 
53. /d. at 820. 
54. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558-59 (1914) 
(upholding regulatory limitations on use ofland granted to railroad by state contract); Minne-
apolis & St. L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1893) (upholding state law requiring 
railroads to build fences and cattle guards, even where railroads had contracted for right-of-
way without such conditions); Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. 
v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., Ill U.S. 746, 750 (1884) (up-
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United States Trust Co. v. New jersey, 55 the Court affirmed the rule that 
"the strictures of the Contract Clause" must be limited by "the 'essen-
tial attributes of sovereign power' necessarily reserved by the States to 
safeguard the welfare of their citizens."56 The Court's opinion noted 
that the "formalistic distinctions" on which this rule was based still 
"contain an important element of truth."57 
The doctrine of Stone v. Mississippi has its federal analog in the doc-
trine of "sovereign breach" or the "defense of sovereign acts." Since 
the mid-nineteenth century, when Congress created the Court of 
Claims and waived sovereign immunity for a broad range of financial 
claims, 58 federal agencies entering into contracts with private parties 
have been liable for damage actions for their breach of such contracts. 
But the Supreme Court has long held that "the United States when 
sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the 
performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and 
general acts as a sovereign."59 Thus in the classic case, the federal gov-
ernment was held not liable for breach of contract when a federal 
agency failed to perform its promise to deliver certain silk shipments by 
a specified date because the government had imposed an embargo on 
the wartime shipment of luxury goods. 60 Relying on this and other de-
cisions by the Supreme Court, the Court of Claims eventually formu-
lated the doctrine in these encompassing terms: "Actions of a general 
and public character, implementing programs in the national interest, 
are considered to be acts of the sovereign for which defendant [the con-
tracting federal agency] cannot be held liable in damages."61 
These formulations are notable for defining "sovereign acts" in 
terms that go beyond classic conceptions of the police power to em-
holding state revocation of a monopoly on slaughtering previously granted by legislative 
charter). 
55. 431 U.S. I (1977). United States Trust Co. was the first case in over forty years in which 
the Supreme Court found a state enactment to be in violation of the contract clause. 
56. /d. at 21 (quoting Home Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 435, 435 (1934)). 
57. !d. at 25. 
58. See note 46 supra. 
59. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925). In the most technical terms, 
then, the doctrine of sovereign breach may be distinguished from the police power doctrine 
under the contract clause: Where the former holds that certain kinds of contracts are neces-
sarily void from the outset, the latter defends government against charges of breach of con-
tract even where the contract would not be invalid in itself. But the effects of the sovereign 
breach doctrine are the same: Government may not be held to promises not to exercise "sov-
ereign" powers. At most, the government may agree to compensate the other party for costs 
incurred by the contract breach, but the other party can never enforce specific performance 
when broader government policy prerogatives are at stake. See notes 63-64 infra and accom-
panying text. 
60. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1925). 
61. Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1965). For 
more recent applications of the sovereign breach doctrine, see Pacific Power & Light Co. v. 
Duncan, 499 F. Supp. 672 (D. Or. 1980); Lebanon Chemical Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 
812 (Ct. Cl. 1984); Reynolds Metal Co. v. United States, 438 F.2d 983 (Ct. Cl. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971); Air Terminal Servs. v. United States, 330 F.2d 974 (Ct. Cl. 1964), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964). 
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brace a range of other "general and public" governmental acts. But 
the sovereign breach doctrine differs from the more recent doctrine, 
expressed in post-New Deal contract clause cases, that state govern-
ments may abrogate contracts, including financial contracts, when such 
an abrogation is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important pub-
lic purpose."62 In contrast to these contract clause rulings, the sover-
eign breach doctrine does not seek to define the extent to which 
government may escape from its contracts; rather, it limits what gov-
ernment may promise in the first place, given its need for ongoing pol-
icy discretion. 
Nothing prevents the federal government from insuring its contrac-
tors against unfavorable changes in public policy by including explicit 
contract provisions promising to "pay the other contracting party the 
amount by which its costs are increased by the Government's sovereign 
act."63 But the federal government simply "cannot make a binding 
contract that it will not exercise a sovereign power."64 In keeping with 
this logic, the Court of Claims (following an early ruling of the 
Supreme Court) disavowed authority to order specific performance by 
the federal government in contract disputes.65 The Court of Claims 
has also held that the government does not have the same obligations 
as do private contracting parties to refrain from actions that might frus-
62. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). In 1934, the Court in 
Home Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), seemed to loosen the traditional contract 
clause constraints. It then upheld a law postponing the foreclosure remedies of creditors in 
mortgage contracts as a reasonable state response to the economic pressures of the Depres-
sion. Rather than relying upon specific doctrinal exceptions, Blaisdell held that the constitu-
tional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts was "not an absolute one and 
is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula." !d. at 428. Subsequent 
decisions affirmed that contract modifications might be necessary to serve a variety of public 
purposes and that courts must acknowledge "wide discretion on the part of the legislature in 
determining what is and is not necessary." East N. Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 
(1945). See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965) (where the Court 
cites this principle \lith approval). But if the contract clause is to retain any force, there must 
be some limits on the kind of public purpose that will justify governmental interference with 
contractual obligations. And limits of some sort must also apply to government measures that 
abrogate contract claims against the government. In United States Trust Co., the Court sug-
gested that state laws impairing government contracts ought to be subject to greater scrutiny 
since the state's self-interest is involved. 431 U.S. at 26. Accordingly, while conceding that 
the state's purpose was proper and legitimate, the Court still found that the contract clause 
prevented New Jersey from cancelling certain guarantees on Port Authority bonds, asserting 
that the state might have adopted other means to achieve its purposes. /d. at 29-31. But 
where contracts are void because they promise something the state has no power to pledge, 
the state need not have any special justification for violating such non-binding obligations. A 
measure that violates an improper or unenforceable "contract" might be challenged as an 
improper exercise of state authority on some other grounds, but it certainly cannot be chal-
lenged for violating the contract clause. 
63. Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 (Ct. Cl.), cerL denied, 389 U.S. 
846 (1967). 
64. /d. 
65. United States v.Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889); Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 
(3d Cir.), art. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Carney v. United States, 462 F.2d 1142 (Ct. Cl. 
1972); Slobojan v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 620 (Ct. Cl. 1956). 
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trate the other party's performance.66 
A different approach to limiting government contract obligations, 
also developed in nineteenth century contract clause cases, is the doc-
trine that valid government contracts are to be construed narrowly 
(that is, in favor of the government) where their provisions are ambigu-
ous.67 With respect to othenvise valid contracts, the doctrine has little 
application in contemporary federal contract law.68 But several current 
doctrines in federal contract law (and related fields) build upon this 
traditional presumption against the acceptance of mere implied obliga-
tions by emphasizing the need for explicit consent to agreements from 
the appropriate governmental authority. 
One example of such a doctrine is the special limitations on federal 
financial contracts. The common law of agency generally treats con-
tracts made by an agent as binding, even where not directly authorized 
by the principal, if the other party to the contract had grounds to rely 
on the agent's authority.69 Governmental financial contracts, by con-
trast, must be directly authorized by Congress. If a government official 
does not have statutory authority to commit government funds, any 
contract that official signs is unenforceable, regardless of the other 
party's good faith expectations in entering the agreement.70 
Courts have developed similar doctrines limiting the force of agree-
ments with the government that are not formal contracts. Here too, 
equitable principles that apply in solely private agreements do not ap-
ply in the same way to the government. The general rule is that regard-
less of the expectation interests at stake, promissory estoppel does not 
run against the government to the extent that it does against private 
66. See, e.g., Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956 (Ct. Cl. 1965) 
(rejecting claim that government had violated an implied duty under construction contract 
when it pursued other construction projects in the same area, making Wunderlich contract 
more difficult and more costly to complete). The contractor "has no legal cause to complain 
if it is the sovereign that renders his performance more difficult to complete." /d. at 967. 
67. This doctrine was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Charles River Bridge v. 
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 419 (1837), where the Court stressed that in contract or 
grant disputes with "the public, nothing passes by implication." /d. at 546. In Fertilizing Co. 
v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 666 (1878), the Court reaffirmed that in government contracts, 
"[n]othing is to be taken as conceded [by the government] but what is given in unmistakable 
terms, or by implication equally clear." 
68. Early in this century, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that where federal con-
tract specifications prescribed the character, dimensions, and location of construction work, 
the government had given an implicit warrant that the contractor would be able to complete 
the project within the agreed-upon period of time if these specifications were met, even 
though such was not explicitly stated in the contract. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 
(1918). For a more recent decision holding that the federal government was liable for breach 
of this sort of implied warranty, see Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451 
(Ct. Cl. 1963). 
69. See, for example, the treatment of "apparent authority" in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY§§ 8, 27 (1958). For an extended analysis of the differences in this area between 
government and private contracts, see Whelan & Dunigan, Government Contracts: Apparent Au-
thority and Estoppel, 55 GEo. LJ. 830 (1967). 
70. See notes 71-73 infra. 
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parties.71 Good faith reliance on the assurances of government officials 
generally is an insufficient ground on which to allow recovery against 
the government when such recovery would not othenvise be forthcom-
ing, 72 and generally is no defense to a government enforcement 
action. 73 Prosecutors may be held to particular plea bargaining agree-
ments74 and lower courts have held that in exceptional cases, such as 
where government officials have actively misled a particular party, and 
failure to provide a remedy would create extreme hardship or injustice, 
promissory estoppel may lie against the government. 75 But the general 
rule, repeatedly reaffirmed, is that government policy may not be 
71. "[I]t is . .. well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms 
as any other litigant." Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (rejecting 
claim that Department of Health and Human Services was estopped from seeking to recoup 
funds improperly granted because the recipient had expanded its operations in reliance on 
this funding). The majority opinion, while noting that the arguments for such a view were 
"substantial," found it 
unnecessary to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which the public 
interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel 
might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum 
standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government. 
/d. at 60-61 (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist,joined by Chiefjustice Burger, filed a 
separate concurring opinion objecting to holding the door open to estoppel claims even to 
this limited extent and noting that in no earlier case "have we ever held the Government to be 
estopped by the representations or conduct of its agents." /d. at 67. 
72. In Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947), the Court denied recov-
ery to a planter who had relied on assurances of a government agency regarding the agency's 
coverage through a crop insurance policy, although the Court acknowledged that this repre-
sentation would have estopped a private insurance carrier. In Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 
785 (1981), the Court similarly rejected the estoppel plea of a Social Security beneficiary who 
had relied on the misrepresentation of a government employee and stood to lose twelve 
months of Social Security benefits. The Court left undecided whether the government would 
be estopped in cases where its employees' conduct constituted "affirmative misconduct." /d. 
at 788. 
73. The Court has repeatedly held that the conduct or assurances of immigration offi-
cials cannot be used to estop subsequent enforcement of the immigration laws. See INS v. 
Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 
308 (1961). 
74. The federal courts "have understandably drawn heavily on the ready analogies of 
substantive and remedial contract law to supply the body of doctrine necessary to order plea 
bargaining practices and to afford relief to defendants aggrieved in the negotiating process." 
Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1979). For recent cases supporting the 
relevance of contract law principles in assessing plea bargain disputes, see United States v. 
Mooney, 654 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mcintosh, 612 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979);Jones v. Es-
telle, 584 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1978). However, a key distinction between ordinary con-
tracts and plea bargain agreements is that the latter must be approved by the trial judge and 
"ordinarily neither party is justified in relying substantially on the bargain until the trial court 
approves it." 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 175.1 (1982). The Supreme 
Court has held that when the prosecutor fails to live up to one side of the bargain, trial courts 
retain broad discretion in deciding whether to order specific performance or simply to allow 
the defendant to change the plea. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); for a 
broader discussion, see Vanore, Criminal Law-Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements, 51 
N.C.L. REV. 602 (1973) (student author). 
75. See Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Local No. 120, 
Laborers' Int'l Union, 683 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1982); Michigan Wis. Pipeline Co. v. Williams-
l\lcWillians Co., 551 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1977). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Stan. L. Rev. 218 1987-1988
218 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:203 
bound by the mistaken or unauthorized advice or action of lower level 
officials. 
In contrast to the sovereign breach cases (or the state police power 
cases), the immediate question in estoppel cases (as in the unauthor-
ized spending cases) is not whether the government may bind itself by 
commitments to private parties, but who within the government has the 
authority to make binding commitments. But, here too, the ultimate 
question is not whether the government has good grounds to escape 
from the particular obligation, but whether the obligation was actually 
valid or properly binding. 76 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the federal government, like a 
state government or municipality, may still make legally binding and 
judicially enforceable agreements in a wide range of situations.77 So 
long as it continues to waive the bar of sovereign immunity to direct 
legal challenges, Congress may be prevented from enacting abroga-
tions of federal contracts or agreements in many situations. 78 But the 
doctrines that limit the binding force of government contracts do not 
merely protect legislative prerogatives or legislative control over 
spending. Thus, the sovereign breach doctrine in federal contract law 
applies to executive acts with as much force as it does to legislative 
enactments.79 So too, the doctrine against enforcing unauthorized 
commitments helps to protect the policy discretion of the executive, 
along with the spending authority of Congress. 
In sum, even if consent agreements were regarded as a pure form of 
contract, some types of consent decrees would still be invalid and unen-
forceable because there are independent limitations on the validity or 
enforceability of government contracts in various circumstances. These 
76. To prevail against contract clause challenges to laws interfering with otherwise valid 
contracts, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest. Mere fiscal concerns have been 
insufficient for this purpose. "If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it 
wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract 
Clause would provide no protection at all." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 
I, 26 (1977). In United States Trust Co., the Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey's need to 
cope with a $24.9 million rail transit deficit was not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify 
its abrogation of contractual commitments to public bond holders. See id. at 12-13. By con-
trast, in federal estoppel cases, the government may repudiate previous understandings, even 
if such repudiation accomplishes nothing more than the saving of public funds, and even if 
the amounts involved are relatively small. For example, in Heckler v. Community Health 
Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984), the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") was al-
lowed to recover improper reimbursements of $7,694, $32,460, and $31,326 that had been 
paid out over a 3-year period, even though the recipient had claimed reimbursements in hon-
est reliance on the advice of HHS officials. The difference is readily explained: The govern-
ment does not need to cite a particularly compelling reason to "take back" what it has never 
given up. The premise of the estoppel cases is that unauthorized assurances by government 
officials cannot be construed as binding commitments or genuine obligations to begin with. 
77. See, e.g., Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 389 
u.s. 846 (1967). 
78. See note 38 supra. 
79. See, e.g., Amino Bros., 372 F.2d at 485; Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 
351 F.2d 956 (Ct. CI. 1965). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Stan. L. Rev. 219 1987-1988
November 1987] CONSENT DECREES 219 
limitations are designed to preserve governmental policy discretion 
and accountability for actual policy choices. But quite apart from the 
limitations on government contracts, the Supreme Court has held that 
certain executive prerogatives must remain inalienable under the Con-
stitution. Such holdings suggest that limitations on governmental con-
tracts are merely particular applications of more general and 
fundamental constitutional limitations. We will elaborate upon this po-
sition in the next section. 
C. ]udidal Recognition of Inalienable Executive Powers 
The Supreme Court has frequently shown great deference to the 
policymaking responsibilities of the federal executive and, in some 
cases, has protected presidential policy prerogatives even against the 
contrary will of Congress.80 In such cases, the Court has emphasized 
that there are definite constitutional limits on the extent to which one 
president may bargain away the policy prerogatives of subsequent pres-
idents, even when bargaining with Congress. If there are limits on how 
much executive authority a president can bargain away to Congress, 
similar limits should constrain bargains with private litigants in consent 
agreements. 81 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha 82 provides one of the 
clearest examples of such limitations. In that case, the Supreme Court 
ruled that "legislative veto" provisions are unconstitutional infringe-
ments on presidential authority. Such provisions, incorporated into 
various legislative enactments, seek to give Congress the power to nul-
lify othenvise valid executive regulations or decisions by a disapproval 
vote in one or, in some versions, both houses. In Chadha, the Court 
held that congressional resolutions can never have the force of law un-
less "presented" to the president to sign or veto, as the Constitution 
80. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) . 
81. This claim may seem intuitively obvious: Surely, what may not be ceded even to 
Congress-which gives the law to the executive in so many respects-may not be ceded to 
mere private parties, who have no general authority or responsibility for the making of public 
policy. Is this reasoning too simple? If the separation of powers is regarded primarily as a 
check on excessive concentration of authority, could it not be argued that ceding executive 
prerogatives to private parties is, after all, less objectionable than ceding them to a potentially 
overweening Congress? Plausible as such doubts may seem, we believe they are misplaced 
and that the unqualified claim advanced in the text remains the soundest view. For even 
where executive prerogatives are originally ceded to private parties, the consequence is still to 
make them unavailable as a check on Congress. Moreover, the premise of the doubter's chal-
lenge-that the separation of powers is simply a device for ensuring the dispersal of power-
is, itself, too simple. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, the reservation of certain 
constitutional prerogatives to the executive is not merely intended to disperse power but to 
focus responsibility on the executive for certain kinds of decisions. See note 134 infra. This 
latter aspect of the Framers' intention, even more surely than their concern for dispersing 
power, would be betrayed by allowing the executive branch to bargain away its constitutional 
responsibilities to private parties. 
82. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
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requires. The Court was not persuaded by the fact that several past 
presidents have agreed to legislative veto provisions. The Court was 
also not swayed by the fact that President Kennedy had approved the 
statute containing the particular legislative veto provision at issue in 
Chadha.83 In effect, the Court ruled that the president's constitutional 
responsibilities in the legislative process can never be waived, even with 
the president's consent. 
Whereas Chadha emphasizes presidential prerogatives in the legisla-
tive process, other decisions, from Meyers v. United States in 1926 to Bow-
sher v. Synar in 1986, affirm that the president also has certain 
inalienable constitutional prerogatives in the administration of existing 
laws.84 Myers was a suit for back pay by a federal postmaster who had 
been peremptorily removed from office by President Wilson. The post-
master argued that his dismissal was invalid because a nineteenth cen-
tury statute required the consent of the Senate for the dismissal of 
postmasters, and such consent had not been obtained in his case. The 
Supreme Court did not dispute that the statute would have given Myers 
a legitimate claim to the continuance of his salary if the statute had 
been constitutional. But the Court ruled that the statute was constitu-
tionally invalid because it inhibited presidential control of executive 
policy. 85 The Court held that even if this interference with presidential 
responsibility had been approved by earlier presidents, it could not be 
binding on later administrations. 86 Othenvise, the Court reasoned, 
presidents would be unable to control their subordinates or to maintain 
"that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the 
Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive 
power in the President alone. "87 
Even those cases that have upheld limitations on the president's re-
moval power have stressed that such limitations are only constitution-
ally acceptable for the insulation of quasi-judicial functions, as 
83. In fact, every president since Herbert Hoover, the first president confronted with a 
legislative veto provision, has expressed doubts about the constitutional propriety of at least 
some legislative veto measures. See J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE 
POWERS 10-13 (1977). Presidents frequently suppressed their objections in their eagerness to 
win new statutory grants of authority when Congress would agree to such grants only with a 
legislative veto provision attached. Presidents, in other words, quite literally "bargained 
away" their constitutional veto power to gain other powers by statutory delegation. I d. at lO-
ll & n.24. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court gave 
little weight to presidential acquiescence to legislative veto provisions in various statutes. 
Compare Nixon v. Administrator of Soc. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (Court not deferential to 
past practices) with Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Court deferential to cus-
tom) and Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 200 (1981) (Court deferential to custom). See generally Glen-
non, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REv. 109 (1984). 
84. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 
(1986). 
85. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176. 
86. Id. at 170. 
87. Id. at 135. 
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contrasted with purely executive functions.88 Most recently, the 
Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar 89 strongly confirmed the Myers rule 
by striking down the delegation of budget-cutting authority to the 
Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman deficit control law. 
The Court viewed even the rather technical and highly circumscribed 
duties of the Comptroller General under this law as "plainly entailing 
execution of the law in constitutional terms."90 Accordingly, the Court 
ruled that budget-cutting functions could not be delegated to an officer 
like the Comptroller General, who is subject to removal by Congress 
rather than the president.91 
Where Myers and Synar struck down limitations on the president's 
88. In Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court limited the 
reach of the Myers ruling when it held that Congress could impose limitations on the presi-
dent's power to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). The Federal 
Trade Commission Act provides that commissioners "may be removed by the President for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). The Court held 
that the president's removal power could indeed be restricted to these causes in regard to 
FTC commissioners, notwithstanding language in Myers suggesting that the presidential re-
moval power must remain entirely unfettered. In distinguishing Myers, Humphrey's Executor 
stressed the quasi-judicial duties of the FTC and noted that the commissioners were not ex-
pected to exercise the general policy discretion entrusted to executive officials. The Court 
saw an FTC commissioner as "charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of 
the law," Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 624, and accordingly concluded that a commissioner is 
"an officer who occupies no place in the executive department and who exercises no part of 
the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President." /d. at 628. This reasoning 
was subsequently invoked in Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), in which the Court 
held that the quasi-judicial duties of the War Claims Commission implied a congressional 
intention to limit presidential removal power that, under these circumstances, was constitu-
tional. 
But the continuing validity of Humphrey's Executor is no longer so clear, at least as it applies 
to officers, like the members of"independent" regulatory commissions, who exercise powers 
beyond those of a quasi-judicial adjudicator. The district court ruling in Bowsher v. Synar ex-
pressly questioned the continuing validity of Humphrey's Executor, and the Supreme Court in 
Synar did not directly repudiate this aspect of the lower court decision. See Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 
3185, 3188-89. But see Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 
885-86 (3d Cir. 1986) (explicitly repudiating the district court in Synar). 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court decision in Synar raised different questions about 
the significance of Humphrey's Executor. In Synar, the Court treated the Comptroller General as 
an officer under the control of Congress, even though Congress may not (under the relevant 
statutes) remove the Comptroller at will, but only for "specified cause" (an arrangement that 
seems exactly parallel to the president's relation to "independent" regulatory commission-
ers). Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3189-91. The Court noted that in Humphrey's Executor President 
Roosevelt had not claimed to be removing Commissioner Humphrey for one of the specified 
causes of removal. /d. at 3190 n.8. The Court seemed to suggest that, had the president 
couched his decision to dismiss FTC Commissioner Humphrey in one of these statutorily 
approved terms, the removal could not have been effectively challenged. At the least, the 
Court depicted the parallel removal power of Congress over the Comptroller General as ef-
fectively unconstrained. /d. at 3190. For a recent academic defense of this position, see 
Strauss, The Plo.ce of Agencies in GovernmenL· Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 573 (1984); see also Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 
1986 DuKE LJ. 779 (suggesting that "for cause" removal limitations might well protect article 
II policymaking direction). For a more thorough critique of Humphrey's Executor, see Miller, 
Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 41. 
89. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
90. /d. at 3192. 
91. /d. 
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removal power, the Court's 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo 92 affirmed 
the president's constitutional power to appoint administrative officers. 
Buckley struck down certain provisions in the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act. These provisions vested the appointment of two of the six 
members of the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") in the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the appointment of two other members 
in the Speaker of the House. Buckley ruled that these provisions vio-
lated the express requirement in article II, section 2 of the Constitution 
vesting the appointment of "all ... Officers of the United States" in the 
President or in presidentially appointed "Heads of Departments. "93 
The Court's decision readily conceded that Congress was entitled to 
appoint officials charged with the sort of investigative or advisory re-
sponsibilities that might otherwise be assumed by congressional com-
mittees. But the Court noted: 
[The commission's] wide-ranging enforcement power, exemplified by 
its discretionary power to seek judicial relief, is authority that cannot 
possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Con-
gress. A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is 
to the President, and not to Congress, that the Constitution entrusts 
the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."94 
The Court concluded that the "administrative functions" of the FEC 
could "be exercised only by persons who are 'Officers of the United 
States'" and are appointed in the manner the Constitution prescribes 
for such officers.95 
These recent decisions clearly establish that Congress may not dele-
gate executive functions to officials who are under congressional, and 
not executive, control. Even presidential consent to such delegation of 
authority cannot cure the underlying constitutional infirmity. The 
Court's decisions leave open the possibility that Congress may constitu-
tionally delegate executive functions to persons who are altogether re-
moved from the control secured by the presidential appointment and 
removal powers, so long as such persons are equally removed from 
congressional control, as might be the case with officers appointed by 
(or answerable to) the courts.96 But there are strong reasons to think 
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
93. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2. 
94. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
95. /d. at 141. 
96. Congress considered such an arrangement for judicial appointment of federal prose-
cutors when it established the federal judicial system in 1789. Notably, however, Congress 
did not finally adopt this arrangement. Instead, Congress left the power to appoint and re-
move federal attorneys to the president. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 108-09 (1923). While the Court's recent decisions 
do not clearly prohibit such an arrangement, the rationales relied upon in these opinions raise 
serious doubts about its constitutional validity. Arrangements that vest powers in officials 
who are appointed by the president but are protected against presidential removal except for 
specified reasons raise further constitutional questions which have been examined by recent 
commentary and decisions. See note 88 supra. 
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that Congress may not constitutionally delegate broad executive pow-
ers either to the judiciary or to private parties, and that the executive 
may not make such delegations or subdelegations when not specifically 
authorized by Congress. 
To begin with, the separation of powers arguments advanced by the 
Court in recent decisions do not refer simply to the division between 
legislative and executive powers. The Court has stated that "[t]he Con-
stitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Gov-
ernment into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial ... "97 and "this system of division and separation ... was 
deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous and open debate on 
the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the 
operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power."98 Plainly, 
both the constitutional emphasis on tripartite division of the federal 
government and the delicate balance it creates would be seriously un-
dermined by arrangements blurring the line between executive and ju-
dicial powers. At the very least, the delegation of executive functions to 
the judiciary obscures the parameters of executive discretion in the im-
plementation of the laws. As the Court noted in Synar, it was precisely 
this concern that James Madison emphasized when he argued against 
involving Congress in executive branch removals lest this "diminish the 
responsibility we have in the head of the Executive. " 99 
On these grounds, we argue that the Constitution prohibits Con-
gress from entrusting the appointment and removal of executive offi-
cials to officers outside of the executive branch, including article III 
judges.100 But whether or not this conclusion is correct, judges who 
undertake such "administrative" duties are not exercising the 'judicial 
power" conferred by article III of the Constitution because article III, 
by its express terms, limits the judicial power to the adjudication of 
actual legal cases or controversies.101 Where judges are exercising 
their article III powers (that is, where judges are indeed acting as 
judges and not as extraordinary administrative officials pursuing some 
highly unusual administrative assignment) 102 the article III jurisdic-
97. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
98. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3187. 
99. /d. (quoting I ANNALS OF CoNGRESS 380 (1789)); cf. Young v. United States ex ret. 
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2148 (1987) (Scalia,J., concurring) (arguing that judicial 
power cannot extend to law enforcement activities, and therefore federal judges lack the 
power to appoint special prosecutors to investigate contempt charges). 
100. This conclusion is one of the central points at issue in current challenges to the 
constitutional validity of the Ethics in Government Act, providing for the judicial appointment 
and removal of "special counsels" to investigate and prosecute criminal charges against gov· 
ernment officials. See note 155 infra. 
101. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, d. 1. 
102. Judges have, in fact, performed administrative duties altogether removed from 
their exercise of"thejudicial power." For example, Chief Justice Earl Warren served as chair 
of a nonjudicial investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy. Justice Robert 
Jackson served as chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial. In 
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), the Justices of the Supreme Court refused to pass 
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tional limitation ensures that judges cannot intrude significantly upon 
the implementation of those statutory responsibilities that have ordina-
rily been entrusted to the executive. Beginning with some of the 
Supreme Court's earliest decisions, federal courts have acknowledged 
that article III precludes them from offering advice or direction to exec-
utive officials on the executive's duties under the law, apart from what 
is necessary for the resolution of actual disputes103 between parties 
with genuinely adverse claims104 in circumstances where the judicial 
decision is binding on both parties. 105 This constitutional limitation is 
an important barrier to excessive judicial involvement in executive 
decisionmaking.Io6 
But this jurisdictional barrier against judicial involvement necessar-
ily falls when an outside party raises ajusticiable claim against the gov-
ernment regarding his own legally protected rights or interests. 
Congress may invest private parties with new and enforceable claims 
against the government, as when legislation creates financial benefits or 
entitlements and a right of action against the executive to insure the 
receipt of those benefits. 107 Similarly, there is no doubt that executive 
officials can create judicially enforceable claims in some circumstances, 
as when the president grants a pardon, Ios or when an executive agency 
judgment on pension claims in their judicial capacities where the statutory scheme would have 
made their judgments merely advisory, although they agreed to offer advice in a nonjudicial 
capacity. 
103. "Congress may not, of course, require this Court to render opinions in matters 
which are not 'cases or controversies.'" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11. Chiefjusticejohnjay inau-
gurated the rule against advisory opinions in 1793 when he declined President Washington's 
request for guidance on the construction of a treaty outside the context of a particular case. 
See 3 H. jOHNSTON, THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF jOHN jAY 489 (1891) (Letter 
from the Supreme Court to President Washington, Aug. 8, 1793), reprinted in P. BATOR, P. 
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-66 
(1973). 
104. In "the absence of a genuine adversary issue between the parties ... a court may 
not safely proceed to judgment .... " United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943). 
105. The requirement of judicial finality was first emphasized in Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 409 (1792), in which the Court noted the impropriety of offering judicial determina-
tions of pension claims that could subsequently be reconsidered by the Secretary of War or 
revised by Congress. The Court's reasoning then and since has been that a non-final judicial 
determination is no more than an advisory opinion. 
106. For a recent restatement of the importance of article III limitations for the preser-
vation of the constitutional separation of powers, see Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essen-
tial Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 881 (1983). But see Nichol, Abusing 
Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 645 (1985) ("Separation of 
powers analysis simply cannot be applied to current standing doctrine requirements."). 
107. We have become so accustomed to judicial review of decisions disallowing or re-
scinding financial entitlements that it is useful to recall that even in this context questions 
were once raised about the constitutional propriety of the procedure. See Decatur v. Paulding, 
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840) (particularly the concurring opinion of Catron, J. at 518-19). 
Even today, Congress sometimes precludes judicial review of administrative determinations 
of eligibility for financial benefits, as with the determinations of the Veterans Administration. 
See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 2ll(a) (1982). 
108. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1872) (holding that no legislation 
can constitutionally direct courts to ignore the effect of a presidential pardon). 
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signs a valid contract.109 
If there were no limit on the creation of new claims against govern-
ment, however, then vast areas of government responsibility might be 
transferred to private claimants, subject only to such restrictions as 
courts might devise from case to case in enforcing such claims. The 
excessive judicial role invited by these claims would be the least impor-
tant objection to them. Most fundamentally, such claims raise ques-
tions about the delegation of governmental authority to private parties. 
Consider, for example, a statutory scheme authorizing "trade or in-
dustrial associations ... to enact the laws they deem to be wise and 
beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or indus-
tries."110 The Supreme Court dismissed such a scheme as "utterly in-
consistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of 
Congress" 111 and subsequently reaffirmed that "delegation ... to pri-
vate persons" is "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form 
.... "
112 Where Congress has instead vested responsibility in an execu-
tive program, directly parallel constitutional objections would surely 
apply to any effort to subdelegate this executive responsibility to pri-
vate parties. Further, where statutes have vested decisionmaking re-
sponsibility in the executive, transfer of this discretion elsewhere would 
flout the assignment of responsibility in these statutes as well as in the 
109. Contract claims are judicially enforceable only insofar as Congress has waived sov-
ereign immunity to allow the courts to review such claims. "The rule that the United States 
may not be sued without its consent is all embracing." Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 
581 (1934). However, Congress may waive sovereign immunity and authorize executive agen-
cies to make judicially enforceable contracts. "The United States are as much bound by their 
contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with 
all the \\Tong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State 
or a municipality or a citizen." Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879). Thus, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court refused to allow the government to repudiate land purchase contracts 
and stressed: "It is a matter of public importance that good faith contracts of the United 
States should not be lightly invalidated." Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945). 
110. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). 
Ill. /d. 
112. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). Although the continuing va-
lidity of the nondelegation doctrine has been questioned by some judges and commentators, 
others claim that it still has some force and it has occasionally been advanced as the basis for 
decisions. See, for example, the express reliance on Schechter Poultry Corp. in the Supreme 
Court's decision in National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 
(1974), and the respectful reliance by Justice Stevens in Industrial Union Dep't v. American 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 647 (1979). Moreover, the particular evil of delegation to 
private parties, emphasized by the Court in Schechter Poultry Corp. and Carter Coal Co., still elicits 
serious attention from modem courts. Thus, for example, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters and 
Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971), one of the most widely cited 
modem treatments of the nondelegation doctrine, a federal district court upheld a plan for 
national price control legislation in the face of a constitutional challenge. But the court em-
phasized that the legislation under challenge did not involve the "kind of delegation of gov-
ernment power to private groups that was involved in Schechter." /d. at 763. Further, the court 
noted in dictum that the price control legislation could not be construed as an open authori-
zation for the president to "delegate authority to persons who are not, at least pro tanto, part 
of a government agency .... " /d. 
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Constitution. 113 
Yet if the executive were free to create privately enforceable claims 
of any scale or scope against government operations, the type of trans-
fer described above could readily result. Consider, as an extreme ex-
ample, a contract by which an executive agency pledged to be guided in 
all its decisions by the advice of private consultants.114 If courts could 
enforce such a contract, then the agency could indeed be compelled to 
transfer all of its decisional authority to a private party or to a court 
acting on behalf of a private party. The ultimate consequence would be 
quite bizarre: Although even Congress may not prohibit the president 
from exercising some influence on an agency's discretionary judgments 
(as the Supreme Court's recent decisions affirm), the agency could, by 
contract, exclude any opportunity for presidential influence over its de-
cisions-and then have this exclusion enforced by the courts. 
Of course, this result would be precluded by the doctrines in federal 
contract law reviewed above. But considering such an extreme case in 
this larger context illustrates that limitations on the enforceability of 
government contracts are simply particular instances of more general 
limitations on the delegation or subdelegation of constitutional respon-
sibilities from their proper constitutional channels. 115 Viewed in this 
context, the contract cases suggest a theory of constitutional limitations 
on executive consent decrees. 
D. Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Limitations 
The Court's recent decisions in separation of powers cases suggest 
that Congress may not delegate executive functions (i.e., functions in-
volving discretionary executive judgments) to officials altogether be-
yond the influence of the presidential appointment and removal 
powers. And, as noted above, 116 there is an even stronger constitu-
tional argument that where Congress has vested responsibility for cer-
tain decisions in the executive, the executive may not redelegate this 
authority to private parties. 
These are rather formal principles, subject to numerous objections 
113. Presidential reorganization schemes, where authority is transferred from one 
agency to another within the federal government, for example, have required explicit con-
gressional authorization. Even where cabinet secretaries have tried to delegate decisionmak-
ing responsibility within their own departments, courts have raised serious questions about 
such practices. The courts have held that where a statute vests ultimate decisional responsi-
bility in the department secretary the secretary cannot delegate this authority. See Morgan v. 
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1938); KFC Nat'l. Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). 
114. See, for example, Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 
(1973), in which the Court affirmed that the Food and Drug Administration could not rely 
solely upon the recommendations of scientific advisory panels in carrying out its statutory 
responsibility to determine the efficacy of prescription drugs, where the petitioner satisfied a 
minimum threshhold of prima facie evidence of efficacy. 
115. See note 112 supra. 
116. See note 113 supra. 
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when viewed from the more "realistic" perspective of traditional prac-
tice. When a federal prosecutor strikes a plea bargain, for example, he 
or she is effectively yielding some prosecutorial discretion to the de-
fendant.117 Yet such agreements are not considered nonbinding. 
When executive agencies sign contracts with suppliers of goods and 
services, these agencies are, in a literal sense, forfeiting to private par-
ties some of the spending discretion they would otherwise retain. But 
again, such authorized financial contracts are not considered unen-
forceable by virtue of these negotiated limitations on executive 
discretion. 
If the formal principle prohibiting the delegation of government au-
thority to private parties has any force, we must be able to draw a line 
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of delegation. The prob-
lem is parallel to the question raised by the limits on the obligation of 
government contracts, or by the doctrine of sovereign breach in federal 
contract law. If all contracts with government could be enforced, then 
state governments might bargain away their police powers, and the fed-
eral government might be compelled to withhold the exercise of its sov-
ereign power. To avoid these results, the Supreme Court has 
prohibited state legislatures from making binding commitments not to 
exercise their general regulatory powers.118 At the federal level, execu-
tive agencies are similarly without power to make binding commitments 
not to exercise their basic policy prerogatives. 119 Executive officials are 
also without power to make unauthorized spending or enforcement/ 
nonenforcement commitments. 
By analogy with the contract cases, and by extrapolation from the 
presidential power cases, we argue that courts should recognize the fol-
lowing three limitations on the permissible scope of consent decrees-
limitations upon which we will elaborate in the next section. First, the 
executive branch cannot bind itself (or subsequent administrations) on 
its legislative recommendations to Congress because these represent a 
broad political responsibility directly rooted in the Constitution. Sec-
ond, while the executive may commit available funds to particular 
projects authorized by Congress, it may not commit itself to dispense 
funds not yet authorized or appropriated by Congress because such ac-
tion would preempt broad congressional policy prerogatives. Third, 
the executive branch may make binding offers of immunity to potential 
criminal defendants in particular cases or limit the reach of its regula-
tory demands on a temporary basis. But it may not permanently bind 
its own general enforcement discretion (or that of subsequent adminis-
trations) any more than it may delegate its decisional authority to non-
governmental bodies by contract. 
117. See note 74 supra. 
118. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. 
119. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text. 
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These limitations on delegations of power by the executive are 
rooted in fundamental constitutional principles. They are, in the first 
instance, limitations on the executive. Where they apply, however, they 
must also be binding on the judiciary, because courts are bound to up-
hold such limitations on the executive power. This reasoning remains 
unaffected by the recent holding in Cleveland Firefighters. 12° For even if, 
as this holding suggests, statutory limitations on judicial authority do 
not always require parallel limitations on the authority of courts to 
enter or enforce consent decrees, the courts may not allow the execu-
tive to do through the medium of consent decree what the executive 
could not properly do otherwise. 
Courts may have erred by inadvertently entering decrees that prom-
ise more than the executive has the constitutional authority to promise. 
Such mistakes are rather easily made when neither party to the agree-
ment has any incentive to remind the court of the limitations involved. 
But where such mistakes are made, it is compounding error for courts 
to enforce the agreement when the executive seeks to repudiate the 
decree and reassert its independent constitutional responsibility for 
making public policy. The best way to minimize the unfairness of the 
repudiation to the other party is to make clear in advance which kinds 
of government commitments will not be enforceable. 
Ill. EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILmES THAT MAY NoT BE 
BARGAINED AWAY 
"Executive power" is the power to execute the laws. This power 
may seem inherently subordinate to the legislative power, the power to 
make and unmake the laws, including the laws that finance executive 
operations.121 The executive power may also seem subordinate to the 
judicial power, insofar as the judicial power is conceived as the power 
120. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. 
121. As Locke stated: "[T]he legislative is the Supreme Power. For what can give laws 
to another must needs be superior to him .... " Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original 
Extent and End of Civil Government, in SociAL CoNTRAcr 88 (1960) (3d ed. 1698). Locke, how-
ever, advanced broad claims for independent executive action in identifYing a residual power 
in the executive "to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription 
of the law .... " Id. at 95. Madison, in the Federalist No. 51, acknowledged forthrightly that 
"[i]n republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates" but went on 
to urge the importance of constitutional guarantees of executive independence. THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 51, at 322 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). As a practical matter, executive 
power in the British monarchy was, by the eighteenth century, broadly accountable to the 
House of Commons because the Commons retained the power of the purse. The Founders 
were well aware of both the strength and source of this parliamentary power. The Constitu-
tion's prohibition against diminishing or increasing the chief executive's salary during the 
presidential term, U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7, was devised to prevent the most blatant kind 
of fiscal assault on executive independence. But legislative control over appropriations obvi-
ously continues to provide a very potent mechanism for influencing and restricting the activi-
ties of executive departments because the departments have no similar protection against 
having their appropriations reduced or restricted. 
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to "say what the law is." 12 2 But the Constitution plainly reserves a sub-
stantial independent role for the executive. 
Statutes may define and direct particular executive duties in consid-
erable detail, but there usually remains substantial discretion between 
statutorily conferred powers and statutorily required actions. In some 
areas, the Constitution ensures that some discretion will remain, as the 
prohibition on bills of attainder in article Jl 23 and the due process guar-
antee of the fifth amendment124 preclude overly particularized enforce-
ment directives. The Constitution also provides a far broader, if more 
indirect, protection for executive discretion by giving the president a 
significant role in the legislative process. 125 Once laws are duly 
enacted, the Constitution provides safeguards for their independent 
execution by requiring that at least the "heads" of executive "depart-
ments" be appointed by the president126 and that the power of remov-
ing executive branch appointees remain with the president or the 
122. The phrase is, of course, from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803), a case that dealt with judicial control over executive conduct. In fact, President jeffer-
son, who criticized Marbury's assertion of the power of courts to review the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments, was equally critical of MarbuT)' 's claim to bind the executive to judicial 
interpretations of the law. President jefferson's view, although not altogether implausible in 
itself, would have implied a very different system than the one we have chosen. See XII THE 
WoRKS OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 138-39 (P.L. Forded. 1905). See generally Monaghan, Marbury 
and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. I (1983). 
123. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Taken literally, the prohibition on bills of attainder 
might be regarded as prohibiting only a legislative enactment specifying a particular penalty 
for a particular person, but not perhaps an enactment directing the executive to prosecute a 
particular offender through the courts. But even the lesser expedient of directing the execu-
tive to withdraw financial benefits from a restricted class of persons has been treated as the 
constitutional equivalent of a bill of attainder. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 
(1946). 
124. U.S. CoNST. amend. V, cl. 3. The due process guarantee of the fifth amendment 
has been understood to contain an equal protection component, prohibiting legislation that 
singles out identified groups even for purposes of restricting funding. See, e.g., United States 
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). There is an even stronger argument for 
applying this reasoning to protect narrow groups from being singled out for prosecution. 
125. The most important guarantee of presidential influence in the legislative process is, 
of course, the president's qualified veto power, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. Alexander Ham-
ilton defended this prO\ision by emphasizing the "propensity of the legislative department to 
intrude upon the rights and to absorb the powers of the other departments" and the conse-
quent "necessity of furnishing each [department or branch of the government] with constitu-
tional arms for its own defense." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 
1961). Without a veto power over legislation, the president "might gradually be stripped of 
his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote." Id. But the same 
discussion goes on to note that the veto power "not only serves as a shield to the Executive, 
but it furnishes an additional security against the enactment of improper laws" and is "calcu-
lated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse 
unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority" in Congress. Id. at 
443. 
126. "Officers of the United States" are made subject to confirmation by the Senate, 
while the appointment of"inferior Officers"-a term not defined-may be vested directly and 
entirely "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments," as 
"Congress may by law" determine. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. While Congress may not 
directly participate in these appointing powers, statutes have often limited eligibility for ap-
pointment by imposing certain required qualifications. Whether it is constitutional for Con-
gress to impose such statutory limitations on nominees to be "Officers of the United States" is 
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president's subordinates. 127 Finally, while the scope of executive dis-
cretion under any particular statute may be restricted by judicial con-
struction of ambiguous statutory provisions, the Constitution assures 
that the judiciary cannot exercise an unlimited supervisory authority 
over executive operations by restricting the judicial power to actual 
cases or controversies presenting justiciable questions of law. 128 
The executive power conferred by the Constitution is thus a com-
plex hybrid, in some respects definitely subordinate to other powers, in 
other respects emphatically independent. Paradoxical as it may seem, it 
is the subordination of the executive as much as its independence that 
requires definite limits on the extent to which the executive may cede 
its own discretion in consent decrees. These limits are easier to discern 
if executive power is examined in its different contexts. 
A. Legislative and Budgetary Recommendations 
The Constitution guarantees the president a large role in legislative 
decisionmaking (including decisionmaking on appropriations). In the 
first place, the Constitution requires that the president "give to the 
Congress Information of the State of the Union and recommend to 
their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and ex-
pedient .... " 129 More importantly, the Constitution gives the presi-
dent a qualified veto over legislation, 130 allowing the president to force 
Congress to pay heed to the president's views on what is unnecessary 
or inexpedient. As the president's veto power is coextensive with the 
congressional power to legislate, the power to "recommend" must be 
equally sweeping. The Framers clearly regarded these separately enu-
merated powers as mutually supporting aspects of an ongoing legisla-
tive role for the president. 13 1 
perhaps a moot point given the Senate's power to refuse its consent for such appointments on 
a case-by-case basis. 
127. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 173-74 (1926); Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 
3188 (1986) (emphasizing that Congress may not participate in the removal of executive of-
ficers except by impeachment). 
128. See notes 103-106 supra. 
129. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3. 
130. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
131. Even the spare text of the Constitution suggests the connection between the presi-
dent's veto power and the more general presidential power to advise Congress on legislation. 
Article I, section 7 presents the veto power not as a mere mechanical obstacle, but quite 
specifically as a device for highlighting presidential policy views on emerging legislation: If 
the president does not "approve" a bill passed by Congress, the Constitution directs that "he 
shall return it, with his Objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall 
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it." U.S. CoNST. art. 
I, § 7, cl. 2. The Constitution does not require the president to propose specific legislative 
alternatives where he does not "approve" a bill as submitted, but many of the Framers plainly 
hoped the veto power would guarantee the president a substantial advisory role in legislative 
deliberation and drafting. 
The presidential veto power, as it now appears in the Constitution, is the institutional 
residue of a more ambitious proposal, repeatedly urged by Madison, Wilson, and other lead-
ing figures at the Constitutional Convention, to associate the president with several members 
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INS v. Chadha 132 establishes that the president's power to influence 
legislative policy is coextensive with the congressional power to legis-
late. In Chadha, the Supreme Court struck dovm the legislative veto 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.133 This pro-
vision purported to grant either house of Congress the authority to 
of the judiciary in a "Council of Revision" to urge changes in legislative bills. On the appeal 
of this proposal, see C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, at 40, 81-90, 
125-27, 171-73 (1969). This scheme was finally rejected for involving the judges too closely 
in policy matters. But Elbridge Gerry captured some of the hopes behind this proposal in 
urging an alternative approach less vulnerable to this charge: "A better expedient for cor-
recting the laws would be to appoint ... a person or persons of proper skill to draw bills for 
the Legislature." II 1\l. FARRAND, THE REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 75 
(1937). 
Article II, section 3 mentions the president's authority to recommend measures to Con-
gress immediately after assigning to the president the duty to give information on the state of 
the union. But this ju.xtaposition was not intended by the Framers to limit the presidential 
power to recommend measures to the context of giving information on the state of the union. 
In earlier drafts of the Constitution, these presidential responsibilities were actually conferred 
by two distinct clauses, separated by a semicolon, with the discretionary character of the 
power to "recommend" emphasized by the separate wording "he may recommend." See id. at 
185. The current wording was proposed by Gouverneur Morris, persistent advocate of a 
stronger executive power, "in order to make it the duty of the president to recommend, & 
thence to prevent umbrage or cavil at his doing it." ld. at 405 (emphasis in original). THE 
FEDERAUST No. 77, at 463 (Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961), returned to listing these as sepa-
rate "powers of the executive . . . comprehended in giving information to Congress of the 
state of the Union; in recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge 
expedient .... " President Washington began the custom of serving the constitutional duty to 
"give to Congress Information of the State of the Union" with a special, formal address at the 
end of each year. But Washington's First Inaugural spoke of "the duty of the President to 
recommend ... such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," without referring 
to the giving of "information of the State of the Union." I RICHARDSON, A CoMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 52 (1896). And President Washington did not 
hesitate to recommend measures to Congress outside the context of his annual address on the 
state of the union. See, e.g., id. at 60 (urging legislation to establish "some uniform and effec-
tive system for the militia"); id. at 149 (urging legislation to establish a special office for public 
supplies in the War Department). 
Thach's study of the original constitutional debates on the presidency concluded that 
most of the Framers held to a "latitudinarian view of the President's veto power" because they 
hoped the president's legislative role would help "to prevent the enactment of unwise poli-
cies." And "(e]ven nith respect to the President's positive power to initiate legislation [by 
exercising his power to recommend], there is no reason to believe," Thach concluded, "that 
the same liberal interpretations [of presidential authority] were not held by many." Thach, 
supra at 171-72. The Supreme Court's Chadha decision suggests that the presidential veto 
power must be coextensive nith the congressional power to legislate. Giving a narrower 
scope for the power to recommend than for the qualified veto power would invite the bizarre 
conclusion that the president may veto any bill that emerges from Congress, but may not 
always give Congress advance warning of an intention to veto, or may not always try to fore-
stall a veto by proposing better alternatives. Giving a narrower scope to the power to recom-
mend than to the power to veto also appears to reverse the nearly universal estimate of the 
relative importance of these powers at the time of the ratification debates. The presidential 
veto power was much criticized by opponents of the Constitution. But, regarding the power 
to recommend, as THE FEDERALIST No. 77 noted, "no objection has been made .... " THE 
FEDERAUST No. 77, at 463 (Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961). We find it difficult to conceive of 
the reasoning that would restrict the power to recommend, which "could [not] possibly admit 
of any [objection]," id., while conceding that the weightier and more controversial veto power 
must remain unfettered. 
132. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
133. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). 
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overrule decisions of the Attorney General suspending individual de-
portation orders of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The 
constitutional flaw in this arrangement, the Court explained, was that 
congressional resolutions were accorded the force of law-in this case, 
compelling the deportation of particular aliens-without opportunity 
for a presidential veto. 134 Even though the congressional determina-
tions involved were as narrow in focus as the fate of particular individu-
als, the Court held that the president must be afforded an opportunity 
to exercise a veto over these determinations. 
If the president's veto power must remain unfettered, even down to 
this level of detail, then his power to "recommend" must remain 
equally unfettered. Put otherwise, if the president may not "bargain 
away" his veto power to Congress even on such particularized determi-
nations, it is hardly conceivable that he may "bargain away" his power 
to recommend. It then must follow that consent decrees can never 
bind the president's power to veto or to recommend legislative meas-
ures, for the president's subordinates in the executive branch cannot 
134. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-54. The violation of the constitutional requirement that 
bills be "presented to the President" for approval was not the Court's only objection to the 
legislative veto provision at issue in Chadha. The Court also found fault with the arrangement 
for violating the requirement that bills be enacted by both houses of Congress before assuming 
the force oflaw. ld. at 948-51. But the decision affords no basis for the supposition that the 
Court was less concerned about the presentment requirement than the bicameralism require-
ment. On the contrary, the Court emphasized the president's distinctive claims to participa-
tion in the legislative process. It noted that the Framers "considered" the presentment 
requirement to be "so imperative that [they] took special pains to assure [it] could not be 
circumvented." /d. at 947. And the Court took "special pains" of its own to defend this 
requirement. Rather than depicting the presentment requirement as merely another mechan-
ical obstacle to impulsive legislative action, akin to the requirement for bicameral agreement, 
the Court described presentment of bills to the president as a device to "serve the important 
purpose of assuring that a 'national' perspective is grafted on the legislative process ... [be-
cause] 'at some times, on some subjects ... the President elected by all the people is rather 
more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose 
constituents are local and not countrywide ... .' " /d. at 948 (quoting Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926)). Moreover, the Court classified the administrative decisions at issue 
in Chadha-decisions by the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of particular 
aliens-as "Executive action" or "the Executive's administration of the laws," disdaining to 
embrace ambiguous compromise terms like "quasi-legislative.'' /d. at 953 n.16. This classifi-
cation of the decisions as "executive" bolstered the Court's claim that the presentment clause 
was an essential safeguard of executive prerogatives against legislative encroachment. /d. at 
947. However, this classification complicated the Court's argument that attempts by either 
house of Congress to overturn a deportation decision were, after all, exercises of legislative 
power, violating the constitutionally mandated procedure for legislative action. 
Curiously enough, even Justice White's dissenting opinion, while seeking to defend the 
propriety of legislative vetos in some settings, did not treat the presentment issue as secon-
dary or peripheral to the bicameralism issue. Indeed, the dissent suggested that a scheme 
allowing Congress to veto executive actions by the concurrent resolution of both houses-
which would seem to satisfy the bicameralism objection-would not be more constitutionally 
acceptable than a one-house veto arrangement, but actually less so. /d. at 997 (White, J., 
dissenting). See also Fellows, Congressional Oversight Through Legislative Veto After INS v. Chadha, 
69 CoRNELL L. REv. 1244, 1255-58 (1984) (student author) (arguing that presentment hold-
ing is central to Chadha ruling). 
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bargain away a presidential prerogative which the president cannot bar-
gain away. 
Does this mean that the president remains free to exercise his veto 
power or his power to recommend legislation even with the specific aim 
of creating obstacles to the implementation of a particular consent 
decree? The answer must be yes. A legislative measure with no other 
purpose than the restriction of the government's contractual obliga-
tions would probably violate the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.135 In certain rare circumstances, similar constitutional 
objections might be raised against legislative measures specifically 
designed to frustrate the implementation of consent decrees.136 But 
even in such cases, the objection would lie against the enacted measure, 
not against the recommendation or veto of the president. For courts to 
restrain or coerce the president's role in the legislative process would 
be as improper as for courts to ertioin the voting of Members of 
Congress.137 
The other party to a threatened consent agreement might, of 
course, try to evade these objections by claiming that the president's leg-
135. See note 39 supra. 
136. The theory articulated in System Fed'n, see notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text, 
suggests that there is no difficulty with a legislative measure invalidating a consent decree by 
altering the statute under which the decree was issued. In general, the other party to the 
decree seems to have no more right to have the decree protected from legislation that may 
modify it than to have the underlying statutory policy maintained. But the Supreme Court has 
sometimes treated the fifth amendment as a guarantee against arbitrary or invidious exclusion 
by statute from government benefits-even where there is no prior right to such benefits. See, 
e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (invalidating statutory 
exclusion from food stamp eligibility of households with unrelated persons). The interest in 
maintaining a consent decree, particularly where the other party had made substantial com-
promises or concessions to obtain the government's agreement to its terms, might be simi-
larly protected, but only against a legislative repeal measure so particular or invidious in its 
application as to seem altogether arbitrary. 
137. Such intervention might breach those protections afforded the president that are 
akin to congressional immunity under the speech or debate clause of article I. "[F]or any 
Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned 
in any other Place." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, d. I. The Supreme Court has construed this 
provision to apply to votes as well as verbal statements in debate. Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486, 506 (1969). This guarantee does not directly apply to the president. Because the 
Constitution gives the president a direct role in the legislative process, however, the Constitu-
tion may imply a similar speech or debate immunity for the president. In United States v. 
Nixon, the Court recognized a constitutional basis for claims of"executive privilege" invoked 
against efforts to compel courtroom testimony about White House deliberations. 408 U.S. 
638 (1974). While the Constitution makes no explicit reference to such "a presidential privi-
lege ... corresponding to the privilege of Members of Congress under the speech or debate 
clause ... ,"the Court noted, "the silence of the Constitution on this score is not dispositive." 
Id. at 705 n.16 (1974). The Court subsequently ruled that the president may not be held to 
account in civil actions for what he says in private deliberations within the executive branch. 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). Presidential legislative preferences, particularly on 
matters of detail, are often conveyed to Congress by individual members, and any presiden-
tially sponsored bill must be submitted by a Member of Congress in order to enter the legisla-
tive process. By relying on those constitutional guarantees already confirmed by the Court, 
the president could convey the executive's legislative preferences to a particular Member of 
Congress in a private discussion- a discussion protected by the doctrine of civil immunity for 
presidential deliberations. The member could then introduce the measure into Congress, 
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islative action, rather than the ultimate legislative result, constitutes the 
violation, because only the executive is an actual party to the decree.13S 
But arguments of this sort are tainted with the precise constitutional 
difficulty identified in Chadha: They envision a legislative process where 
Congress may act with binding results while the president is prevented 
from participating in the process.l39 
Consent decrees that pledge the president to act or not to act in 
particular ways in the legislative process must be void in this respect, 
because they promise more than the executive has the constitutional 
power to promise.l40 
B. Spending Authority 
Once an appropriation has been duly enacted, the authority of the 
executive in expending that appropriation stands on a different consti-
tutional footing. Here, executive policymaking is not coequal with that 
of Congress, but is largely subordinate.141 An appropriation may be 
expound at length on the president's rationales, and then claim the legal immunity of the 
speech or debate clause. 
In addition, restraints or coercions relative to the president's legislative involvement may 
offend the ripeness component of justiciability requirements by addressing a hypothetical in-
jury, because the president's recommendation or veto may not determine the ultimate out-
come of legislation. The ripeness component of justiciability is one aspect of the more 
general prohibition on judicial consideration of abstract or hypothetical questions, a prohibi-
tion that has long been treated by the federal courts as a necessary inference from article Ill's 
restriction of "the judicial power" to actual cases and controversies. See, e.g., United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,89-90 (1947) ("The power of courts ... arises only when the 
interests of litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual 
interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough."). But see Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitu-
tion, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1987) (arguing for a prudential ripeness test). 
138. To the extent that Congress remains free to alter or invalidate consent decrees by 
altering the statutory provisions under which they were negotiated, Congress may indeed 
seem not to be bound by government consent decrees and thus not a party to such decrees. 
See note 136 supra. 
139. The actual legislative veto provision struck down in Chadha gave action by only one 
house of Congress the force oflaw. But the Court clarified that even action by both houses, 
where the possibility of a presidential veto was excluded in advance, would be subject to fatal 
constitutional objection. For elaboration of the claim that the universal applicability of the 
presentment clause was an essential holding of Chadha, see note 134 supra. 
140. Even if one doubts the arguments for an absolute prohibition on enforceable 
promises of this kind, the constitutional difficulties are great enough to justify judicial refusals 
to recognize such promises except when clearly and explicitly articulated by a fully authorized 
representative of the president. Such refusals are in keeping with well-established doctrine in 
estoppel cases that private parties cannot rely on unauthorized representations oflower offi-
cials if these turn out to be contrary to established policy. See notes 71-73 supra and accompa-
nying text. And, consistent with this reasoning, it might be argued that no single president is 
authorized to speak for later presidents on such matters. 
141. After the impoundment controversy of the early 1970s (that is, the events sur-
rounding President Nixon's claim that the executive can refuse to spend appropriated funds if 
the president judges such refusal to be in the national interest), the Supreme Court empha-
sized that legislative intent determines whether the executive may withhold appropriated funds. 
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35,41 (1975). In Train, the Court noted that the Justice 
Department had not tried to argue the contrary constitutional position in this major test case 
of the Nixon impoundment policy. Instead, the Department had relied on a different inter-
pretation of the relevant funding statutes. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
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sufficiently precise and detailed to exclude all executive discretion, 
leaving the relevant funding agency with a ministerial duty to deliver 
the funds as directed.l42 
But even here there are important constitutional limitations on the 
extent to which the executive may bind itself to dispense funds. These 
limitations derive precisely from·the constitutional necessity of subordi-
nating executive operations in this area to legislative policy. 
The Constitution specifies that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." 143 To 
safeguard its constitutional control of the federal pursestrings, Con-
gress enacted a statutory prohibition in the nineteenth century against 
the making of any "contract or purchase on behalf of the United States, 
unless the same be authorized by law or be under an appropriation ade-
quate to its fulfillment .... " 144 The provision is plainly designed to 
prevent the executive from committing Congress to appropriate funds 
to redeem unauthorized agreements. Congress recently extended a 
similar prohibition against involving the federal government in any 
"obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made 
unless authorized by law."l45 
Just as courts cannot enforce unauthorized contracts, consent 
agreements promising grants or funding without legislative authoriza-
tion must be void because such agreements would equally compel Con-
gress to appropriate funds against its will. 146 But what if a funding 
agreement is simply made contingent on a subsequent appropriation? 
Where the executive promises to provide funds only if and when 
relevant appropriations are approved by Congress, such promises may 
No. 93-344, §§ 1001-1017, 88 Stat. 297, 332-39 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
~§ 681-688 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), imposed time limits and subsequent accountability of 
the president to Congress for such broad spending decisions. Prior to the excesses of the 
Nixon Administration, many presidents had asserted a constitutional authority to withhold 
appropriated funds. The practice had been defended by several commentators, see, e.g., L. 
FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CoNGRESS 122-27 (1972); Note, Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional 
Theories and Political Realities, 61 GEo. LJ. 1295 (1973), and some commentators had even 
defended impoundment as a necessary constitutional prerogative of the president. See Miller, 
Pmzdentzal Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision-making, 43 
N.C.L. REv. 502, 533 (1965). The disavowal of this broader spending prerogative since the 
mid-1970s, however, does not affect the argument for executive spending discretion within 
the limits laid down by Congress. For further elaboration of Congress' ability to limit execu-
tive spending discretion, see Devins, The Regulation of Government Agencies Through Appropriations 
Riders, 1987 DuKE LJ. -- (forthcoming). 
142. See Kendall v. United States ex reL Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612-13 (1838). 
143. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
144. Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 84, § 10, 12 Stat. 214,220 (current version at 41 U.S.C. 
§ 11 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
145. Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 1341, 96 Stat. 877, 923 (codified at 31 
u.s.c. § 134 (1982)). 
146. This principle does not apply to authorized proceedings in the United States Court 
of Claims. The jurisdictional statutes authorizing these proceedings imply advance congres-
sional consent to the payment of such claims, see note 46 supra, and Congress has appropriated 
funds in advance to a fund for the settlement of these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2517 (1982). 
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seem to pose no threat to the legislative power of the purse. And, the 
courts could therefore enforce such a promise without constitutional 
objection if Congress subsequently enacts the relevant appropriation. 
Yet suppose that Congress intended the appropriation to cover a large 
number of projects or programs but full satisfaction of a prior contin-
gent commitment has the effect of excluding most other expenditures 
because the prior commitment preempts so much of the appropriation. 
In that case, enforcement of a contingent funding commitment might 
indeed thwart legislative expectations and thus still threaten legislative 
control of the federal pursestrings. 
The courts need not void all contingent funding commitments ab 
initio in order to avoid this difficulty. The "sovereign breach" doctrine 
in federal contract law provides an adequate mechanism to prevent this 
potential loss oflegislative control, assuring that no federal agency may 
make a binding contract that constrains the government from undertak-
ing "[a]ctions of a general and public character, implementing pro-
grams in the national interest .... " 147 Even a funding agency may 
invoke this doctrine in defense of its residual authority to alter the 
"general and public" framework of its grant-making policy. If an 
agency has promised to supply funding to a particular party when ap-
propriations become available, the agency might properly be enjoined 
from entirely repudiating this particular commitment. But such a con-
tingent commitment could not prevent the agency from altering its 
general funding policies, even though the policy alteration had the inci-
dental effect of limiting the funds available for that particular commit-
ment. No agency has the constitutional authority to restrict its own 
ability to alter "general and public" policies. 
This distinction is quite important for executive obligations made 
contingent on future appropriations or authorizations. Although it 
sometimes authorizes multi-year funding commitments, Congress 
enacts most appropriations on a year-to-year basis and limits auth-
orizations of funding commitments accordingly. 148 The size of appro-
priations may vary from year to year in unpredictable ways and there 
may be even more unpredictable variance in the costs or needs of the 
programs involved. Agencies must therefore recalibrate their spending 
priorities each year to serve congressional expectations. The technical 
question of whether an appropriation is large enough to cover a partic-
ular prior commitment is not the same as the policy question of 
whether honoring that commitment will leave sufficient remaining 
funds to accommodate all of the other goals and needs of the program 
involved at the most appropriate levels of funding. If the executive 
were forced to honor prior contingent commitments whenever the ap-
147. Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
148. See Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Fonnal Rules and Infonnal 
Practices, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 51, 99-102 (1979). 
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propriation was technically sufficient, Congress might have to appropri-
ate larger sums than it would otherwise have done-or risk seeing its 
program expectations frustrated by the diversion of its general appro-
priation to one or two priority commitments. By acknowledging limits 
on the enforceability of executive agreements to commit funds, courts 
would forestall this threat to congressional control of government 
spending. 
C. Enforcement Discretion 
Compared with the president's participation in the legislative pro-
cess, enforcement of existing laws by the executive is plainly a 
subordinate prerogative constrained by what each statute provides. 
Congress may limit the scope and form of executive discretion in law 
enforcement, and the Constitution imposes other limitations with the 
rights it confers on the accused. 149 An irreducible core of executive 
independence in the exercise of enforcement discretion nevertheless 
remains. On the one hand, the president's pardon power150 and the 
prohibition of congressional bills of attainder151 assure that prosecu-
tion and enforcement in particular cases can never be a purely ministe-
rial duty. On the other hand, enforcement is always a problem of 
balancing enforcement goals against available resources. While both 
the goals and the resources are largely determined by Congress, the 
executive must have flexibility to adapt to changing congressional pri-
orities and changing levels of funding. 
The Supreme Court has continued to emphasize the constitutional 
grounding of executive discretion in law enforcement. In United States 
v. Nixon, the Court insisted that the executive branch retains "absolute 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case," 152 citing earlier deci-
sions tracing prosecutorial discretion to "the constitutional separation 
of powers."153 Only evidence of flagrant bias or discrimination in the 
pattern of prosecution seems to justify judicial review of decisions not 
to prosecute. 154 
149. For example, the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the fifth amendment's requirement of due process, and the sixth amendment's 
confrontation clause impose significant restraints on the executive's enforcement discretion. 
150. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The pardon power may be exercised at any time 
subsequent to the commission of an offense, even prior to indictment. See Ex Parle Garland, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). 
151. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. This clause prohibits legislative enactments that im-
pose penalties-even indirect penalties, like the denial of public employment-on an overly 
particularized basis. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,441-46 (1965); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Garland, 71 U.S. at 377. 
152. 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 (7 Wall.) 454 (1868)). 
153. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. nom. Cox v. 
Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) (tracing prosecutorial discretion to "the constitutional princi-
ple of the separation of powers"). 
154. "The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to con-
test the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor 
threatened with prosecution .... [I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks 
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Congress can, no doubt, narrow the range of enforcement discre-
tion with more detailed and emphatic statutory standards. But some 
room for executive judgment and discretion-regarding the sufficiency 
of evidence, the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms, the 
competing claims of other cases on enforcement resources, and so on-
will always remain. 155 
This reasoning is not limited to criminal prosecutions. In its 1985 
decision in Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court affirmed the Food and 
Drug Administration's unreviewable discretion to decline to challenge 
the safety and efficacy of particular drugs. 156 The Court in Chaney did 
not hesitate to draw the parallel between these aspects of administra-
tive discretion: 
[An administrative or regulatory] agency's refusal to institute proceed-
ings shares to some extent characteristics of the decision of a prosecu-
tor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long 
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inas-
much as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to "take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed."157 
And, the Court saw parallel practical arguments for "the general un-
ajudicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R.S. 
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 
(1981) (per curiam). Discriminatory enforcement policies were relied upon to invalidate a 
statute in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But, in Doyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 
456 (1962), the Supreme Court held that, in general, "the conscious exercise of some selectiv-
ity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Only where there is evi-
dence that prosecutorial "selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," the Court explained, are there 
"grounds supporting a finding of denial of equal protection .... " ld. 
155. One apparent exception to the general acceptance of executive discretion in crimi-
nal prosecutions is presented by the post-Watergate Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ § 591-598 ( 1982 & Supp. III 1985)). This Act provides for the appointment of special coun-
sel in place of Justice Department officials to investigate and prosecute charges of criminal 
wrongdoing by government officials. The statutory scheme deliberately places the special 
counsel beyond the direct or indirect reach of presidential removal power in order to insulate 
its decisions from executive control. The constitutionality of this arrangement, however, has 
been questioned by former Attorney General Griffin Bell, as well as by the current Justice 
Department, and is currently the subject of litigation. See Hearings Before the House judiciary 
Subcommittee on Extension of the Ethics in Government Act, lOOth Gong., 1st Sess. 1987. The mea-
sure as currently crafted is not a complete contradiction of the larger principle of executive 
discretion in criminal prosecution policy. The District of Columbia Circuit refused in a recent 
case to allow judicial review of the Attorney General's exercise of discretion under the Act in 
deciding whether to call for the appointment of a special counsel in any particular case. Na-
than v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Bork's concurring opinion stressed that 
this decision was grounded in constitutional concerns derived from the principle of separa-
tion of powers: "[W]e may not lightly impute to Congress an intent to remove prosecutorial 
discretion from the Executive and place it in courts and private parties. Before the courts 
decide the constitutionality of such a transfer of the law enforcement power, it must be very 
clear that Congress has attempted it." Id. at 1079. Because Judge Bork's opinion focused on 
threshold jurisdictional questions, it made no judgment on the ultimate constitutionality of 
the statutory scheme, even as so interpreted. Id. at 1082. 
156. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985). 
157. Id. at 1656. 
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suitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforce-
ment."158 "An agency," the Court continued, "generally cannot act 
against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforc-
ing. The agency is generally far better equipped than the courts to deal 
with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its 
priorities."159 
The policy discretion exercised by executive agencies in promulgat-
ing general standards or implementing regulations may seem far re-
moved from the prosecutorial discretion exercised in particular cases. 
But the Supreme Court has emphasized a similar constitutional per-
spective in cases dealing with rulemaking.160 In its recent decision in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 161 for example, 
the Court overturned a lower court's invalidation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency's ("EPA") "bubble policy." This EPA rule allowed 
increases in certain pollution sources if compensated for by greater de-
creases in other pollution sources in the same area (or under the same 
metaphorical "bubble"). Because the Clean Air Act162 did not explic-
itly prohibit this approach, the Court reasoned, Congress had left the 
issue to the policy judgment of the executive, and the lower court had 
thus acted improperly in substituting its own view of the most appropri-
ate interpretation of the statute. The Court's reasoning is one of the 
clearest acknowledgments of the political dimension in executive im-
plementing discretion: 
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but 
not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, 
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibili-
ties may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judg-
158. /d. at 1656. 
159. /d. 
160. At first glance, rulemaking might seem too remote from the core executive func-
tions to receive the same deference as the discretion exercised by prosecutors. In fact, Con-
gress has delegated certain rulemaking powers to the executive from the very outset of its 
history. The first Congress authorized President Washington to issue rules and regulations 
for the control of trade with the Indians. Act of july 22, 1790, ch. 33, § I, 1 Stat. 137 Uuly 22, 
1790) (extended Mar. I, 1793, repealed May 19, 1796). Even as a conceptual matter, more-
over, there is no easy way to distinguish between settled prosecution or enforcement policies 
on the one hand, and "rules" on the other. A statement of enforcement policy, indicating 
which sorts of violations an agency will pursue (and which sorts of violations it will not pur-
sue) is not different, after all, from a "regulation." Congress can, of course, limit the discre-
tion of executive agencies in rulemaking by requiring that rules be justified on the basis of 
evidence developed in formal hearings. But as the D.C. Circuit noted in 1981, unless Con-
gress has been quite explicit about its expectations, courts must assume that Congress has not 
intended to "convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by 
political considerations or the presence of Presidential power." Sierra Club v. Castle, 657 
F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a thoughtful exposition of the argument that, under the 
Constitution, the president can never be entirely excluded from some supervisory or directive 
role in administrative rulemaking, see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
PoU'ers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
161. 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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ments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch 
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, 
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the ad-
ministration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 163 
It is true that Congress may limit executive rulemaking discretion 
with more explicit and detailed statutory directives and with procedural 
requirements for developing rules on the basis of evidence established 
in formal hearings. But the very existence of administrative rules is an 
acknowledgment that statutory standards do not and usually cannot 
clarify policy in sufficient detail. And, as with prosecutorial discretion 
in particular cases, administrative rulemaking can rarely be governed 
entirely by legal formulas and mechanical criteria. The two functions 
involve similar considerations about the sufficiency of the evidence to 
justify a particular approach, the availability of alternatives, the capaci-
ties and resources of agency enforcement operations, and so on. 164 
This analysis suggests a strong constitutional presumption against 
allowing courts to direct executive agencies to particular results in 
rulemaking, as in individual enforcement decisions. The Court has 
been inconsistent in its rulings on the degree to which courts should 
defer to an agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate, although it 
has generally urged some degree of deference.165 Even where the 
courts have substituted their own judgments regarding the construc-
tion of statutory standards, however, they have rarely directed execu-
tive agencies to particular rulemaking results. Rather, the courts have 
almost always remanded challenged rules back to the agency for revi-
sion "in the light of" the court's construction of the relevant statutory 
mandate. 166 This practice acknowledges that a good deal of discretion 
163. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
164. Professor Rabin provides a valuable analysis of the range of factors influencing the 
prosecutorial discretion of U.S. Attorneys in criminal referrals from federal agencies. Rabin, 
Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. 
L. REv. 1036 (1972). Many of the same factors are applicable to administrative enforcement 
decisions and somewhat similar considerations can be applied to the discretion involved in 
rulemaking: "[M]any agencies, like the ITC, have the power to initiate cases as well as to 
decide them, and these agencies can exercise virtually the same degree of planning in the 
commencement of adjudicatory proceedings as they can in rulemaking." Shapiro, The Choice 
of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 932 
(1965). 
165. The Court's inconsistency is emphasized in K.C. DAVIS, 1982 SuPPLEMENT TO AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 580-85 (1982). Professor Davis discusses the divergence in ap-
proach between cases like INS v.Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam), in which 
the court held that the agency possessed "the authority to construe [the statutory language] 
narrowly should they deem it wise to do so," id. at 145, and cases like Northeast Marine 
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977) (9-0 decision), in which the Court construed the 
statutory language without regard for the agency's interpretation. 
166. In the early period of administrative law, ... courts had not developed tech-
niques to review the exercise of discretion on the part of administrators ... without 
usurping it. . . . The absence of such techniques buttressed traditional separation-of-
powers concerns about judicial review of agency inaction. But the modem period 
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must inevitably remain with implementing agencies, even m 
rulemaking. 167 
How much of this discretion may be bargained away in consent de-
crees without violating constitutional principles? The distinction be-
tween particular commitments and general policies is quite relevant to 
the answer. The pardon power, the classic example of executive discre-
tion in enforcement, suggests a method for analyzing the distinction. 
Once granted by the president, a particular pardon may not be revoked 
by a subsequent president, or by Congress. 168 The pardon is, in effect, 
an unbreakable contract with the recipient, protecting the pardoned in-
dividual against any future punishment for the particular offenses cov-
ered by the pardon. But a pardon can only cover specified, past 
offenses. A guarantee against punishment for unspecified future of-
fenses would not be a pardon but the exercise of a dispensing power, a 
power unknown to the United States Constitution.169 Even the legisla-
ture may not bind its successors against penalizing specified behavior in 
the future, 170 nor may the executive assume this power over future ex-
ecutives with open-ended guarantees of immunity. 171 Administrative 
rulemaking, although it may narrow the prospective reach of a broad 
statutory prohibition, does not give one executive power over succes-
sors if the responsible executive agency remains free to change the rule 
and subsequently re-enlarge the scope of the prohibitions (with pro-
spective effect). 
The typical government consent decree does involve a binding 
promise not to prosecute, but it is no more problematic than a presi-
dential pardon because it applies only to a discrete past offense.172 
has seen the rise of a number of strategies by which courts might review the exercise 
of discretion without usurping the executive function. Courts may require explana-
tions for decisions, and in reviewing those explanations, they may be quite 
deferential. 
Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 671 (1985) 
(citation omitted). 
167. For elaboration of the various understandings of agency discretion, see Koch,]udi-
cial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986). 
168. Although pardons may be granted conditionally, an absolute pardon may not be 
revoked, refused, or subsequently modified. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); Ex 
Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925); Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 315 (1855). 
169. "[A] dispensing power ... has no countenance for its support, in any part of the 
constitution." Kendall v. United States ex reL Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 611 (1838). The 
claim of King James II to a dispensing prerogative-a power to authorize named individuals 
to act in violation of otherwise valid laws-was one of the royal abuses that provoked the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688. See F.W. !\IAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
302-06 (1913). 
170. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (statutory proscription of lotteries 
overrides a charter to a lottery company granted by state legislature in the preceding year). 
171. See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying text. 
172. Antitrust decrees sometimes present particularly awkward challenges to this rule 
because of the difficulty in determining when a business activity allegedly prohibited by a 
decree is "the same" offense. For further discussion of antitrust consent decrees, see Note, 
The Scope of judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 153 (1983). 
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Consent decrees that promise not to prosecute future offenses- even 
after the relevant rules are changed-must be regarded as nonbind-
ing.173 So too must agreements that commit an agency to undertake 
particular types of levels of enforcement effort into the indefinite fu-
ture. Such agreements not only foreclose reconsideration of broad 
public policy issues by subsequent administrations, but also constrain 
the reallocation of enforcement resources in response to altered cir-
cumstances and different appropriation levels. If courts could enforce 
broad agency commitments of this kind, then congressional control of 
agency funding would be undermined, as much as if the commitments 
involved direct financial outlays to private parties rather than internal 
agency resources. Similar reasoning applies to rulemaking. If courts 
could freeze particular rules or standards in place, they would prevent 
agencies from adapting to new funding levels, new circumstances, or 
new policy perspectives, contrary to the intent of Congress when it del-
egated rulemaking discretion to executive agencies. 
D. Interim Conclusions 
The Chadha decision emphasized that presidents may not bargain 
away their legislative prerogatives to Congress. We argue that execu-
tive officials have no greater authority to strike such bargains with pri-
vate parties. We have also argued above that the executive branch must 
retain discretion in relation to broad spending and enforcement priori-
ties in order to keep faith with legislative intentions. As available re-
sources and external circumstances vary, administrators must be able to 
readjust their own operating policies and priorities, even if their activi-
ties are regarded as entirely subordinate to congressional expectations. 
Yet Supreme Court decisions on the presidential appointment and re-
moval powers imply that even this implementing discretion, 
subordinate as it is to legislative control, is not simply a matter of ad-
hering to congressional expectations. 
For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court noted that the president, 
rather than Congress or the courts, is charged by the Constitution to 
" 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' " 174 And as the 
Court noted long ago in Myers v. United States, respect for this constitu-
tional commitment helps to "secure that unitary and uniform execution 
of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated 
in vesting general executive power in the President alone." 175 If the 
implementation of individual laws is guided at least in part by the 
claims of "uniformity" -of what is needed to harmonize with other ad-
ministration policies-then actual patterns of enforcement or imple-
173. See notes 81, 129-140 supra and accompanying texts. 
174. 424 U.S. I, 138 (1976) (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3). 
175. 272 u.s. 52, 135 (1926). 
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mentation may often depart from the expectation of the Congress that 
enacted a particular law. 
Arguably, Congress intends executive agencies to take varying cir-
cumstances and the claims of competing commitments into account in 
implementing particular legislative standards or directives. One can 
even argue that Congress forces this sort of continuous readjustment 
by altering funding levels and by adding new laws or programs that 
alter the overall policy context. But Supreme Court rulings on separa-
tion of powers suggest a still broader point: The Constitution requires 
Congress to leave implementing discretion to the executive, at least 
where congressional enactments allow for some exercise of judgment 
and discretion in implementation policy (as do virtually all measures). 
If the separation of powers means anything, it means that courts cannot 
entirely preempt the judgment and discretion of executive officials. 
That is, even if it wanted to do so, Congress could not simply convert 
the executive into an arm of the judiciary or grant plenary supervisory 
powers over administrative activity to the courts. This conclusion, 
grounded in part on the separation of powers, draws added force from 
the consideration that, in practice, delegations of power to the judiciary 
will usually involve delegations of governmental authority to the pri-
vate parties bringing the cases to judicial notice and relying on an ulti-
mate judicial sanction to negotiate setdements and remedies that affect 
broad government policies. And delegation of governmental power to 
private parties is delegation in its "most obnoxious form." 176 
It may be very difficult, amidst the complexities of contemporary 
administrative law, to find clear constitutional dividing lines that are 
unfailingly respected by the courts. But the existence of some lines, in 
principle, cannot be denied without denying that the Constitution im-
poses a definite division of authority between executive and judicial 
power. Courts implicidy acknowledge this constitutional division. 
First, courts have asserted that article III imposes definite "core re-
quirements" for standing that even Congress may not waive or reduce. 
The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that any execu-
tive decision or policy can be brought under judicial scrutiny by any 
complainant, notwithstanding its willingness to accomodate a consider-
able relaxation of standing barriers in recent decades. 177 Second, 
176. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). 
177. The case law on standing to sue in federal court is predominately a product of the 
contemporary judicial concern that legal protection be assured for interests beyond the tradi-
tional property claims protected at common law. As Joseph Vining pointed out, even the 
term "standing" was rarely used before World War II. J. VINING, LEGAL IDE!IITITY, THE CoM-
INC OF AcE OF Pusuc LAw 55, 56 (1978). Before that time, the question at issue in standing, 
that is, who is authorized to bring a legal challenge before a court, was answered solely by the 
definition of particular causes of action: Someone claiming to have sustained injury to a le-
gally protected right could bring a lawsuit. Then the lawsuit focused only on the question of 
whether the challenger's personal rights had or had not been violated. Under this traditional 
approach, government inaction in the courts was rarely challenged successfully. Further, pri-
vate parties were rarely accountable at common law for inaction, except where the challenging 
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courts have shown a marked aversion to directing administrative policy 
party could appeal to some specific contractual duty owed specifically to him or her. Judicial 
review of administrative decisions, therefore, was largely confined to the protection of private 
property from government excess. !d. at 35-37. 
By contrast, the recent expansion of judicial review suggests that administrative inaction 
may also impose injury and that such injuries should be grounds for judicial intervention. 
The new approach was crystallized in the Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Association of 
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, which interpreted the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act as conferring standing on any person "aggrieved" by an administrative 
decision, regardless of whether the administrative decision was made under a statute specifi-
cally extending judicial review to all persons "aggrieved." Under the Data Processing test, a 
would-be challenger need only show that he or she had sustained "injury in fact, economic or 
otherwise" to contest an administrative decision in the courts. !d. at 152. The plaintiff need 
not prove that the challenged administrative action had violated some specially protected per-
sonal right of his own, but merely that the challenged action was contrary to statutory require-
ments or an "abuse of discretion." 
The separation of standing requirements from the merits of a claim makes judicial review 
much more readily available because a challenger can more easily demonstrate injury in fact 
(that is, deprivation of advantages that might have been gained from a different administrative 
decision), than wrongful invasion or neglect of a distinct legal interest or right. In the 1970s, 
commentators like Vining accordingly expected that the law of standing would diverge more 
and more fully from private law notions of individualized rights and duties and would en-
courage the development of an entirely separate public law jurisprudence. The latter was 
expected to focus not on the correction of discrete wrongs to particular individuals, but on 
the enforcement of more extended "public values" in administrative law, with challengers of 
administrative decisions recognized as representatives of the public interest in these more 
extended values. J. VINING, supra, at 106-12, 179-81. 
In fact, however, the Supreme Court has generally tightened standing requirements since 
the mid-1970s. First, the Court emphasized in several cases that the "core standing require-
ment" of"injury in fact" can only be satisfied by the showing of a "concrete irUury" which is 
not simply that of a harm or disadvantage "undifferentiated from that of other citizens." 
Schlesinger v. Reservists, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974). More importantly, the Court gave teeth 
to this requirement by emphasizing that a would-be plaintiff must not only have shown a 
"concrete injury" to secure standing, but must have "shown an injury to himself that is likely to 
be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 
(1976) (emphasis added). While these limitations are not always easy to apply, their evident 
purpose is to ensure that judicial review comports with its traditional emphasis on the relief of 
individualized harms. Under these limitations, the more generalized is a complaint about 
administrative policy, the more questionable is the standing of a particular challenger because 
demonstration of a particular harm is more difficult with increasing generality. The Court's 
recent decision in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), illustrates the force of these limita-
tions. In Allen, the Court denied standing to black parents seeking to challenge the adequacy 
oflntemal Revenue Service ("IRS") enforcement of non-discrimination requirements for tax-
exempt private schools, on the grounds that even if the IRS pursued a different enforcement 
strategy, there was no assurance that the particular schools near the would-be challengers 
would move toward greater integration rather than simply forfeit their tax exemptions. 
The Court has not quite returned to Justice Stewart's suggestion that standing to chal-
lenge government inaction should be available only when the plaintiff seeks to enforce an 
affirmative government duty that "relates to a very particularized and explicit performance by 
the asserted obligor, such as the payment of money or the rendition of specific items of infor-
mation." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 203 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Indeed, recently the Court has avoided addressing standing problems directly so that it could 
reach the merits of particular cases. See, e.g., Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984); 
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984). See generally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CAUF. L. 
REv. 68 (1984) (noting inconsistent judicial approaches to standing); Miller & Devins, Injuries 
and Remedies (manuscript in progress). 
However, the Court has attempted to deny standing to the mere critic of government 
policy who might seek to "employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances." Richardson, 418 U.S. at 203 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)). 
Thus, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Court suggested that judicial review of agency inaction was 
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in detail even in cases properly before them. Courts have clarified the 
bounds of executive discretion under existing law and demanded that 
agencies clarify the factual and legal bases of their own policies.178 But 
they have tried to avoid a direct or complete preemption of executive 
policy discretion within the bounds allowed by law.179 
If there are fundamental constitutional difficulties with direct judi-
cial preemption of executive discretion, as this pattern of reticence and 
restraint implies, these difficulties are no less fundamental when the 
executive seeks to preempt its own discretion-or that of its succes-
sors-in binding consent agreements. The purpose of the constitu-
tional division between executive and judicial power is to provide the 
executive with more discretion, more flexibility, and more room for 
political responsiveness than thejudiciary. Unlike the judiciary, the ex-
ecutive is not bound by a fixed understanding of legislative intent-its 
own or that of its predecessors-because the resulting legalistic rigidity 
runs counter to the nature of executive power.180 
Executive agencies must be able to make binding contracts and 
agreements in a wide range of circumstances, as in routine supply con-
tracts, routine plea-bargaining agreements in law enforcement, and so 
on. The mere fact that an agreement curtails executive discretion can-
not be an argument against judicial enforcement of the agreement. 
generally inappropriate, and stated that: "[W]hen an agency refuses to act it generally does 
not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not 
infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect." 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656 
(1985) (emphasis in original). 
178. Note, for example, the modest scope of court orders in decisions such as Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), requiring the EPA to 
explain and clarify its policies regarding suspension of dangerous pesticides: ':Judicial review 
must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will confine and control the exer-
cise of discretion." /d. at 598. 
179. Thus, for example, in National Research Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, which estab-
lished the decree challenged in Citizens for a Better Environment, discussed in notes 342-34 7 infra 
and accompanying text, the Court concluded that "the primary touchstone for determining 
whether any given decree impermissibly infringes on an agency's discretion appears to be 
whether the decree is result or procedure oriented." 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2084, 2088 
(D.D.C. 1982). Although we question the correctness of this conclusion, the conclusion is 
revealing of prevailing judicial cautions. 
180. James Madison captured the complexity of the Framers' view of the executive in a 
speech to the Constitutional Convention, as he explained why life tenure was not appropriate 
for the chief executive or executive subordinates even though it could properly be accorded 
to the judges: 
There was an analogy between the Executive &Judiciary departments in several re-
spects. [Both] ... executed the laws in certain cases [both] expounded and applied 
[the laws] for certain purposes .... The differences between them seemed to consist 
chiefly in two circumstances-!. the collective interest & security were much more in 
the power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department. 2. in the 
administration of the former much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion 
than in the administration of the latter . . . . [T]he 2d consideration proves that it will 
be more difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for trying the Execut[ive]: than 
the Judges, [in an impeachment proceeding] & forms an objection to the same ten-
ure of office. 
II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). 
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When the executive purports to tie its hands in relation to fundamental 
policy prerogatives, however, its agreements cannot be enforceable any 
more than a legislature can be constrained by past contracts from exer-
cising its broad, regulatory, or "sovereign" discretion. 
We have suggested three applications of this principle in relation to 
executive consent agreements. First, no agreement can bind the presi-
dent's veto or recommendation prerogatives in legislative matters, as 
these must extend as broadly as the legislative powers of Congress. 
Second, no agreement can bind the executive to spend funds not ap-
propriated or authorized, or to refrain from altering "general and pub-
lic" spending policies. Third, agreements on enforcement policy can 
only apply to action against past offenses and cannot irrevocably com-
mit the executive to enforcement strategies, standards, or priorities in 
regard to future offenses. 
In the next section, we will review several recent cases in which par-
ties asked the courts to enforce consent decrees that we believe ex-
ceeded the above limitations. In the section that follows we will analyze 
the problems arising from the failure of these courts to articulate the 
constitutional limitations at issue in these cases. 
IV. RECENT CASES 
Five recent cases illustrate the range of circumstances in which, 
under the prevailing norms of ready access to the courts, executive 
agencies may make highly questionable consent agreements. Arising in 
the context of civil rights regulation,181 housing subsidy programs,182 
domestic security policy,183 and environmental regulation, 184 these 
cases have involved consent decree provisions affecting various aspects 
of the executive's discretionary authority. Included in these decrees, 
for example, were provisions requiring executive action on legislative 
proposals, 185 budget proposals, 186 adoption of new regulations, 187 and 
181. United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984); Wo-
men's Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
182. Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984). 
183. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en 
bane). 
184. National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A sixth case, Citi-
zens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), involved a challenge to a 
consent decree in which the executive bargained away to environmental groups substantial 
discretionary authority. Unlike the other five cases discussed in this section, a subsequent 
administration did not challenge this negotiated limitation on its discretion. Instead, industry 
intervenors challenged the decree as an improper limitation on executive authority. Because 
the legal issues involved in Citizens for a Better Env 't are very similar to those of the five other 
cases, we refer to Citizens for a Better Env 't in the footnotes in this section. See notes 342-34 7 
infra and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of Citizens for a Better Env 't. 
185. Board of Educ. of Chicago, see notes 192-203 infra and accompanying text; Ferrell, see 
notes 240-247 infra and accompanying text; National Audubon Soc'y, see notes 232-238 infra and 
accompanying text. 
186. Board of Educ. of Chicago, see notes 192-203 infra and accompanying text; Ferrell, see 
notes 240-247 infra and accompanying text. 
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ongoing enforcement priorities.188 In all of these cases, efforts were 
subsequently made to enforce and to challenge these agreements in the 
context of policy changes under a new administration. 189 
For the most part, the appellate briefs submitted by government 
agencies in these cases called attention to some of the constitutional 
difficulties posed by these decrees. Not surprisingly, these constitu-
tional arguments failed to impress the opposing parties. After all, the 
constitutional difficulties had already failed to dissuade federal district 
court judges from requiring that the consent decrees be enforced.190 
Most of the appellate decisions rendered in these cases, while attempt-
ing to limit somewhat the policy reach of the decrees, further illustrate 
the reluctance of judges to come to grips with the constitutional issues 
involved. 191 The various devices adopted by appellate courts to evade 
these constitutional problems seem quite unsatisfactory in a number of 
respects. In our view, therefore, these cases reinforce the conclusion 
that courts must articulate clear constitutional limitations on the entry 
and enforcement of government consent decrees. 
A. The Cases 
United States v. Board of Education of Chicago 192 is the anomaly in this 
group of cases. It is the one case that was not brought by a public 
interest organization and the one case that did not involve a federal 
agency as the original defendant. Instead, the decree at issue arose 
from a long-standing desegregation suit against the Chicago school 
board in which the federal government was the original plaintiff. After 
years of highly publicized and rather controversial negotiations with 
the Chicago school board over the scope and adequacy of its desegre-
gation efforts, the Carter Justice Department reached agreement with 
the school board on a remedial plan. 193 The resulting consent decree 
was entered in the district court in September 1980194 and, although 
187. Adams, see notes 213-231 infra and accompanying text; Ferrell, see notes 240-247 infra 
and accompanying text; Citizens for a Better Env't, see notes 342-347 infra and accompanying 
text; Alliance to End Repression, see notes 206-211 infra and accompanying text. 
188. Adams, see notes 213-231 infra and accompanying text; Citizens for a Better Env't, see 
notes 342-347 infra and accompanying text. 
189. With the exception of that in Ferrell, these consent decrees were entered into dur-
ing the Carter era; the Ferrell decree was a product of the Ford Administration. One suit to 
enforce a consent decree was filed during the Carter Administration, see National Wildlife 
Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
190. See notes 223-279 infra and accompanying text. 
191. See notes 280-312 infra and accompanying text. 
192. 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (consent decree upheld), 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. 
Ill. 1983) (injunction granted), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 717 F.2d 378 {7th 
Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Board of Educ. ofChieago I), on remand, 588 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1984), 
vacated and remanded, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984) (hereinafter Board of Educ. of Chicago II). 
193. See generally Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago 
School Desegregation Cases, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1243, 1258-63 (1984). 
194. Consent Decree, United States v. Board ofEduc. of Chicago, No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 24, 1980) (hereinafter Consent Decree, Board of Educ. of Chicago). 
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challenged as inadequate by the local NAACP and Urban League, was 
subsequendy upheld by that court. 195 Under paragraph 15.1 of the de-
cree, both the federal government and the Chicago school board 
pledged "to make every good faith effort to find and provide every 
available fonn of financial resources [sic] adequate for the implementa-
tion of the desegregation plan." 196 In May 1983, the Chicago school 
board claimed the federal government violated this provision. The dis-
trict court agreed. It accordingly ordered the Education Department 
("ED") to award as many discretionary grants to Chicago as necessary 
to fund its desegregation efforts and ordered the Reagan Administra-
tion as a whole to "take every affirmative step within its legal authority 
to seek and to 'find and provide' desegregation funding to the 
Board." 197 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the Reagan Ad-
ministration had violated paragraph 15.1 by failing to award adequate 
grants to Chicago from available ED funds. 198 But the Seventh Circuit 
overturned the district court's remedial order, which had frozen spend-
ing by ED to preserve at least $14.6 million for Chicago.199 
Over the following year, the Reagan Administration engaged in leg-
islative and rulemaking activities that limited the amount of funding 
195. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 554 F. Supp. at 913 n.2. 
196. Consent Decree, Board of Educ. of Chicago, supra note 194, at 12. We find it curious 
that the government agreed to undertake substantial financial obligations in a lawsuit that it 
had initiated. We speculate that the Carter Administration may have made such a commit-
ment in order to secure votes in Chicago for the 1980 presidential election. See Devins & 
Stedman, supra note 193, at 1258-60. The possibility that such concerns might motivate nego-
tiations in consent decrees exemplifies the risks inherent in far-reaching consent decrees, in 
terms both of unaccountability and constraints placed on subsequent executive policymaking. 
197. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 567 F. Supp. at 286-88. The conflict between the school 
board and the United States arose, in part, because of recent changes in federal education 
assistance programs. At the time the consent decree was entered, Chicago was eligible for aid 
under the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 (ESAA), Pub. L. No. 92-318,86 Stat. 354 (1972) 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-19 (1982), repealed Pub. L. 95-561, § 601(b)(2), 92 Stat. 2268 
(1978)). Under this program, substantial federal assistance was available for activities directly 
related to the implementation of desegregation plans and to those districts most recently 
adopting desegregation plans. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 193, at 1251-54. With the 
advent of the Reagan Administration, the ESAA ran afoul of the "new federalism" in educa-
tion. See WHITE HOUSE, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR EcoNOMIC RECOVERY 
(1981). For elementary and secondary education, this "new federalism" called for consolidat-
ing forty-five federal programs (including the ESAA) in order to "shift control over education 
policy away from the Federal government and back to State and local authorities-where it 
constitutionally and historically belongs." /d. at 7-1. In response to this executive proposal, 
Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 
Stat. 357 (1981) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 20, 38, 42 U.S.C.). Among the 
programs repealed and consol~dated was the ESAA. Congress gave the school districts-by 
way of state departments of education-block grants to be distributed among any of the 
number of activities that had previously been funded directly and individually by the federal 
government. 
198. Board of Educ. of Chicago I, 717 F.2d at 382-85. 
199. /d. at 382-85. Noting that the United States did not have an "adequate opportunity 
to challenge the remedies selected by the district court," id. at 385, the appellate court cau-
tioned "[w]here another branch of government is found to be in violation of a court order, 
courts have shown a preference for allowing that branch to come into compliance voluntarily 
.... " /d. at 384. 
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available to the Chicago school board. 200 At the same time, Congress 
enacted riders to ED appropriation bills which earmarked $20 million 
for Chicago desegregation efforts, but also specified that no ED funds 
"shall be withheld from distribution to [other] grantees because of the 
provision of the order" issued by the district court.201 Though Chicago 
duly received its $20 million, the district court found the Reagan Ad-
ministration had acted in "bad faith" by supporting these legislative 
restrictions and by refusing to grant more than this amount.202 Ac-
cordingly, in August 1984, the district court ordered the "Executive 
Branch promptly to undertake some combination of ... lobbying activi-
ties to the extent necessary to assure financing adequate for implemen-
tation" of the Chicago desegregation plan2°3-and specified almost 
$104 million as "adequate" for such financing.204 The government ap-
pealed this order to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.2os 
The Seventh Circuit faced a somewhat different challenge to a gov-
ernment consent decree earlier in 1984, also growing out of an agree-
ment signed by the outgoing Carter Administration in the fall of 1980. 
In Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 206 a coalition of civil rights 
and civil liberties organizations in Chicago (the "Alliance") sued the 
city and the federal government over surveillance activities. 207 The co-
alition members charged that the government violated their first 
amendment rights by conducting this surveillance, which they claimed 
was in response to their public statements. 208 As a result, paragraph 
3.4(a) of the settlement agreement with the federal government prom-
ised that "[t]he F.B.I. shall not conduct an investigation solely on the 
basis of activities protected by the First Amendment .... "209 In March 
of 1983, however, the Justice Department released new FBI investiga-
tive guidelines (for the entire country) noting that in "its efforts to an-
ticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times initiate investigations in 
advance of criminal conduct" and that such investigations "may be war-
ranted" when "statements advocate criminal activity . . . unless it is apparent, 
from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is 
no prospect of hann. "210 The plaintiffs in Alliance to End Repression pro-
200. Board of Educ. of Chicago //, 744 F.2d 1300, 1307-08 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985). 
201. Pub. L. No. 98-139, § 209, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (1983). 
202. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. 232, 238-39 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
203. /d. at 242. 
204. /d. at 241. 
205. Board of Educ. of Chicago II, 744 F.2d at 1304. 
206. 742 F.2d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
207. /d. at 1009. 
208. Plaintiffs' allegations, as summarized by the coun, were that the affected organiza-
tions "posed no actual or potential threat to domestic security, that the motivation for the 
investigation was the FBI's dislike of their political views, and that the goal and consequence 
of the investigation were to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs." /d. 
209. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
210. Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1010 (quoting The Attorney General's Guide-
lines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investi-
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tested that this language violated the consent decree and persuaded the 
district court to issue an injunction against applying this portion of the 
new guidelines within Chicago.211 The Reagan Administration 
appealed.212 
Adams v. Bel/ 213, a District of Columbia Circuit case, also involved a 
consent decree signed by the Carter Administration which, according 
to the plaintiffs, the Reagan Administration had failed to honor.214 
The case began with a 1970 suit, Adams v. Richardson, on behalf of black 
students and parents throughout the South (although it was not for-
mally certified as a class action). The original suit complained of en-
forcement failures by the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") then part of 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (and transferred af-
ter 1979 to the new Education Department).215 OCR enforces Title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racial discrimination in 
any "program or activity receiving federal financial assistance," and 
also enforces parallel statutes prohibiting sex discrimination (Title IX) 
and discrimination against the handicapped (section 504).216 The orig-
inal Adams suit protested OCR's failure to impose sanctions on several 
hundred named school districts in the South that the agency itself had 
found to be inadequately desegregated, and with which it had been ne-
gotiating for many months to secure remedial plans. The district court 
held these actions to be impermissible delays constituting an abuse of 
discretion.217 Accordingly, the court set a series of precise deadlines by 
which it required the agency to commence formal enforcement pro-
ceedings (unless the school districts had, in the meantime, agreed to 
comply with the agency's standards).218 The ruling was affirmed (with 
slight modifications) by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1973.219 
The original plaintiffs returned to the district court in 1975 with a 
new list of delinquent school districts.220 They claimed that OCR 
delayed too long before proceeding to formal enforcement in these dis-
gations (March 7, 1983)) (emphasis provided by court in Alliance to End Repression). Plaintiffs 
alleged that these new guidelines contravened first amendment speech protections specified 
in the consent decree, claiming that speech can only be limited by a showing of immediate and 
substantial danger. Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1011 (citing Brandenberg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969)(per curiam)). 
211. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 575, 582-83 (N.D. Ill. 
1983), modified, 733 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir.), reversed, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
212. Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1010. 
213. 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
214. /d. at 43. 
215. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (en bane). Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint for Declaratory and Other Relief with the 
federal district court in the District of Columbia on October 19, 1970. 
216. Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); Title IX 
of the Education Amendment of 1972, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. (1976); Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1980). 
217. Adams, 356 F. Supp. at 94-98. 
218. /d. 
219. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane). 
220. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269, 271 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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tricts. This time the district court not only set deadlines for enforce-
ment actions against the named school districts but also set general 
deadlines for investigation, mediation, and formal enforcement against 
any other school district (in seventeen specified southern states) about 
which OCR might receive complaints of racial discrimination.22I Ef-
forts to satisfy this order occupied such a disproportionate share of 
OCR resources that the agency was soon charged with enforcement de-
ficiencies in a range of other areas. 222 In separate suits, parents of 
black school children challenged Title VI enforcement delays in north-
em and western states,223 parents of Hispanic school children chal-
lenged delays in enforcing bilingual education requirements under 
Title VI, 224 groups concerned with sex discrimination challenged de-
lays in enforcing Title IX,225 and groups concerned with the needs of 
disabled persons challenged delays in the enforcement of Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974.226 The Carter Administration was 
rebuffed in its efforts to join all of these suits withAdams,227 but collec-
tive negotiations with all the various plaintiff groups led to a compre-
hensive settlement, endorsed by the Adams court at the end of 1977.228 
Under the agreement, OCR promised to investigate all discrimination 
complaints under the three statutes within specified time frames and 
also to undertake specified numbers of agency-initiated compliance re-
views on specified issues within specified processing deadlines.229 
OCR has never succeeded in meeting the agreed "timeframes" for 
all of its cases. With significant expansion in staff and resources, it had 
improved its record considerably by the summer of 1979, but thereafter 
its performance deteriorated notably.230 Various plaintiff groups re-
turned to court in 1981 to protest these violations of the consent de-
221. ld. at 273. 
222. See, e.g., Motion for Intervention, Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70, slip op. (D.D.C. 
June 14, 1976) (claiming that the OCR refused to act on complaints of discrimination against 
non-English-speaking minorities on the grounds that compliance with Adams orders pre-
empted all available resources) (on file with the Sumford Law Review). 
223. Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D.D.C. 1976). 
224. Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70, slip. op. (D.D.C. June 14, 1976). 
225. Women's Equity Action League v. Matthew, (No. 74-1720) (D.D.C. 1974). 
226. Application for Leave to Intervene as Plaintiffs, National Federation of the Blind, 
DouglasS. Usiak &Joyce S. Stiff (June 28, 1977). 
227. Order of Judge Pratt, Oct. 24, 1977 (on file with the Stanford Law Review). 
228. Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977). 
229. For example, the decree required that (l) within 105 days of the receipt of a com-
plete complaint, OCR shall make a written determination as to whether a violation has oc-
curred; (2) OCR must investigate all allegations of the complaint, interview the complainants 
and nitnesses, and permit complainants an opportunity to rebut adverse evidence; (3) within 
180 days of beginning a compliance review, OCR must conclude negotiations for corrective 
action if a \'iolation has been found; and (4) at least 60 days prior to the beginning of each 
fiscal year, OCR must publish a proposed operating plan for public comment. /d. 
230. Deposition of Cynthia Brown, former Deputy Director for Compliance and En-
forcement of OCR, at 56-57, 83-84, Adams v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Brown 
reported that OCR had met its "timeframes" under Adams in 64% of its cases in August 1979. 
Howe\'er, this figure had dropped to 40% by September 1979. /d. 
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cree and in 1983 won a supplementary order from the district court 
reconfirming the essence of the original decree while accommodating 
some modifications to make it more enforceable.231 The Justice De-
partment appealed. 
The District of Columbia Circuit confronted another alleged viola-
tion of a consent decree in National Audubon Society v. Watt.232 In that 
case, both the Carter Administration, which had signed the original 
agreement, as well as the new Reagan Administration, tried to resist 
enforcement of the decree. The Audubon Society had filed suit in 
1976, seeking to block the Interior Department from going ahead ·with 
a vast water project in North Dakota in alleged violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act.233 A stipulation and order entered in 1977 
required the Interior Department to refrain from further construction 
until it had completed two environmental impact studies on the project, 
submitted proposals to Congress, and secured actual legislation 
"reauthorizing, modifying or deauthorizing the project."234 The De-
partment subsequently completed the studies, but submitted no legisla-
tive proposals on the matter to Congress. 235 Congress did not 
explicitly reauthorize, deauthorize, or modify the project. But Con-
gress did continue to appropriate funds for the project each year and 
when President Carter notified Congress of his decision not to expend 
the appropriation, the Senate voted to disapprove this deferral of fund-
ing for the water project. 236 The Interior Department interpreted this 
vote as releasing it from the stipulation.237 But the National Audubon 
Society claimed that only an explicit reauthorization by Congress could 
allow the project to go fonvard and eventually obtained an injunction 
from the district court prohibiting the Department from continuing 
work on the project until Congress had acted more explicitly, as pro-
vided by the original stipulation.238 The injunction, handed down in 
May 1981, was appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit by the Rea-
gan Administration. 239 
Another case of this kind, Ferrell v. Pierce,240 arose in the Seventh 
Circuit and involved a mortgage insurance program operated by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). In 1976, 
HUD settled a suit brought by low-income homeowners in the Chicago 
area and promised to take assignment of the mortgages of these home-
231. Order, Adams v. Bell, C.A. 3095-70 (Mar. II, I983) (on file with the Stanford Law 
Review). 
232. 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. I982). 
233. Id. at 302. 
234. /d. at 301. 
235. Id. at 303. 
236. /d. at 304. 
237. /d. 
238. /d. at 304-05. 
239. /d. at 305. 
240. 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. I984). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Stan. L. Rev. 253 1987-1988
November 1987] CONSENT DECREES 253 
owners, under certain conditions, to prevent foreclosures by the origi-
nal mortgagees.241 When the plaintiffs subsequently charged HUD 
with failure to observe the terms of this agreement in 1979, the parties 
agreed to an amended stipulation.242 HUD promised that "it would 
operate the assignment program for five years in accordance with its 
newly-revised handbook"; that "it would not, during [this period] cur-
tail the 'basic rights' of participating mortgagors"; that it would "give 
notice to plaintiffs' counsel prior to final action on any modification"; 
and, that after the expiration of the five year period, it would continue 
the assignment program or an "equivalent substitute."243 In 1980, on 
HUD's recommendation, Congress enacted the Temporary Mortgage 
Assistance Program ("TMAP") as a means of coping with skyrocketing 
costs under the mortgage assignment program.244 Under TMAP, HUD 
would not take over mortgages when insured, low-income homeowners 
were threatened with foreclosure, but would simply assist them in 
meeting their monthly payments to the original mortgagees. 245 When 
HUD sought further to amend the 1979 amended stipulation in Ferrell 
to specify that TMAP assistance would satisfy its requirements, the dis-
trict court judge refused to allow the change.246 HUD's implementing 
regulations for TMAP, the district judge found, had tightened eligibil-
ity requirements and lowered the quality of mortgage assistance in vari-
ous ways so that it was not really an "equivalent substitute."247 The 
Reagan Administration appealed this ruling to the Seventh Circuit. 248 
B. The Arguments 
The government attacked these consent decrees on grounds as pe-
destrian as the precise meaning of the particular consent decree249 and 
241. See id. at 457. 
242. See id. 
243. /d. at 457-58. 
244. Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 341, 94 
Stat. 1614 (1980) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (Supp 1987)). 
245. See Ferrell, 743 F.2d at 458-460. 
246. Ferrell v. Pierce, 560 F. Supp. 1344, 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd 743 F.2d 454 (7th 
Cir. 1984). 
247. /d. at 1359-72. 
248. Ferrel~ 743 F.2d at 455. 
249. In Board of Education of Chicago/, for example, the issue of government liability cen-
tered on a consent decree provision that "[e]ach party is obligated to make every good faith 
effort to find and provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the imple-
mentation of the desegregation plan." Consent Decree at 12, Board of Educ. of Chicago I, supra 
note 194. The Board argued that the government had "entered into a consent decree by 
which it agreed . ... [u]nder judicial supervision, to be mutually responsible with a school 
board for funding a desegregation plan." Brieffor the Board of Education of Chicago at I, 
Board of Educ. of Chicago I, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983) (Nos. 83-2308, 83-2402, 83-2445) 
[hereinafter Brief for Board of Education, Board of Educ. of Chicago I]. The Board interpreted 
this obligation as a specific commitment to Chicago, not merely a general obligation that 
permitted Chicago to compete with other school districts for congressionally authorized edu-
cation funds. The United States disagreed and claimed that the consent decree "does not 
require the Executive Branch .... to prefer Chicago over other school districts ... in dispens-
HeinOnline -- 40 Stan. L. Rev. 254 1987-1988
254 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:203 
as lofty as the general constitutional authority of the judiciary under 
article 111250 or of the executive under article 11.251 In between these 
extremes, there were arguments about the meaning of statutory provi-
sions underlying the decrees, 252 the significance of related congres-
ing federal financial assistance and structuring federal assistance programs." Brief for the 
United States at 16, Board ofEduc. of Chicago I, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983) (Nos. 83-2308,83-
2402, 83-2445) [hereinafter Brief for United States, Board of Educ. of Chicago I]. The Board 
prevailed on this matter, thus forcing the Executive either to modify its position or to justify 
noncompliance on constitutional grounds. Board of Educ. of Chicago /, 717 F.2d at 382-83; see 
notes 281-292 infra. 
Alliance to End Repression involved a provision stipulating that "[t]he FBI shall not conduct 
an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment." Alliance to 
End Repression, 91 F.R.D. 182, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing joint Motion and Stipulation at 19). 
The government read this provision narrowly, contending that it "bars the FBI from con-
ducting an investigation, the sole purpose of which would be to suppress or harass the exer-
cise of protested speech." Brief for Appellants at 19, Alliance to End Repression v. City of 
Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Nos. 
83-1853, 83-1854) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants, Alliance]. Plaintiffs, using first amend-
ment Supreme Court decisions as a point of reference, argued that "the phrase 'protected by 
the First Amendment' is a term of art with a well-defined meaning encompassing all advocacy 
that is not likely to and intended to lead to imminent criminal activity." Brief for American 
Civil Liberties Union at 8, Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187 (7th 
Cir. 1984), rev'd 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Nos. 83-1853, 83-1854) [hereinafter 
Brief for ACLU, Alliance]; see notes 293-299 infra. 
250. See notes 265-267 irifra and accompanying text. 
251. See notes 259-264 infra and accompanying text. 
252. National Audubon Society concerned the authority of the Secretary of Interior under 
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). Although neither side disputed that the 
Secretary could defer construction of a public works contract either to undertake environmen-
tal impact studies or to permit Congress an opportunity to further study the project, sharp 
disagreement existed as to whether the Secretary, under NEPA, could unconditionally delay 
construction of a previously approved project until Congress again addressed the issue. The 
government argued that "NEPA [only] gives the Secretary discretion to defer construction of 
an authorized project for a reasonable period of time so that Congress may consider alternatives to 
the project." Brief for Federal Appellants at 26, National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 
299 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Nos. 81-1641, 81-1763) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Brieffor Federal 
Appellants, National Audubon Soc'y ]. Countering this argument, the National Audubon Society 
alleged that "[i]fthe Secretary has the ability to defer project activity at all, he should certainly 
be able to continue that deferral until the objectives ofNEPA [that underlie the agreement] 
have been attained, or until Congress has determined that he should proceed." Brief for 
National Audubon Society at 30, National Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (Nos. 81-1641, 81-1763) [hereinafter Brief for National Audubon Society, Nat'[ 
Audubon Soc'y]. 
Appellate briefs in Citizens for a Better Env't also framed their arguments around a statutory 
question. They focused upon whether the challenged consent decree provisions created addi-
tional obligations for the EPA beyond those required by the Clean Water Act. Compare Brief 
for Appellants American Iron and Steel Institute at 28-31, Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gor-
such, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Nos. 82-1365-68, 1673-76, 1770-73) [hereinafter Brief 
for Industry Intervenors, Citizens], with Brief for Federal Appellees at 18-24, Citizens for a 
Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Nos. 82-1365 etc.) [hereinafter Brief 
for Federal Appellees, Citizens]. 
Adams is one other case in which the government emphasized questions of statutory in-
terpretation. In its effort to nullify the 1977 consent decree, the government argued that 
"neither the language of those provisions [on which the decree is based], their legislative 
histories, nor cases construing similar legislation support the pervasive regulation embodied 
in the district court's [enforcement of the consent decree]." Brief for Appellants at 37-38, 
Adams v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Nos. 83-1516, 83-1590) [hereinafter Brieffor 
Appellants, Adams]. This issue was not explicitly addressed in the civil rights plaintiffs' brief, 
although much of that brief concerned the executive's failure to enforce those statutes. Brief 
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sional actions, 253 presumptions regarding the resolution of ambiguities 
in executive contracts, 254 distinctions between stipulations of settle-
ment and consent decrees, 255 and the significance of related court deci-
sions.256 Significant (and frequently novel) as these issues may be, our 
for Appellees at 63-64, Adams v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Nos. 83-1516, 83-1590) 
[hereinafter Brief for Appellees, Adams]. 
253. Two cases that raised this issue are Board of Education of Chicago II and Citizens for a 
Belter Environment. The significance of a 420 million dollar appropriations rider enacted in 
response to the district court's decision to freeze 420 million dollars of federal education 
funds was at issue in Board of Education of Chicago II. For a discussion of these measures, see 
De\ins & Stedman, supra note 193, at 1282-84. Referring to debates surrounding this appro-
priation, the United States argued that Congress intended its appropriated education funds to 
benefit school children throughout the nation. Brief for United States at 52-59, Board of Educ. 
of Chicago II, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984) (No. 84-2405) [hereinafter Brieffor United States, 
Board of Educ. of Chicago II]. The Board, while not disputing this claim, contended that 
"[n]othing in the plain language or legislative history of these provisions reflects any Con-
gressional determination affecting the availability of funds to be provided to the Board." 
Brieffor Board of Education of Chicago at 57, Board of Educ. of Chicago II, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (No. 84-2405) [hereinafter Brieffor Board of Education of Chicago, Board of Educ. 
of Chicago II]. For further discussion of the issue of whether courts should view appropriations 
riders as substantive legislation, see Devins, Appropriations Riders as Substantive Legislation (man-
uscript in preparation). 
Citizens for a Better Environment raises another interesting question pertaining to congres-
sional review of consent decree settlements. In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Water 
Act, in part because of the use of consent decree settlements to rectifY the alleged delin-
quency of the EPA. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1238-44 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). The government contended that such congressional awareness effectively 
codified the consent decree. By contrast, industry appellants argued that Congress did not 
concern itself with those consent decree provisions limiting EPA discretionary authority. Com-
pare Brieffor Federal Appellees at 46, Citizens, supra note 252, with Brieffor Industry-Interven-
ors at 47-49, Citiuns, supra note 252. See also Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for 
Legulative Intent: A Venture into Speculative Unrealities, 64 B.U.L. REv. 737 (1984). 
254. For a general discussion of the executive's contractual obligations, see notes 58-79 
supra and accompanying text. At issue here is whether consent decrees should be interpreted 
so as not to infringe on the executive's article II policymaking responsibilities. The executive 
raised this argument in Board of Educ. of Chicago II, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984). In that case, 
the United States tried to sway the Seventh Circuit to read the settlement agreement narrowly 
because 
[t]o the extent that the district court read into the consent decree, by implication, any 
such constraints on the President's constitutional powers, its strained interpretation 
must give way to one more reasoned-one that does not seek to invade the exclusive 
province of the President-if the decree is to survive. 
Brief for the United States at 35, Board of Educ. of Chicago II, supra note 253. In response to this 
argument, the school board contended that to entitle the government to "read out of consent 
decrees any provision that the government later finds burdensome . . . would undermine 
respect for the rule oflaw, and deprive both citizens and the government of the benefits of 
settling litigation." Brieffor Board of Education of Chicago at 39, Board of Educ. of Chicago II, 
supra note 253. 
255. Stipulations of settlement function as stays on litigation, not as permanent settle-
ments. See Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEo. LJ. 1241 (1985). In Na-
tional Audubon Soc)·, the parties entered into a hybrid agreement. The National Audubon 
Society agreed to suspend litigation pending the introduction of legislation by the Secretary 
oflnterior. See National Audubon Socy, 678 F.2d. at 301. Viewing the arrangement as tentative, 
the United States claimed that "[i]t is time to declare the Stipulation dead so that Secretary 
Watt may have available to him the full range of discretion to which he is entitled ... and so 
that all parties may press forward to a conclusion of this litigation on the merits." Brief for 
Federal Appellants at 20-21, National Audubon Soc':;, supra note 252. 
256. In Adams, the government sought modification of the decree because "[j]udicial 
decisions since 1977 ... establish that th[e] conception ofhow these statutes [which underlie 
HeinOnline -- 40 Stan. L. Rev. 256 1987-1988
256 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:203 
focus is limited to questions involving the article II responsibilities of 
the executive and the authority of the courts under article III. Most of 
the briefs did address the constitutional issues. 257 In their simplest 
form, the arguments pitted the sanctity of contracts against the article 
II responsibilities of the executive in our tripartite governmental 
scheme. 
The United States argued that "it is within the exclusive authority of 
the President to propose, support, oppose, sign, or veto legislation, as 
he and only he deems necessary and expedient."258 To the extent that 
the consent decree] work is wrong and that the purpose of the consent decree is outdated." 
Brief for Appellants at 65, Adams, supra note 252. The plaintiffs asserted both that there had 
been no change in decisional law and that "even if the decisional precedent upon which an 
injunction is based is overruled, the injunction is not to be vacated." Brief for Appellees at 
47, Adams, supra note 252. Without addressing the question of whether there was a change in 
decisional law, it is worth noting that such a change in all likelihood constitutes sufficient 
justification for the modification of a consent decree. 
257. Briefs in Alliance to End Repression did not directly raise the issue. Instead, these 
briefs focused on the analogous issue of whether, for purposes of consent decree interpreta-
tion, a presumption should exist that government would not contract away discretionary poli-
cymaking authority. Arguing that contracts should be construed in the public interest, the 
United States contended that "[t]here is unquestionably a significant public interest in the 
ability of the government to 'safeguard[] its own capacity to function ... [in order] to preserve 
the security of its people .... " Brief for Appellants at 43, Alliance, supra note 249 (quoting 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972)). Also noting that 
limitations on domestic security investigations run "contrary to its constitutional obligation" 
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, the United States claimed that the Alliance to 
End Repression consent decree "must be construed in light of the strong public policy consider-
ation of that fundamental governmental obligation." I d. at 44. Appellee American Civil Lib-
erties Union ("ACLU") argued that public policy considerations supported the agreement. 
Specifically, the ACLU noted the interest both in settlement and in preventing the sort of FBI 
misconduct that spurred on this litigation. Brief for ACLU at 26-29, Alliance, supra note 249. 
The one case in which the government took a different approach is Citizens for a Better 
Environment, where the United States, after unsuccessfully seeking District Court deletion of 
those provisions of the decree not expressly mandated by statute, claimed that the consent 
decree was a "classic settlement." Although not reversing itself on this issue, the United 
States asserted that it chose not to appeal this ruling because of "a wide array of factors 
including consideration of factors outside the confines of this litigation." Brief for Federal 
Appellees at 51, Citizens, supra note 252. In its appellate brief, however, the United States 
advanced arguments inconsistent with its earlier position. Most notably, the government 
claimed both that the decree did not impermissibly intrude into EPA affairs and that, "in 
many respects, the decree was an accommodation to EPA's discretion." I d. at 40. In fact, the 
United States argued that "[t]he government's ability to negotiate such settlements may often 
depend-as it did in this case-on its ability to be bound, through a consent decree, to take 
certain discretionary actions." Id. at 43. 
This argument is blatantly inconsistent with the EPA's earlier position in this case-a 
position that EPA claims (in the same brief) to be correct. Also remarkable is the fact that 
EPA would make such an argument when environmental plaintiffs had threatened to bring 
contempt proceedings against EPA because of their alleged "dissatisfaction with the agency's 
strategy." Id. at 50. Moreover, EPA's position is inconsistent with the government's position 
in analogous cases. This inconsistency was highlighted in Industry-Intervenors brief in Citi-
zens for a Better Environment. Brief for Industry-Intervenors at 49-51, 54-57, Citizens, supra note 
252. Referring to the government's position in National Audubon Soc'y, industry intervenors 
noted that "the Government stated flatly that the judicial order embodying the stipulation in 
question was no longer binding because 'the judicial branch is without power to command the 
executive branch to exercise its discretionary powers in any particular manner.' " Id. at 50 
(quoting Brief for Federal Appellants at 17, National Audubon Soc'y, supra note 252). 
258. Brief for United States at 61, Board of Educ. of Chicago II, supra note 253. 
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consent decrees regulate "the President's constitutional authority to 
recommend to Congress such measures as he believes proper," they 
interfere with "the political discourse that is vital to the day-to-day rela-
tionship between the Executive and Legislative Branches of govern-
ment."259 In addition to the president's plenary authority in activities 
directly affecting legislative-executive interaction, government briefs 
invoked the president's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws 
and urged that this responsibility provides constitutional protection for 
the implementing discretion of administrative agencies.260 The gov-
ernment insisted that enforcement of consent decree settlements can-
not be tolerated when such enforcement "effectively freezes [a] 
regulatory scheme into place, denying the agencies the flexibility to 
shift approaches due to changing circumstances or even to profit from 
their experience."26I 
Claiming that one administration cannot bind a successor adminis-
tration in the exercise of its discretionary power, the United States ar-
gued that "[w]here the laws leave room for the exercise of discretion, 
the executive branch must be free to implement those laws in a manner 
that is consistent with its own policies."262 In this spirit, the United 
States contended that dissatisfaction with discretionary public policy 
decisions263 should be addressed at the polls, not the courts: 
[T]he Constitution provides for Presidential elections every four years, 
and for the appointment of agency and department heads by the Presi-
dent. New Directors and Secretaries are entitled to make judgments 
about how to operate their agencies . . . . These fundamental demo-
cratic precepts do not permit officials to mortgage their responsibilities 
by entering into consent orders tying their successor's (sic) hands in 
the overall management of the agency.264 
259. Id. at 33-34. 
260. Brief for Appellants at 48-49, Adams, supra note 252 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. NRPC, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 
279, 290 (1965)). In its Adams brief, the United States sought to support this claim on two 
grounds, namely: (l) "'[A]gencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and 
to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous 
duties' " and (2) "the day-to-day management of that administrative process-including de-
termining how long it takes to investigate a given case and to prepare reasoned findings, when 
negotiations are no longer fruitful, and how much time is necessary to take a case to enforce-
ment-is an executive function." Id. 
261. /d. at 53. As stated by the government in Adams: "This proceeding no longer em-
bodies a controversy between particular injured plaintiffs and the government; it has become 
an endless judicial receivership of the civil rights enforcement functions of two large agen-
cies." Id. at 58. 
262. Brief for Federal Apellants at 18, National Audubon Soc'y, supra note 252. 
263. On matters mandated either by statute or the Constitution, the government recog-
nizes that a court may order, or an agency may agree to, a change in executive practices. See, 
e.g., Brief for Appellants at 64 n.62, Adams, supra note 252. 
264. /d. at 63-64. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984), a change in administration may 
support executive branch reassessment of predecessor policies. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by 
HeinOnline -- 40 Stan. L. Rev. 258 1987-1988
258 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:203 
Related to these concerns, the United States argued that article III 
courts are without authority either to enter or enforce executive con-
sent decree settlements that impinge on protected policymaking discre-
tion. Citing System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees' Department v. 
Wright, 265 the government argued that a court could not enter consent 
decree settlements broader than that which a court could order in adju-
dicating the case if it had gone to trial. 266 The brief for the United 
States in the 1984 Chicago Board of Education case asserted: "The 
President's decisions to support or oppose legislation, his provision of 
assistance to Members of Congress, and his communications ·with Con-
gress are not subject to judicial inquiry and no contract, consent decree 
or court order could, consistent with the Constitution, subject such de-
cisions to judicial inquiry."267 
The plaintiffs in these cases saw the matter differently, of course. In 
addition to challenging the government on both the scope of executive 
branch discretion and the authority of article III courts, plaintiffs em-
phasized the sanctity of contracts, the public interest in the efficient set-
tlement of lawsuits, and the integrity of the judicial process. 
Plaintiffs advanced numerous arguments to rebut the government's 
claims about the separation of powers. Some briefs boldly dismissed 
such claims altogether: "Article II, Section 3 merely establishes the 
Executive's ability to recommend matters to Congress; it does not ad-
dress the accountability of the Executive Branch for its failure to meet 
an obligation to do so."268 On another level, plaintiffs, by defining sep-
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the 
philosophy of the administration.") (footnote omitted). 
265. 364 U.S. 642 (1961); see notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. 
266. An analogous argument was made in Adams: Courts should be circumspect in their 
dealings with other branches of government (even in the approval of executive-crafted con-
sent decrees) because of concern about the " 'proper-and properly limited role of the courts 
in a democratic society.'" Brieffor Appellants at 63, Adams, supra note 252 (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). 
267. Brieffor the United States at 62, Board of Educ. of Chicago II, supra note 253 (citations 
omitted). Pointing to the fundamental equitable requirement of a fit between remedy and 
violation, the United States further argued that if it had agreed in a consent decree "to restrict 
the President unconstitutionally in his dealings with Congress or to commit unlimited finan-
cial assistance in contravention of its legal authority," a court would be obligated to invalidate 
the decree. /d. at 65 (citation omitted). 
The most extensive presentation of the judicial authority issue was contained in Industry-
Intervenors' brief in Citizens for a Better Environment. In instances where Congress has granted 
the executive discretionary authority, " 'a court may not compel an administrative agency to 
pursue a particular course of action when another is open to it.' " Brief for Industry-Interven-
ors at 22, Citizens, supra note 252 (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 
543 F.2d 757, 833 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). Although the executive may play a substantial role 
in drafting a settlement agreement, the brief notes that the entry and modification of a con-
sent decree is ajudicial act. /d. at 21. To support their claim, the intervenors cited a number 
of court cases concerned with the judiciary's limited role in the operation of government. See 
id. at 21-27, 32-34, 51-54. 
268. Brieffor Board of Education of Chicago at 74, Board of Educ. of Chicago II, supra note 
253. 
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aration ofpowers as interbranch friction,269 contended that the consti-
tutionally mandated balance among the three branches is preserved 
wherever the executive voluntarily enters into a consent decree.270 
Plaintiffs thus viewed the government's separation of powers argument 
as an "effort to create a world where there are no restrictions for ad-
ministrators. . . . The truth, of course, is that new administrations fre-
quently and properly take office with their options limited by the 
actions of their predecessors, by acts of Congress, and by judicial 
decrees."271 
The plaintiffs' arguments about the authority of federal courts fol-
lowed from their view of the separation of powers. Viewing the execu-
tive's initial consent as sufficient to validate a decree, the plaintiffs 
depicted the article III authority issue as concerning only the general 
equitable powers of federal courts. 272 Viewing this power quite 
broadly in the context of private party efforts to force public officials to 
comply with their legal duties, plaintiffs argued that where "a court is 
exercising its equitable powers in a public interest context, there are no 
grounds for a niggling view of the reach of the court's power to grant 
relief. " 273 
Plaintiffs thus argued that the executive, like any private party, is 
bound by its contracts.274 As stated by the civil rights groups in Adams, 
"[i]t shocks the conscience to suggest that the Government ... should 
be less bound than other litigants by the terms of duly promulgated 
consent decrees issued to vindicate federal statutory and constitutional 
269. See Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wxs. L. REv. 
37. But see j. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUI10NAL DEMOCRACY 10 (1984) (sep-
aration of powers ensures each branch the right to develop its own constitutional principles). 
270. There is no disruption of the balance between coordinate branches because 
the Executive Branch properly exercised a constitutionally assigned power when it 
chose to enter the Consent Decree. Having once made this decision, it can hardly be 
said that judicial enforcement of its obligations is an uninvited intrusion into the 
exercise of its powers. 
Brief for Board of Education of Chicago at 70, Board. of Educ. of Chieago II, supra note 253; see 
also Brief for Appellees at 54-55, Adams, supra note 252. The United States, contrary to its 
position in all other cases, argued in Citizens for a Better Environment that "[t]he fact that EPA 
was a prime formulator of the consent decree is highly relevant to the issue of whether the 
decree constitutes a permissible constraint on the agency's discretion." Brief for Federal Ap-
pellees at 39, Citizens, supra note 252. 
271. Brief for Appellees at 59, Adams, supra note 252. 
272. "The district court did not compel the Secretary to elevate environmental concerns 
over all others; it merely ordered him to adhere to a contract in which he agreed to exercise 
his discretion in a certain and permissible manner." Brieffor National Audubon Society at 28 
n.4, Nat '/Audubon Soc)~ supra note 252; see also id. at 18-27, 4 7 -48; Brieffor Board of Education 
at 75-76, Board. of Educ. of Chicago II, supra note 253. 
273. Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council at 20-21, Citizens for a Better Env't v. 
Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Nos. 82-1365, etc.) [hereinafter Brieffor NRDC, 
Citizens]. In Citizens for a Better Environment, consumer group appellees argued that three princi-
ples support broad equity powers in this type of case: (1) equity should rest in the sound 
discretion of the court; (2) where the executive does not comply with his legal duties, specific 
decrees should be favored; and (3) the scope of equitable remedies may be greater when 
public interest concerns are involved. /d. at 19-20. 
274. /d. 
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requirements."275 Taking this argument one step further, the school 
board in Board of Education of Chicago II, noting that a consent decree is a 
final judicial order, contended that the" 'duty of compliance is particu-
larly important when Government officers are involved, for "[t]he 
greater the power that defies the law the less tolerant can this Court be 
of defiance."' " 276 
The final argument advanced by plaintiff groups in these cases con-
cerned the authority of article III courts to execute their orders.277 
This argument looked directly to the judicial role in maintaining checks 
and balances in our constitutional scheme. 278 As the school board 
plaintiffs in Board of Education of Chicago II stated: 
The ability of the Judicial Branch to ensure that lawful judgments 
against the Executive Branch are enforced is critical to a government of 
laws and thus the integrity of our constitutional structure. If the Judi-
cial Branch lacks power to enforce judgments voluntarily entered by 
the Executive Branch ... then the independent and co-equal status of 
the Judicial Branch is endangered.279 
Such arguments regarding the necessary reach of judicial power under 
article III are, of course, the direct counterpart to the government's 
arguments regarding the necessary constitutional autonomy of the ex-
ecutive under article II. With both sides invoking such broad constitu-
tional claims, these cases seemed very promising vehicles for the 
elucidation of basic constitutional principles. But things did not tum 
out that way. 
C. The Decisions 
Despite this extensive discussion of constitutional issues in the 
briefs, none of the appellate decisions in these cases was explicitly 
grounded on a constitutional rationale. In the one case in which the 
plaintiffs clearly prevailed, Ferrell, the appellate court explicitly dis-
avowed the relevance of constitutional considerations.280 The other 
decisions seemed to reflect some degree of judicial sensitivity to the 
constitutional claims of the executive, but the explicitness of this recog-
nition varied considerably. 
275. Brief for Appellees at 48, Adams, supra note 252. 
276. Brief for Board of Education of Chicago at 68, Board. of Educ. of Chicago II, supra 
note 253 (quoting United States v. An Undetermined Quantity, 583 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 
1978) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947))). 
277. Plaintiffs have also noted that public policy favors settlement agreements as a 
means to conserve judicial resources. See, e.g., Brief for National Audubon Society at 48, Na-
tional Audubon Soc'y, supra note 252. 
278. Were the pertinent consent decree void on other grounds, this argument would be 
irrelevant. The United States has not addressed this issue because it considers consent decree 
provisions to be unconstitutional to the extent that they divest the executive of authority to 
exercise discretion. 
279. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Board ofEduc. of Chicago v. United States, 
744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985). 
280. Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Board of Education of Chicago Il,281 
handed down in September 1984, displayed sensitivity to the relevant 
constitutional distinctions and a marked reluctance to articulate them 
as such. Throughout its decision, the court seemed anxious to prevent 
the original consent decree from restricting executive discretion in 
broad policy matters. It achieved this aim by interpreting the decree in 
narrow terms.282 It held that paragraph 15.1 of the original decree-
the agreement to help secure funding for Chicago desegregation ef-
forts-applied only to funds already appropriated. 283 This interpreta-
tion made it unnecessary to question Reagan Administration budget 
recommendations to Congress and the court accordingly vacated the 
district court's directives.284 The court of appeals also rejected the dis-
trict court's finding of "bad faith" in the Education Department's "re-
drafting of administrative regulations limiting grants of Discretionary 
Funds."285 The new regulations-despite their restrictive impact on 
funding for Chicago-reflected "general policy decisions applicable to 
all grantees"286 and had not been "drafted specifically to avoid the 
government's obligations under ~ 15.1."287 The court left open the 
possibility that executive lobbying for specific congressional restric-
tions on funding for Chicago might indeed constitute "bad faith. "288 
But it chided the district court for responding to the earlier riders "by 
ordering a $103.858 million monetary remedy against the govern-
ment" when "it should have been apparent" that this would have elimi-
nated federal desegregation funding for all other school districts in the 
country.289 
On the other hand, the court suggested that the executive might 
properly be subject to a district court order requiring the government 
"either to refrain from specific efforts to make desegregation funds un-
available to the board or to inform Congress about the funding obliga-
tions of the government under the Decree."290 Moreover, the court of 
appeals was willing to enforce the ED's "obligation" to give Chicago 
"top of the list priority"-as the ED was by then promising to do291-in 
281. 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984). 
282. /d. at 1305-06. The Court also relied upon its holding in Board of Educ. of Chicago I 
that the executive can enter into a contract limiting its discretion in the distribution of con-
gressional appropriations. /d. at 1302-04 (citing Board of Educ. of Chicago I, 717 F.2d 378, 383 
(7th Cir. 1983)); see also Devins & Stedman, supra note 193, at 1274-82. 
283. Ferrel~ 744 F.2d at 1305-06. 
284. The court ruled that, because these policy decisions affected all school districts, the 
United States did not violate the decree. /d. at 1307 & n.9. 
285. /d. at 1307 n.lO. 
286. ld. 
287. /d. 
288. /d. at 1307-08. 
289. /d. 
290. /d. at 1308. 
291. /d. at 1305-06. The United States had earlier argued that the Board was not enti-
tled to special status. See Brieffor the United States at 17-20, United States v. Board ofEduc. 
of Chicago, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-2308). 
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processing grant applications under relevant, general funding pro-
grams. Under this ruling, the United States was obligated-for an in-
definite period of time-to give the Chicago school board special 
consideration in ED appropriations decisions.292 
In Alliance to End Repression, 293 the Seventh Circuit interpreted the 
original consent decree so as to avoid interference with the constitu-
tional prerogatives of the executive, although only after an initial deci-
sion generally endorsing the district court's injunction.294 After a 
rehearing en bane, the court held that the consent agreement could 
indeed accommodate the new FBI investigative guidelines. The court 
of appeals candidly acknowledged that it would "resolve all reasonable 
doubts in favor of an interpretation of the guidelines that will avoid 
conflict with the decree. " 295 It then proceeded to argue that the dis-
trict court's literal reading of the consent decree was implausible. 
Stressing "the consequences of alternative interpretations,"296 the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the Justice Department could not have in-
tended to tie "its hands to such an extent; for if it did, it was trifling 
with the public safety of the people of Chicago and maybe even violat-
ing the President's constitutional obligation to 'take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.' "297 The court also stressed the difficulty of 
limiting the effects of the Chicago consent decree (if read literally) to 
that one city since "there is no way to keep a Chicago-nurtured terrorist 
organization in Chicago, any more than the Nazi party could be con-
fined to Munich.''29S While affirming the government's obligation to 
honor many particulars of the consent decree (involving, among other 
things, regular reporting requirements to the plaintiffs in Alliance to End 
Repression), the Seventh Circuit preserved the broad discretion of the 
executive branch over ongoing national policy.299 
292. The appellate court recently clarified its ruling. See notes 327-329 infra and accom-
panying text. 
293. 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
294. !d. at 1010-11. 
295. Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1011. 
296. /d. at 1013. 
297. !d. at 1014 (quoting U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 3, cl. 3). The appellate court noted that it 
granted plaintiffs more than a paper victory. Contending that the district court would do little 
more than slap the FBI's hands if the case had gone to trial, the Alliance court concluded that 
plaintiffs obtained a fair bargain because "only in Chicago must the FBI report on its investi-
gatory activity periodically to civil rights lawyers." /d. at 1016-17. 
298. /d. at 1020. "We doubt that any neutral observer would think it appropriate that 
the FBI should be governed by other than a uniform national set of investigatory standards 
••.. " /d. at 1018. 
299. A due regard for the separation of powers, the flexibility of equity, the ambigu-
ity of the decree, ... the sensitivity and importance of the subject matter, and the 
limitations of judicial competence argues against precipitating a premature confron-
tation between the judicial and executive branches in a setting where inevitably some 
people will say with pardonable exaggeration, that the federal judiciary is playing fast 
and loose with the public safety. 
/d. at 1019. 
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In Adams v. Bell, 300 the District of Columbia Circuit achieved a simi-
lar result by questioning the standing of the various plaintiffs involved 
to maintain such broad-based litigation. In remanding the case to the 
district court for consideration of the standing issue, the court of ap-
peals noted that the government should generally be "granted the wid-
est latitude in the 'dispatch of its own internal affairs' ":301 "[S]uits 
challenging the particular programs agencies establish to carry out 
their legal obligations, rather than specifically identifiable government 
violations of law are rarely, if ever, appropriate for federal court 
adjudication. "302 
In National Audubon Society 303 the District of Columbia Circuit of-
fered a still simpler resolution. Taking note of the "novel and far-
reaching constitutional issues involved,"304 the Court proceeded tore-
interpret the original stipulation so as to avoid addressing these issues 
directly. It held that the original agreement between the National Au-
dubon Society and the Interior Department contained an "implied con-
dition" that the executive's obligation to propose new legislation on 
the affected water project would lapse after Congress had been given a 
"reasonable opportunity" to act on its own. 305 Finding that this condi-
tion had been met, the court of appeals concluded that the Interior 
Department was no longer bound by its earlier agreement and accord-
ingly vacated the district court's injunction against proceeding with the 
North Dakota water project.306 
Only in Ferrell v. Pierce307 did the executive suffer a complete defeat. 
The Seventh Circuit avowedly ignored, rather than rejected, the consti-
tutional arguments in this case. The Seventh Circuit held that the "dif-
ficult constitutional issues" should not be considered because these 
issues were "never presented, directly or indirectly, to the district 
300. 743 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
301. /d. at 43 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (quoting Cafeteria 
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961))). 
302. /d. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 759). 
303. 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
304. /d. at 305 n.12. Although expressing no opinion on this issue, the National Audubon 
Soc'y court noted: 
/d. 
General principles may be drawn from dictum in cases dealing with the constitu-
tional prohibition on state law impairing the obligation of contracts, U.S. Const., Art. 
I, § 10; from cases upholding one Administration's decision to change a policy 
adopted by its predecessors; from cases limiting the power of the judiciary, in the 
absence of any contract, to direct the Executive in the exercise of its discretion; and 
from cases holding that particular contracts made by one Administration are binding 
on its successors. 
305. /d. at 310. Underlying this holding was the court's statutory interpretation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). "Although NEPA may permit the government, in 
its discretion, to postpone implementation of other federal statutes ... it certainly does not 
allow these statutes to be repealed sub silentio at the administrative level." /d. 
306. /d. at 311. 
307. 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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court."308 On the merits, the majority endorsed the finding of the dis-
trict court that the TMAP involved too many disadvantages to be re-
garded as an "equivalent substitute" for the mortgage assignment 
program that HUD had originally promised to maintain.309 This con-
clusion was challenged in a forceful dissent that argued that Congress 
had clearly intended TMAP to supervene the earlier program and 
charged the majority with attempting to "rewrite our nation's housing 
laws" and to "engage in social legislation" by "imposing the [court] 
majority's will for that of Congress."310 But the majority, on its read-
ing of the TMAP legislation, affirmed the district court's refusal to 
modify the original consent decree or to release HUD from its 
requirements. 311 
The appellate decisions in these cases differed considerably in the 
degree to which they acknowledged the constitutionally protected pol-
icy prerogatives of the executive.312 In Alliance to End Repression and 
National Audubon Society, appeals courts interpreted consent decree pro-
visions to favor the government's position so as to avoid constitutional 
conflicts. The Adams court, while not directly addressing the issue, 
seemed concerned about the line between judicial authority and execu-
tive discretion when it remanded the case on threshold standing 
grounds. By contrast, the Ferrell court maintained that the government 
could not raise new constitutional arguments on appeal. Finally, in 
Board of Education of Chicago II, the court sought to steer an ambiguous 
middle course. It ruled that the executive may indeed make long-term 
funding commitments in consent agreements and that courts may en-
force such agreements by ordering the executive not to undertake 
either lobbying activities or administrative policy changes with the spe-
cific intention of limiting such funding commitments. On the other 
hand, the court suggested that such funding commitments should not 
be allowed to interfere with legislative proposals or administrative pol-
icy changes made in good faith with general policy aims. 
V. CRITICAL AssESSMENTs: THE PRICE oF HIDDEN STANDARDS 
Courts often avoid ruling on constitutional claims when cases can be 
308. I d. at 463. In dicta, however, the court indicated that "we doubt that [this constitu-
tional issue] would be so substantial as to require us to ignore the plain language of the 
consent decree." Id. 
309. ld. at 461-63. 
310. Id. at 471 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
311. HUD's implementation of the decree is still subject to a judicial order. Ongoing 
litigation is now exploring the question of whether HUD activities are consistent with decree 
requirements. See Ferrell v. Pierce, 785 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir. 1986). 
312. In Citizens for a Better Environment, the D.C. Circuit, although upholding finding for 
the government, seemed unpersuaded by the intervenors' claim that the executive's discre-
tionary authority is protected by the Constitution. See notes 342-347 infra and accompanying 
text. The Court emphasized the fit between the consent decree and Congress's generalized 
purpose in enacting the Clean Water Act, as well as the fact that the EPA had been a party to 
the decree. Citizens for a Better Env't, 718 F.2d at 1128. 
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resolved on other grounds.313 The concerns of the executive pre-
vailed, at least in part, in four of these five cases, even without any di-
rect ruling in favor of the executive's constitutional claims. Still, these 
cases illustrate the dangers and distortions that can arise when courts 
seek to evade direct acknowledgement of the constitutional limitations 
on consent decrees.314 
The initial posture of all five cases before the appellate courts sug-
gests that the district court judges did not understand these limitations. 
In each case, the district courtjudge had entered a consent decree that 
raised constitutional difficulties. In no case were these questions 
openly considered when the decree was entered. In each case, district 
court judges sought to enforce the decrees in circumstances that 
sharply underscored the constitutional difficulties. But in no case did 
any of the district judges find a constitutional barrier to upholding the 
decree or order in question. None of the appellate decisions provides 
clear guidance to district judges about the potential limits on the au-
thority of district courts to enter or enforce decrees in subsequent 
cases.315 
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Ferrell dismissed the constitutional 
arguments out of hand because they were not directly presented to the 
district court. This dismissal is confusing because, if there are indeed 
constitutional limitations on the authority of the executive to sign away 
its policy discretion in consent agreements, there must be correspond-
ing constitutional limits on the authority of the judiciary to enter or 
enforce such decrees.316 These limitations are not mere technical doc-
trines in the interest of judicial efficiency, like laches or res judicata, 
that may be disregarded in appellate proceedings where not pressed in 
the trial court. These limitations raise fundamental jurisdictional ques-
tions about the authority of any federal court under article III. The 
cavalier dismissal of these questions in Ferrell was an open invitation to 
district judges to proceed with equal disregard of their jurisdictional 
limits. 
The District of Columbia Circuit behaved much more responsibly in 
Adams by raising the standing question on its own initiative. Because 
standing limitations reflect, in part, limitations on judicial authority 
under article III,317 the court of appeals was quite justified in treating 
313. See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at lOll; National Audubon Soc'y, 678 F.2d 
at 306 n.l7. 
314. Citizens fora Better Environment also exemplifies the various devices that a court may 
use to avoid difficult constitutional questions. See notes 342-347 infra and accompanying text. 
315. The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Cleveland Firefighters is likely to exacerbate this 
problem because it encourages the entry of consent decrees without careful judicial scrutiny. 
See notes 28-37 supra. 
316. See notes 24-27, 265-267 supra. 
317. In Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1974), the Supreme Court emphasized that 
standing is a "threshold question in every federal case." See note 177 supra for a brief charac-
terization of the trends in contemporary standing law. See also Brilmayer, The jurispnuience of 
,1.rticle Ill: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297, 310-15 
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the standing issue as fundamental. Standing limitations are designed to 
restrict judicial attention to concrete injuries rather than hypothetical 
issues.318 In cases where the plaintiffs' initial claim is a general demand 
for "appropriate" enforcement of the law, more scrupulous judicial re-
spect for standing limitations might prevent the entry and subsequent 
enforcement of consent agreements that improperly constrain execu-
tive discretion in broad matters of public policy. But standing limita-
tions are notoriously ambiguous and manipulable.319 By comparison, 
limitations on the entry and enforcement of consent decrees derived 
from article II may be far easier to articulate and apply, and they are no 
less fundamental. 
Adams demonstrates the ambiguity and unreliability of standing limi-
tations. The court of appeals remanded the case for a determination of 
whether the plaintiffs were properly accorded standing given the com-
plex facts in the case. Despite an elaborate record comprising dozens 
of proceedings and extending back almost fifteen years, the court of 
appeals was still unable to determine whether the plaintiffs were prop-
erly accorded standing. The court of appeals pointed to the Supreme 
Court's 1984 decision in Allen v. Wright 320 as particularly calling the 
standing of the Adams plaintiffs into question. 321 Allen denied standing 
to a group of parents of black students alleging lax enforcement by the 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") of nondiscrimination requirements 
for tax-exempt private schools. This decision may well prove control-
ling for Adams, but it is still unclear whether Allen represents a broad, 
reliable precedent in the law of standing.s22 
Thus, for example, in a case closely related to Allen decided only the 
year before, the Supreme Court raised no threshold justiciability ques-
tions about the appropriateness of Bob Jones University to challenge 
nondiscrimination requirements that the IRS was not even proposing 
to enforce.323 On the other hand, even if the approach to standing in 
(1979) (defending standing limitations as an essential limitation of the "case or controversy" 
requirement in article III). 
318. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1981). 
319. See Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68, 68 n.3 (1984}, for a list of 
recent commentaries elaborating this complaint. In their complaint, the plaintiffs in Alliance to 
End Repression alleged that the FBI had conducted illegal surveillance and gathered informa-
tion about them. 742 F.2d at 1009-10. 
320. 468 u.s. 737 (1984). 
321. Adams, 743 F.2d at 44. 
322. See id.; cf. Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(holding that Allen does not bar abortion clinics from challenging the tax-exempt status of the 
Catholic Church), a.ffd, In reUnited States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987). 
323. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 n.9 (1983). Technically, 
the standing issue was not raised in Bob Jones University because of a court order prohibiting 
the IRS from granting tax-exempt status pending the resolution of Allen. Bob Jones University, 
however, did raise the threshold issue of adverseness. The Administration asked the Court to 
appoint "counsel adversary" to argue in support of a regulatory scheme that it had once 
repudiated. See generally McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemption 
for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FoRDHAM L. REV. 441 (1984). Moreover, while adverseness 
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Allen is now accorded more respect, Adams might still be distinguished 
from Allen given the factual differences between the cases. The Adams 
plaintiffs purport to represent minority, female, and disabled students 
in institutions regulated by the Office for Civil Rights. The parents in 
Allen acknowledged that their children did not attend the private 
schools regulated by the IRS. 324 Thus, the district court and the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals may feel compelled to accept the 
standing of the Adams plaintiffs after all, and so return to the constitu-
tional difficulties with the consent decree at a later stage. Meanwhile, 
the Office for Civil Rights must still contend with the constraints im-
posed by the 1977 decree. 
The reinterpretation of decrees to avoid constitutional difficulties, 
an approach adopted in other cases, also poses considerable problems. 
In preserving the decree, the courts create uncertainty about the dis-
trict courts' subsequent enforcement authority. In Board of Education of 
Chicago II, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the decree (as apply-
ing only to appropriated funds) allowed the court to vacate the district 
judge's demand that the president seek additional desegregation fund-
ing from Congress for the Chicago schools. But the court of appeals 
did not provide an explicit ruling on whether the decree would be vio-
lated by administration support for particular legislative restrictions on 
funding available to the Chicago schools. 325 
Given the activist tendencies previously displayed by the district 
judge in Board of Education of Chicago II, this evasive ruling opened the 
way for a new round of awkward constitutional confrontations. On re-
mand, the district court interpreted the Seventh Circuit's opinion as 
requiring the Education Department to give priority treatment to Chi-
cago for all federal programs for which it might be eligible. 326 In Au-
gust 1986, the appellate court clarified its earlier ruling and again 
reversed the district court, holding that while the consent decree oper-
ates as a "constraint" on the Secretary's discretion, deference must be 
given to the Secretary unless his actions "reflect[] an absence of serious 
consideration of the Board's needs."327 The appellate court, perhaps 
tiring of its oversight role in this matter, further suggested that it might 
be best to vacate the decree. 328 The court observed: "The history of 
is distinct from standing, the two doctrines are closely related. Without adverseness, it is 
unlikely that the plaintiff actually suffered an injury. That is, how can an agency be sued for 
the effects of a regulatory scheme that it fails to implement? 
324. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 743 (1984). 
325. See notes 290-292 supra and accompanying text. 
326. United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 621 F. Supp. 1296, 1396 (N.D. III. 
1985). 
327. United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago III, 799 F.2d 281, 293-94 (7th Cir. 
1986). Specifically, the appellate court required ED to "maximize the amount of funds going 
to the Board in the same way it would seek to maximize the funds going to any one of a large 
number of priorities competing for their shares of a limited budget." Id. at 293. 
328. /d. at 297 ("the past can and should be undone where ... no amount of funding 
sufficient to implement the Board's plan at an acceptable level can be provided.") 
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this decree is notable not for its success in raising an allegedly segre-
gated school system to a constitutionally acceptable level, but for what 
it has illuminated about the character and limitations of the executive, 
municipal and judicial institutions involved."329 In the end, it is quite 
possible that much fruitless litigation could have been avoided if the 
Seventh Circuit had faced the constitutional issues directly, ruling 
clearly from the outset on the impropriety of judicial interference with 
the executive's legislative recommendations and general policy 
decisions. 
The decisions in Alliance to End Repression and National Audubon Society 
provide graphic illustrations of a different problem involved in reinter-
preting consent decrees to avoid constitutional difficulties. In both 
cases, appellate courts exercised a highly questionable creativity in 
their reading of the decrees. In Alliance to End Repression, the Seventh 
Circuit speculated at length on what would have constituted a reason-
able "bargain" for the Justice Department to have struck with the plain-
tiffs and relied heavily on these speculations without citing any 
evidence from the actual record in the case to justify its conveniently 
loose interpretation of the agreement.330 In National Audubon Society, 
the District of Columbia Circuit discovered an "implied condition" in 
the plaintiffs' agreement with the Interior Department, but did not cite 
any direct evidence in the record to support this finding.331 Both deci-
sions seem to flaunt the Supreme Court's admonition that "the scope 
of a consent decree must be discerned within its four comers."332 Both 
also seem to disregard the principle that district court factfinding 
should be accorded substantial deference in appellate review. However 
sympathetic one may be to the immediate policy concerns underlying 
these creative appellate rulings, the appellate courts went too far in 
placing their own preferences above the plain language of these "ex-
traordinary" decrees.333 Moreover, if applied in more traditional con-
texts, their rulings would suggest that the government may improperly 
shirk its legitimate contractual obligations whenever a judge deems it 
convenient to allow such breaches.334 
329. /d. at 283. 
330. See 742 F.2d at 1023-25 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
331. 678 F.2d at 311. 
332. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). In National Audubon 
Society, this concern is heightened because the appeals court could have invalidated the agree-
ment as being inconsistent with the underlying statute. In a concurring opinion, Judge Mack-
innon addressed the scope of permissible relief available to environmental plaintiffs under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). He stated that 
the agreement should have been vacated because plaintiffs, "by indirect means, [have] at-
tempted to enforce a substantive environmental mandate allegedly based on the NEPA that is 
not authorized by the terms of the law." 678 F.2d at 314 (MacKinnon,J., concurring) (em-
phasis in original). This approach is quite sound, for it directly confronts the underlying 
issues of executive and judicial authority on statutory grounds. 
333. Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1010. 
334. Many of these criticisms can be found in Rademaker, Alliance to End Repression v. 
City of Chicago: judicial Abandonment of Consent Decree Principles, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1675, 1689-
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To be sure, courts often deliberately choose less plausible legal con-
structions in order to preserve statutes or other legal instruments from 
constitutional infirmities.335 But this strategy is much less justified 
when courts fail even to articulate the constitutional obstacles they are 
trying to avoid. From the standpoint of fairness to the litigants, the 
approach taken in decisions like Alliance to End Repression and National 
Audubon Society may actually threaten the "worst of both worlds." On 
the one hand, these decisions undermine confidence in the impartial 
enforcement of agreements with the government. On the other hand, 
by failing to clarify the constitutional limits on such agreements, these 
decisions do not provide notice to future litigants of which agreements 
·will carry the risk of evisceration by creative construction. 
In sum, these cases generally display a disturbing failure to come to 
grips with the obligations of contracts, the policy prerogatives of the 
executive under article II, and the limits on judicial power under article 
III. Faced with serious and novel issues, these courts practiced "issue-
avoidance" and offered little guidance to lower courts and future pro-
spective parties to consent decrees on the central constitutional 
questions. 
VI. PRACTICAL CoNSIDERATIONS: THE BENEFITS 
OF EXPLICIT STANDARDS 
We have argued that the courts should recognize definite constitu-
tional limits on the enforcement of consent decrees to which the federal 
government is a party because the Constitution reserves certain policy 
prerogatives to the independent judgment of the executive. Where 
courts do not otherwise have the power to preempt executive discre-
tion, they cannot acquire this power, even through the express "con-
sent" of the executive. The executive cannot delegate to the judiciary 
those constitutional responsibilities entrusted to it any more than it can 
delegate these responsibilities to private parties. 
There is no significant body of case law testing or defining the con-
stitutional limits on the authority of courts to regulate the exercise of 
executive power because courts rarely issue elaborate direct orders to 
federal executive agencies over the objections of agency officials. Now 
the constitutional limits on judicial authority over the executive have 
finally been placed at issue in the context of consent decrees. But the 
issue has only now come into focus because agencies commonly negoti-
ate settlement agreements in advance of a judicial judgment on the 
merits. Even when litigation continues through a judgment on the 
merits, courts frequently ask executive agencies to negotiate the details 
1711 (1986) (student author). This note, however, concludes that the principle of govern-
ment adherence to contractual obligations outweighs possible separation of powers problems. 
335. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979). 
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of the remedial orders. 336 By shifting responsibility for the content of 
decrees back to the executive-or allowing the executive to take this 
responsibility on its own shoulders-courts may imagine that they are 
displaying more respect for the separation of powers or allowing more 
scope for administrative expertise. But the consent of executive offi-
cials to particular orders cannot save the decrees from constitutional 
difficulties. And at a practical level, such consent may compound the 
potential for abuse. 
The absence of clearly articulated and acknowledged limitations on 
the permissible scope of government consent decrees, and on the au-
thority of courts to enter and enforce such decrees, invites abuse on 
several levels. First, this absence invites federal agencies to placate par-
ticular parties at the expense of their broader policy responsibilities to 
the general public. Second, it invites federal agencies to evade proper 
accountability by securing a judicial imprimatur for their own disputa-
ble policy choices. Finally, it threatens democratic accountability in a 
different way by allowing one administration to bind its successors. 
Each of these dangers can be illustrated by some of the cases we have 
already examined. 
A. Placating Particular Parties 
In the Chicago school board case, the Carter Administration negoti-
ated a rather remarkable settlement agreement. Having previously de-
manded more encompassing plans to reassign students in the Chicago 
school system, the Carter Justice Department agreed to a different ap-
proach and promised to help secure federal financing for the new plan. 
The timing of this settlement (September 1980) strongly suggests that 
the Carter Administration was anxious to end its longstanding dispute 
with Chicago officials in advance of the 1980 presidential elections. 337 
Whatever the merits of that desegregation agreement as a particular 
instance of civil rights policy, the agreement had the effect of mortgag-
ing a large share of Education Department funds that might have been 
better spent elsewhere in an era of general spending constraints. Such 
distortions in the allocation of government resources are inevitable, 
however, if there are no limits to what agencies may promise in their 
eagerness to settle particular cases. 
This misallocation can be even greater when the government, as a 
defendant, is tempted to settle suits brought by public interest plaintiffs 
that directly concern large national policies. That is, of course, what 
happened in Ferrell v. Pierce, where HUD mortgaged its future flexibility 
336. See, e.g., American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972) 
(district court issued elaborate findings of inadequate enforcement by FDA and then simply 
appealed to the parties for help in constructing a remedial order). 
337. For a critical account of the circumstances of this settlement that hints at political 
calculation, see j. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S REPORT FROM THE WHITE 
HousE AND THE CABINET 228-29 (1981); see also Devins & Stedman, supra note 193. 
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in the administration of a complex housing program by agreeing to a 
particular set of standards to settle a suit brought by a handful of pri-
vate program beneficiaries.338 The government, like any defendant, al-
ways faces time and resource pressures to settle cases rather than 
continue with long and costly litigation. These pressures cannot be 
avoided and voluntary settlement is, no doubt, often a desirable and 
efficient mode of resolving legal disputes. But in suits involving broad 
questions of public policy, there may also be peculiar political pressures 
to settle quickly and avoid prolonged controversy or bad publicity.339 
In such cases, it is peculiarly important to set limits on what the execu-
tive may bargain away, lest public policy be permanently fixed by short-
term political expediencies. 
B. Evasion of Policy Responsibilities 
One difficulty with freezing the policy decisions made at a particular 
moment is that government officials cannot always anticipate future 
needs or circumstances at the time decrees are negotiated. But short-
sightedness is not the only risk involved in overly broad consent agree-
ments. What must also be balanced against the interest in securing 
quick and amicable settlements is the public interest in maintaining ac-
countable government. As they constrain policy discretion, legal com-
mitments may also reduce political responsibility for government 
officials: What is required by consent agreement or court orders need 
not be othenvise justified or rethought by agency officials. Thus the 
government may not challenge or resist an improper decree even in 
later years when its constraints become more burdensome. 
In truth, "the government" is a legal abstraction. In the real world, 
a variety of officials in different agencies at different levels of authority 
are engaged in continuous pulling and hauling over resources, priori-
ties, and subtle gradations of policy. A consent decree can be an all too 
ready handle for officials at one level to manipulate their superiors or 
rivals-with consequent distortions to the ongoing development ofpol-
icy.340 In the Adams v. Bell litigation, for example, officials of the Office 
for Civil Rights pleaded the demands of the consent agreement to fore-
stall scrutiny and reformist pressures from successive department sec-
retaries, while department secretaries used the litigation to cajole 
larger appropriation requests from the Office of Management and 
Budget.341 
The risks in such inside dealing are starkly illustrated by the 1983 
338. See notes 240-247 supra and accompanying text. 
339. On the general tendency to avoid controversy in regulatory decisionmaking, see 
THE PoLITics OF REGULt\TION 375-78 (J.Q, Wilson ed. 1980). 
340. For a brief discussion of the pressure on agency leaders to conciliate subordinates, 
see E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY TilE BooK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULt\TORY UNREASONA-
BLENESS 181-83 (1982). 
341. See Perspectives on Current Developments, REG., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 5. 
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decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment.342 In 1976, the EPA negotiated a consent agreement with a 
number of environmental groups in a suit challenging the agency's fail-
ure to implement provisions of the Clean Water Act within mandated 
statutory deadlines.343 The agreement pledged the agency to adopt 
certain scientific methodologies and decisionmaking criteria in deter-
mining whether to issue additional regulations and in determining 
whether other pollutants should be included in the regulatory scheme. 
But the agreement also allowed the agency further extensions of time 
in which to act. The settlement was eventually challenged, not by the 
Reagan Administration, but by steel companies, which protested that 
the decisionmaking criteria and procedures involved were not required 
by the statute and would predetermine the results in a manner prejudi-
cial to their interests. 
The court of appeals ultimately upheld this agreement as a fair "bal-
ancing of the equities," although the court conceded that the proce-
dures involved were not mandated by the statute and might have been 
designed othenvise.344 In rejecting the claim of these industry-inter-
venors, the court maintained that its holding did not impinge on the 
agency's discretion to determine the ultimate substance of the regula-
tion. Instead, the court claimed, its holding only "requires EPA to be-
gin the process of formulating regulations . . . and describes a 
methodology to be followed by the agency."345 This attempted distinc-
tion between substance and "methodology" is not at all persuasive, 
however, as Judge Wilkey pointed out in a powerful dissenting opinion, 
and as the Supreme Court has suggested in other cases.346 By resort-
ing to this highly dubious distinction, the court of appeals managed to 
obscure the very serious constitutional problems with the consent de-
cree in Citizens for a Better Environment. 
The most notable feature of the case, however, was the position of 
the government. Because the EPA was still comfortable with the agree-
ment, Justice Department attorneys argued that the agency must re-
main bound by it347 despite contrary arguments advanced by the 
Justice Department in the cases described above! The EPA could cer-
342. 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
343. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 
1976), modified, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 12 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1833 
(D.D.C. 1979). 
344. Citizens for a Better Env't, 718 F.2d at 1125. 
345. Id. 
346. "The consent decree commits the EPA Administrator to certain choices-choices 
as to priorities, choices as to methods, choices as to allocation of resources." I d. at 1133 
(Wilkey, J., dissenting). For a parallel insistence on the substantive implications of court-
ordered procedural requirements, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
347. The decree was characterized by the Justice Department as "an accomodation to 
EPA's discretion" rather than an intrusion on EPA's authority. Brieffor Federal Appellees at 
40, Citizens, supra note 252. 
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tainly have adopted the decisionmaking procedures and criteria in-
volved in the free exercise of its discretion, as the majority opinion 
acknowledged. But the Reagan appointees at EPA found it far more 
convenient to hide behind the constraints of the consent agreement 
than to make this decision on their own authority. 
Allen v. Wright also illustrates these dangers. The plaintiffs sought to 
force the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to impose more demanding 
nondiscrimination requirements on tax-exempt private schools. The 
Reagan Administration eventually succeeded before the Supreme 
Court in its challenge to the plaintiffs' standing.348 But in 1978, the 
IRS had sought to satisfy the plaintiffs by proposing new regulations 
imposing elaborate affirmative action requirements on private 
schools.349 These regulations provoked so much protest and contro-
versy that Congress voted riders to the IRS appropriation in 1979 (and 
in ensuing years), denying the IRS any funds to enforce these proposed 
new requirements. 350 Had the IRS negotiated the substance of these 
regulations in a consent agreement with the plaintiffs, however, instead 
of issuing them on its own authority, it might well have evaded public 
and congressional accountability on the matter. The legislative history 
of the appropriation riders makes it clear that Congress was quite reluc-
tant to interfere with already existing judicially sanctioned decrees.351 
C. Shortcircuiting Electoral Accountability 
Excessive diffusion of authority and consequent vulnerability to spe-
cial interest pressures are endemic problems in American govern-
ment. 352 The Supreme Court has frowned on direct delegation to 
private parties of governmental standard-setting powers.353 But at 
least since the 1930s, political scientists have charged that, in one pol-
icy sphere after another, federal authority has been unduly influenced 
by organized special interests. 354 The public interest law movement of 
the 1970s was greatly inspired by this critique. And the broadening of 
access to the courts for public interest challenges was largely inspired 
by the desire of federal courts-as well as Congress-to provide a new 
forum to challenge agency favoritism toward special interests.355 But 
348. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
349. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978), revised at 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979). 
350. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-74, §§ 103, 614, 93 Stat. 559, 562, 576 (1979). 
351. See, e.g., 125 CoNG. REc. S11, 979-80 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (statement of Senator 
Helms, claiming that these riders would "not change the existing law"). 
352. j.M. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FouR-PAR'IY POLITICS IN AMERICA 
(1963) is the most famous of numerous critiques along this line. For a more recent version, 
see Cutler, To Fonn a Government, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1980, at 126. 
353. See notes 110-113 supra and accompanying text. 
354. One of the most powerful and influential contemporary statements of this perspec-
tive is T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, PoLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC Au-
THORITY (1969). 
355. For an early defense of public interest litigation as an antidote to the "capture" of 
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public interest groups, however well-meaning or sincere, may fre-
quently be captivated by highly partisan or highly parochial perspec-
tives on public policy.356 Without clear limits on the extent to which 
they may tie down agency policies with consent decrees, public interest 
groups may simply present a new version of the problem they were ex-
pected to remedy: the delegation of public policymaking authority to 
private interests. 
There is, of course, no easy escape from the problem of special in-
terest pressures in public policy. The Constitution does not create a 
simple system of majority rule, but a complex system of checks and bal-
ances in which several differently constituted bodies all have an equal 
claim to speak for the majority. The complexity of the system obviously 
enhances the bargaining power of marginal constituencies.357 None-
theless, public policy cannot be sensibly governed by an endless scram-
ble among particular, narrow interests, if for no other reason than that 
this sort of scramble is likely to prove self-defeating for most of the 
interests involved. As recent experience with tax reform suggests, par-
ticular interests that strain too hard to secure particular advantages may 
frustrate wider benefits which they themselves might othenvise en-
joy. 358 And wider public interests are likely to be more persistently ad-
vanced by political representatives with a broader political base. The 
president, elected from a far broader voting base than any other elected 
official, is often better situated to speak for the broadest public 
concerns. 359 
Yet, just as government consent decrees can undermine the policy 
responsibility of executive officials by making policy choices appear un-
controllable, these consent decrees can also sever this essential link be-
tween particular policies and the broad signals conveyed by the 
electorate in presidential elections. Thus, the defeat of President 
Carter in 1980 was widely interpreted as a sign of public exasperation 
with excessive federal spending and with heavy-handed, overly intru-
regulatory agencies by "special interests," see Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and The People, 
57 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1971). 
356. See, for example, M. DouGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN EssAY ON 
THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 164-73 (1982) for a characteriza-
tion of the "sectarian" outlook of safety and environmental public interest groups. 
357. As Louis Jaffe noted more than twenty years ago, it is not always easy to distinguish 
" 'special interests' fairly defeated by the political process" from " 'minorities' whose claims 
to equality are being run over rough-shod by .•. conniving majorities .... " L.jAFFE,jum-
CIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 489 (1965). Madison warned that a popular major-
ity could easily "sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights 
of other citizens," and accordingly denounced "a pure democracy" as "admit[ting] of no cure 
for the mischiefs of faction." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-60 ij. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961). 
358. For an elaboration of this theme, see A. MAAss, CoNGRESS AND THE CoMMON Goon 
(1983). 
359. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE PoLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960). 
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sive federal regulation.360 But the consent decrees in Ferrell and Board 
of Education of Chicago II reduced the Reagan Administration's capacity 
to limit spending as the Adams decree reduced the Administration's ca-
pacity to limit regulatory intrusiveness. 
This constraint on the executive is not a problem solely for adminis-
trations claiming a mandate to constrain big government.361 President 
Carter's first Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Joseph 
Califano, sharply criticized the Adams decree for hampering his capacity 
to revitalize OCR through the rearrangement of enforcement priorities 
and resources within the agency.362 More generally, an administration 
committed to a range of major new spending and regulatory initiatives 
might be most resentful of having its hands tied by awkward, competing 
commitments. 363 
In the larger scheme of things, the effect of any particular consent 
decree may seem trivial. But a great many policy decisions can be 
shrugged off on the grounds that no single one makes much difference. 
And this complacency is really the heart of the problem with consent 
decrees that commit the government to general policies: They rein-
force the bureaucratic tendency toward inertia, toward uncritical ac-
ceptance of established policy.364 Elections are supposed to counter 
that tendency, and constitutional principles are supposed to remind 
government officials that even small decisions may implicate large con-
cerns.365 The principle that executive policy must remain open to the 
360. Kiewiet & Rivers, The Economic Basis of Reagan~ Appea~ in THE NEw DIRECTION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 69, 70-71 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1985). 
361. President Carter's 1976 election arguably benefitted from his asserted concern 
about civil rights issues. For an account of the 1976 presidential election stressing the impor-
tance to candidate Carter of very high support from black voters along with a willingness by 
white voters to put aside opposition to busing, see Weissberg, The Democratic Party and the 
Conflict Over Racial Policy, in Do ELECTIONS MATIER? 204-20 (B. Ginsberg & A. Stone eds. 
1986). 
362. J. CALIFANO, supra note 337, at 218-19. 
363. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. 
REv. 1075, 1082 (1986) (emphasizing that even a White House committed to extending regu-
latory controls in certain areas would seek to maintain centralized executive oversight in order 
to determine priorities). Rules and policies determined in litigation are, however, exempted 
from review and approval by the Office oflnformation and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of 
Management and Budget, the principal coordinating mechanism at present. For a contrasting 
perspective, see Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency 
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193 (1981) (arguing that Order 
12,291 violates the separation of powers because the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 
U.S.C.A. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (West 1977), gives plenary informal rulemaking authority to ad-
ministrative agencies). 
364. On the perils oflegalistic inertia, see E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 340, at 93-
119. 
365. The "Court is the institution best fitted to give us a rule of principle, which we 
strive to attain along with the principle of self-rule. Hence principle, called constitutional law, 
is in the Court's charge, and the other institutions are expected to defer to the Court with 
respect to it. Anything else would probably not work." A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 261 (2d ed. 1986). 
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influence of new elections does not invoke a concern that is fanciful or 
purely rhetorical. 
VII. SuMMARY AND CoNCLUSION 
Several recent cases in the courts of appeals have raised-without 
clearly settling-a major constitutional issue: How far may the federal 
government bind its policy discretion in consent agreements? Even if 
consent agreements are regarded as contracts, it does not follow that 
they must always be honored. In cases dealing with ordinary govern-
ment contracts, the Supreme Court has continually held that govern-
ment may not bargain away essential sovereign powers or obligate itself 
as readily as private parties. 366 To the extent that consent decrees are 
regarded as judicially sanctioned remedies rather than mere contracts 
between the parties, 367 the argument for limitations remains equally 
compelling. There must be limits on the extent to which courts may 
preempt the policy discretion vested by the Constitution in the execu-
tive branch. Otherwise, the separation of powers would have no mean-
ing. The limits that courts must respect on their own remedial 
authority cannot be extended by the temporary acquiescence of the 
executive. 368 
Three areas of discretion constitutionally reserved to the executive 
suggest three limitations on what is constitutionally permissible in the 
entry and enforcement of consent decrees. First, the Constitution 
reserves for the president an unrestricted discretion to make (or to 
withhold) legislative and budgetary recommendations to Congress in 
accord with presidential views of the public interest. If courts could 
limit this discretion (or allow the executive to consent to have it lim-
ited), then an essential element in the system of checks and balances 
devised by the Framers could be curtailed by litigation. 369 
Two other limitations relate to implementing discretion within the 
executive branch. Courts, we contend, must not interfere with the dis-
cretion of executive officers in establishing broad spending priorities 
nor with discretion in setting broad enforcement priorities. Consent 
agreements that unduly constrain such discretion must be considered 
unenforceable. Otherwise, courts could not only threaten the authority 
of the executive to adjust administrative priorities to new circum-
stances- including a new political mandate from the voters-but also 
threaten the authority of Congress to influence administrative priorities 
366. See notes 48-66 supra and accompanying text. 
367. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text. 
368. See notes 82-99 supra and accompanying text. 
369. "The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Gov-
ernment into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive and judicial, to assure, as nearly 
as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibil-
ity." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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by varying the scale of annual appropriations.370 
Failure to acknowledge these limitations creates considerable 
hazards for private litigants, for the judiciary, and for the executive. In 
the first place, there is the prospect of uncertainty and unfairness for 
litigants because judges may interpret away agreements upon which the 
litigants once thought they could rely.371 On the other hand, adminis-
trative officials may use consent agreements with outside parties to in-
sulate their policies and priorities from appropriate political controls. 
Both prospects could be substantially reduced if courts forthrightly ac-
knowledged the relevant limitations on their own remedial authority 
and on the permissible scope of consent agreements. 
The argument for preserving executive discretion presupposes, of 
course, that the executive does have lawful discretion in the particular 
case. Executive agencies usually have such discretion in the implemen-
tation of broad statutory programs. But even then, the discretion ac-
corded by statutes is rarely of the ali-or-nothing kind; statutes generally 
limit executive choices regarding implementation policy, while leaving 
some range of choice within these limits for the executive on how and 
when to act. 372 How, then, can courts prevent executive agencies from 
making unlawful choices without constraining legitimate discretion? 
Or, to state the problem from the standpoint of a would-be plaintiff, 
how can there ever be a successful challenge to the adequacy of imple-
mentation if the courts will not direct or sanction a particular course of 
action for the agency involved? 
There is admittedly some awkwardness in allowing challenges to 
agency policies when a "successful" challenge can secure nothing more 
than a directive to the agency to offer a different alternative. It is tedi-
ous, if not faintly ridiculous, for a reviewing court to remand new poli-
cies back to an agency, time after time, with the conscientiously self-
limiting advice from the court that "what you have done (or omitted to 
do) is not acceptable under the statute but we won't tell you what you 
must do." It seems much quicker and easier for the court to ratify 
whatever agreement seems mutually satisfactory to the agency and its 
particular challengers in the initial round of litigation. 
That it seems unfairly burdensome to would-be plaintiffs to deny 
this expedient is perhaps a serious argument against opening courts, in 
the first place, to challenges that do not invoke clearly defined personal 
rights with clear and direct remedies.373 But if we continue to allow 
370. For a forthright statement of the need for "economic" assessments of the "worth" 
of enforcement, implying that appropriations are a means of gauging proper levels of"invest-
ment" in enforcement, see Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic S)'Slem, 98 HARv. 
L. REV. 4, 41-42 (1985). 
371. See notes 330-333 supra and accompanying text. 
372. For a concise statement of this view, see L. jAFFE, jUDICIAL CoNTRoL OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965). 
373. For elaboration of the argument that standing ought to be confined to clear private 
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public interest challenges to broad agency policies, this burden on the 
challengers may simply be the necessary price they-and the judges 
and the executive officials involved-must pay for a system that opens 
so many questions of executive discretion to judicial review. As the 
Supreme Court observed in Chadha, "[I]t is crystal clear [that] the 
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency."374 
And in the larger scheme of things, the preservation of executive 
discretion is not at odds with the cause of good government. Rather, 
our constitutional scheme presupposes that "energy in the executive is 
a leading character in the definition of good government" and sound 
administration.375 This constitutional presumption should not be over-
turned to satisfy the convenience of judges, private plaintiffs, or execu-
tive officials. 
rights, see Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983). 
374. 462 U.S. at 958-59. 
375. "Energy in the executive ... is not less essential to the steady administration of the 
laws" than to "the protection of the community against foreign attacks .... " THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 70, at 423 (Rossiter ed. 1961). 
